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ABSTRACT 
 
Rules of origin are those laws and regulations that are applied to determine the 
country of origin of goods. Upon the importation of a product, each country applies its 
own rules of origin to determine the origin of the product. Such origin rules are 
known as “non-preferential rules of origin”. However, there is another type of rules of 
origin called “preferential rules of origin”. They are used to stipulate whether a good 
is deemed to originate in a preferential trade agreement partner country and 
consequently eligible for preferential tariff treatment.  
Unfortunately, preferential rules of origin have been misused by some 
countries to achieve protectionist, trade-diverting and political objectives. Misusing 
preferential rules of origin can lead to negative results and therefore does not facilitate 
international trade. In addition, the increase in the number of preferential trade 
agreements leads to the proliferation of preferential rules of origin worldwide. Their 
variations, along with their complexity, are considered to be a nightmare for 
producers and traders all over the world. 
Harmonizing preferential rules of origin would eliminate their negative effects, 
thereby helping to liberalize international trade. This thesis discusses the negative 
effects that may result from the misuse of preferential rules of origin and gives 
realistic examples showing how the misuse of rules of origin in different preferential 
trade regimes hinders international trade. Also, the thesis offers the member countries 
of the World Trade Organization a proposed harmonized set of preferential rules of 
origin to be hopefully implemented in the World Trade Organization system. 
Moreover, the thesis theoretically tests the proposal and gives very deep and technical 
details on that. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
“While the primary aim of rules of origin is to ensure that preferences accrue only 
to the signatories of a preferential trade agreement, they are often complex and can act 
as a barrier to trade”1
World War I severed trade relations.  At that time, no international organization 
existed to maintain trade relations or recreate balanced international trade.
 
2   On 
November 11, 1918, Germany surrendered to the Allied nations.3  In 1919, Germany 
and the Allied forces signed the Peace Treaty of Versailles. 4   Under this treaty, 
Germany was obligated to pay war reparations to the Allies, mainly France and Great 
Britain. “These reparations cut into the financial resources of central Europe”.5The 
recovery of Europe’s economy was hindered, the amount of poverty increased, which 
led possibly to the emerging of the Fascist and Nazi movements in Italy and Germany 
in the 1920s and 1930s.6After World War I, Japan was the first country that practised 
protectionism on a very excessive level to protect itself from big markets like the 
United States (US) because it was very difficult for small-sized markets like Japan to 
globally compete and prosper. 7
                                                 
1 Eckart Naumann, ‘Comparing EU free trade agreements - Rules of origin’ [2006] (61) InBrief, 3. 
2 Gale Encyclopedia of U.S. Economic History, ‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt)’ 
(1999) Retrieved June 08, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-
3406400356.html> accessed 13 June 2014. 
3 Harry R. Rudin, Armistice 1918 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967) 320-349. 
4 Koppel S. Pinson, Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization (13th printing edn, New York: The 
MacMillan Co., 1954), p. 397. 
5 Gale Encyclopedia (n 2). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Kerry A. Chase, Trading Blocs: States, Firms, and Regions in the World Economy (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2005) 52, 65-66. 
On the other hand, Great Britain had inefficient 
production firms and its producers suffered from a low rate of the national demand. 
Thus, when Australia, New Zealand, India and Canada started to practise 
protectionism, Britain encountered hindrances when it came to exporting to and 
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selling in Imperial markets.8  Britain therefore tried to protect its firms on a national 
and global level to increase demand for their products.9Before World War II and 
during the period of the Weimar Republic, Germany gave up open trade.10  To have a 
“self-sufficient” economy (autarky), Germany’s New Plan of 1934 continued 
Germany’s introduction of exchange controls that took place in 1931.11Between 1929 
and 1933, Germany practised protectionism mainly in agricultural products.12In 1929 
the Great Depression began and lasted until the early 1940s. The inapt financial 
policies in Europe and the United States and the collapse of the US stock market of 
1929, commonly known as the Wall Street Crash, were the main triggers of the 
Depression. 13 During the 1930s, the practice of protectionism was on the 
rise.14Following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act was 
adopted by the US Congress in 1930.15  The Act raised US tariffs on about 20,000 
imported goods mainly to protect national farmers against competition from foreign 
agricultural imports.16Responding to the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, Italy and Spain 
imposed high tariffs on many US goods.17  Many European countries were affected 
by such action and it led to trade war with the US.18
                                                 
8For instance, in 1931 India increased its tariffs on British cotton fabrics from 3.5 % to 25 %. Ibid, 76. 
9For example, the British automobile industry was in favour of protectionism and the British Dyestuff 
Importation Act was also adopted to increase the tariffs on dyestuffs and, consequently, prevent 
German competition. Ibid, 78. 
10 Kerry A. Chase, ‘Imperial Protection and Strategic Trade Policy in the Interwar Period’ (2004) 11 
Review of International Political Economy 180. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Chase, Trading Blocs: States, Firms, and Regions in the World Economy (n 7) 88. 
13 World Bank, World Development Report 1987 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 139. 
14 Gale Encyclopedia (n 2). 
15 Tariff Act 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1930)). 
16 Mikhel Ruia, ‘Will the Current Parlous State of the Economy Give Rise to Protectionist Sentiment?’ 
[2009] (3) Durham University Investment and Finance Group, 1 
<http://duifg.com/downloads/Market%20Reports/DUIFG%20Market%20Report%20Mar%2009.pdf> 
accessed 13 February 2014. 
17 In June 1930, Italy imposed high tariffs on hats and olive oil.  In July 1930, Spain adopted the Wais 
Tariff which imposed high tariffs on many US goods, such as automobiles, tyres, tubes, motion-
pictures films, cork, grapes, oranges and onions.   
18 World Bank (n 13) 139. 
  Subsequently, Switzerland, 
Canada, Australia, Cuba, Mexico, France and New Zealand participated as well in 
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such trade war.19As a result, the Great Depression worsened and a severe drop in 
international trade took place.20Towards the end of World War II, in July 1944, the 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, known also as the Bretton 
Woods Conference, took place at which the Allies gathered for the purpose of 
establishing institutions that would abolish the economic reasons for wars.21  The 
conference led to the formation of two international organizations, namely the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and the 
International Monetary Fund.22In 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) was established as reaction against the protectionism that had hindered 
international trade and aided the expansion of the Great Depression.23
The GATT held eight rounds of negotiations and succeeded in gradually reducing 
the level of tariffs and urged trade facilitation between its member countries.
 
24The 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was the eighth round (1986-1994). 
It resulted in the conclusion of the Marrakesh Agreement and updated the GATT 
1947 to the GATT 1994.  The GATT 1994 included 12 additional side agreements.  In 
1995, the institutional machinery of the GATT was replaced by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) under the Marrakesh Agreement.25
                                                 
19 Switzerland imposed high tariffs on watches, shoes and embroideries and boycotted imports from the 
US.  In August, 1932, Canada tripled its tariffs on food products, timber and logs. Ibid. 
20 U.S. Department of State, ‘Hawley-Smoot Tariff’ 
<http://future.state.gov/when/timeline/1921_timeline/smoot_tariff.html> accessed 13 February 2014. 
21 Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and 
Peace (Oxford University Press 2006). 
22 Sandra Blanco and Enrique Carrasco, ‘The Functions of the IMF and the World Bank’ (2009) 
UICIFD Bretton Woods Project. 
23 Gale Encyclopedia (n 2). 
24 See Douglas A. Irwin, ‘Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions’ (2002) The Library of 
Economics and Liberty: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/InternationalTradeAgreements.html#abouttheauthor> accessed 13 
February 2014. 
25 World Trade Organization, ‘The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm> accessed 14 August 2014. 
  Today, the WTO acts as the 
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umbrella for about 60 different agreements26 and over 160 countries are members.27
If certain conditions laid down in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 are 
fulfilled, preferential trade agreements may be formed as a discriminatory exception 
to the MFN principle.  A preferential trade agreement is a trade agreement between 
certain countries.  It gives preferential tariff treatment to goods from countries that are 
parties to the agreement.  A preferential trade agreement may be multilateral or 
bilateral.  A multilateral trade agreement is formed between many countries.  A 
 
One of these agreements is the Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
 
1.1    Articles I, III and XXIV of the GATT 1994. 
 
There are two vital principles to the GATT: the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) 
principle and the National Treatment principle.  Pursuant to Article 1 (General MFN 
Treatment) of the GATT 1994, a WTO member country is not allowed to discriminate 
between its trading partners.  Accordingly, when a WTO member country lowers its 
customs duty rate for one of its goods coming from a particular member of the WTO, 
the same shall be done for all other WTO members.   
Pursuant to Article III of the GATT 1994, WTO members are prohibited from 
adopting domestic policies designed to discriminate against foreign imported goods in 
favour of the same or similar locally-produced goods. For example, it is a violation of 
the GATT national treatment principle when a WTO member country imposes 
technical standards on imported goods that are more stringent than on similar 
domestic goods. 
                                                 
26 World Trade Organization, ‘WTO legal texts’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm> accessed 13 August 2014. 
27 World Trade Organization, ‘Members and Observers’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> accessed 13 August 2014. 
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bilateral agreement is formed between two countries.  Moreover, in 1979, the GATT 
adopted the “Enabling Clause” under which unilateral concessions may be made 
when a country unilaterally decides to grant preferential access to certain goods from 
another country or countries, such as the EU (European Union) Generalized System 
of Preferences (GSP) regime.28  About 585preferential trade agreements had been 
notified to the WTO as of June 15, 2014.29Each preferential trade agreement has its 
own rules of origin.30
The last substantial transformation is a concept used to determine the country 
of origin of the good when more than one country is involved in the production of the 
good, i.e. the importation of inputs from one or more country was needed to produce 
the good. The last substantial transformation may be indicated by three possible 
 
 
1.2    Rules of Origin in General. 
 
Rules of origin are those laws and regulations that are applied to determine the 
country of origin of a particular good.  A good is conferred origin if it was wholly 
obtained in the exporting country or has undergone a last substantial transformation 
there. 
A wholly obtained good is a good that is produced entirely in the exporting 
country. It is either a natural product or a good produced from natural product in the 
exporting country, such as minerals extracted from soil or water, live animals, 
harvested vegetables or goods produced thereof.  
                                                 
28 Yong-Shik Lee and others, Law and Development Perspective on International Trade Law (CUP 
2011) 145. 
29 World Trade Organization, ‘Regional Trade Agreements’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm> accessed 9 September 2014. 
30 Except Customs Unions. They do not have preferential rules of origin (illustrated later in this 
chapter). 
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means: the change in tariff classification, the value added or the specific 
manufacturing operation.31
The change in tariff classification method relies on the Harmonized System 
(The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System or the HS).
These three means are also recognized in Article 2(a) of 
the Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
32 The HS 
has been developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO) to classify the goods 
being traded between “all participating countries” by using names and numbers.33 The 
goods in the HS are classified under up to 6-digit codes. However, WTO member 
countries are free to add more digits for more specific classification of products, like 8 
or 10 digits. Under the change in tariff classification method, origin can be conferred 
when a product has undergone a change in tariff classification at the 2, 4, 6 or 8 to 10-
digit levels. While the 2-digit level is called the tariff chapter, the 4-digit level is 
called the tariff heading, the 6-digit level is known as the tariff sub-heading and the 8 
to 10-digit level is called the tariff item.34
 
A change in tariff classification rule of 
origin could look like this: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 World Customs Organization, ‘Rules of Origin –handbook’ 
<http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/overview/origin-handbook.aspx> accessed 15 August 2014. 
32 World Customs Organization, ‘What is the Harmonized System (HS)?’ 
<http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/what-is-the-harmonized-system.aspx> 
accessed 15 August 2014. 
33 The number of countries or economic unions that apply the HS is 207 as of 28June 2014. See the 
World Customs Organization ‘List of Contracting Parties to the HS Convention and countries using the 
HS’ <http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/overview/list-of-contracting-parties-to-the-hs-
convention-and-countries-using-the-hs.aspx> accessed 15 August 2014. 
34 Biswajit Nag and Debdeep De, ‘Rules of origin and development of regional production network in 
Asia: case studies of selected industries’ (2011) Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, 
Working Paper Series 101, 4. 
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Change in tariff classification at the 2-digit level (chapter level): 
Chapter  Tariff heading Tariff Sub-
heading 
Product 
description  
Rule of Origin 
58 5806 5806.31 Other woven 
fabrics: of cotton 
A change to sub-
heading 5806.31 
from any other 
chapter 
Source: Author’s example  
Under the mentioned rule of origin, a manufacturer in an exporting country (country 
A) could produce woven fabrics by using cotton yarn imported from another country 
(country B) which falls under sub-heading 5206.25 of the HS. Thus, according to this 
example, origin would be conferred by a change in tariff classification from chapter 
52 (which includes sub-heading 5206.25) for cotton-yarn to sub-heading 5806.31 
(woven fabrics), i.e. the exporting producer’s woven fabrics would be considered to 
originate in country A. 
 The value added criterion is different from the change in tariff classification 
because it does not rely on the HS when applied. It is in principle very straightforward, 
but often complicated to operate in practice since the methods of valuation differ from 
one agreement to another (discussed in chapter 3). In general, the value added 
criterion could be either the maximum allowed percentage of imported inputs or the 
minimum percentage of local inputs used to produce the good.35
                                                 
35 Joseph A. LaNasa III, ‘An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance of Rules of Origin, and the 
Effectiveness of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Rules of Origin in Harmonizing and Regulating 
Them’ (1996) Jean Monnet Center – NYU School of Law Working Paper 9601. 
The imposition of the 
value added criterion could look like this: 
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Chapter  Tariff heading Tariff Sub-
heading 
Product 
description  
Rule of Origin 
73 7302 7302.10 Rails A maximum import 
content of 40% 
Source: Author’s example 
So if an exporter in country A manufactured rails using inputs imported from other 
countries, the rails would be considered to originate in country A if the value of the 
imported materials was no greater than 40% of the value of the manufactured rails. 
 The specific manufacturing operation method is straightforward in principle, 
just like the value added, but sometimes requires too much technicality related to the 
operation that the product has to undergo. The manufacturing operation test could be 
either positive, by requiring certain materials to have been used or operations to have 
occurred in the exporting country if the goods are deemed to originate there, or 
negative, when the rule of origin prohibits the use of certain inputs or certain 
operations. Sometimes the positive or negative tests are clarified by clear statements 
and sometimes they are clarified by using the change in tariff classification method. 
The following is an example showing what a positive test might look like: 
Chapter  Tariff heading Tariff Sub-
heading 
Product 
description  
Rule of Origin 
61 6103 6103.10 Suits The good (suits) is 
both cut and sewn in 
the territory of the 
exporting country 
Source: Author’s example 
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The following example shows how a manufacturing operation test could rely on the 
change in tariff classification test in a negative state: 
Chapter  Tariff 
heading 
Tariff Sub-
heading 
Product description  Rule of Origin 
90 9002 900211 “Objective lenses: For 
cameras, projectors or 
photographic 
enlargers or reducers” 
“Change to 
subheading 900211 
from any other 
subheading, except 
from heading 9001” 
Source: Author’s analysis based on the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic 
Agreement (ANZCERTA) Annex G: Product Specific Rules of Origin 
 
900211 is the sub-heading number under which the product is classified. The first two 
digits (90) represent the chapter. The first four represent the tariff heading (9002). 
According to the table, the product (objective lenses) classified under sub-heading 
900211 could be conferred origin when goods classified under any other sub-heading 
are used in its production, except goods classified under heading 9001 (negative test). 
Upon the importation of a product, each country applies its own rules of origin to 
determine the origin of the product.  That is why rules of origin differ from one 
country to another. Such rules of origin are known as “non-preferential rules of 
origin”.  Non-preferential rules of origin are mainly used for gathering trade statistics, 
government procurement, carrying out origin marking and labeling requirements, and 
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the application of trade policy instruments such as anti-dumping duties, 
countervailing measures and quantitative restrictions.   
However, there is another type of rules of origin called “preferential rules of 
origin”.  Preferential rules of origin deal with preferential trade agreements. They are 
used to stipulate whether a good is deemed to originate in a preferential trade 
agreement partner country and consequently eligible for preferential tariff treatment.   
 
1.3    Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Agreements. 
 
There are two kinds of preferential trade agreements, agreements establishing Free 
Trade Areas and agreements establishing Customs Unions (CUs). A Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) is an agreement under which two or more countries agree to grant 
each other tariff free access for goods being traded between only them.  However, 
each party to the agreement is imposes tariffs on the goods imported from countries 
which are not members of the free trade area (third countries).  In FTAs, each member 
maintains its own restrictions on trade with third countries.  Therefore, the external 
tariff of a member can be different (lower or higher) from the external tariff of 
another member of a FTA.  That is why if lax rules of origin are imposed in a FTA, 
trade deflection (or the transshipment of goods) could take place.  Trade deflection is 
the export of goods from a third country to a member of a FTA via the member of the 
FTA imposing the lowest external tariff in order to benefit from the FTA preferences 
when entering the market(s) of first member which imposes a higher external tariff. 
So, for example, in a FTA one member, country A, charges 10% customs duty on 
imported cars and another member, country B, charges 30%, and there were no rules 
of origin governing trade between members of that FTA, an exporter of cars in a third 
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country might find it cheaper to export cars to country B by exporting the cars first to 
country A, where it pays 10% duty and then re-exporting the cars duty free from 
country A to country B, thereby circumventing country B’s 30% duty. This 
phenomenon is known as a deflection of trade. Preferential rules of origin between 
members of a FTA are designed to prevent such deflections of trade. 
A CU is formed when two or more countries agree to grant tariff free access to 
goods traded between them and apply a common external tariff to goods imported 
from non-members (third countries).  In other words, unlike FTAs, all of the CU 
members agree to impose the same (not different) tariff rates on imports coming into 
the CU which leaves no room for deflection of trade to take place.  Thus, there is no 
need for preferential rules of origin in CUs when it comes to internal trade (within the 
trade area) because of the common external tariff. 
FTAs and CUs can be multilateral, such as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and the European Union Customs Union, or 
bilateral, such as the US-Singapore Agreement and the Switzerland-Liechtenstein CU. 
 
1.4    Addressing the Thesis Issue. 
 
Although preferential rules of origin play an increasing role and are an 
important issue in international trade because of the number of preferential trade 
agreements, such rules can be used in ways that can obstruct international trade. Even 
though the primary purpose of preferential rules of origin is to identify the 
beneficiaries of tariff preferences, the incidental effect of such rules may be 
protectionist when countries use preferential rules of origin as alternative barriers to 
trade to protect their own national interests and goods susceptible to adverse 
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competition from imports by imposing too stringent rules of origin. Using rules of 
origin as replacement barriers to trade has been called the “Law of Constant 
Protection” by Bhagwati.36
 A country could use the preferential tariff as a bait to induce another to form 
together a preferential trade agreement.  Because of such inducement, sometimes the 
latter country does not pay appropriate attention to the rules of origin when 
concluding the trade agreement. Also, sometimes all members of a preferential trade 
area agree to impose protectionist rules of origin so as to divert trade from an 
economically efficient external source of supply (outside the preferential trade area) 
to an inefficient internal one (within the trade area). In this thesis, efficiency refers to 
the ability to produce a good at its lowest average cost using the fewest resources 
possible. Thus, the efficient producer is the one who is able to produce goods intended 
to be sold to consumers for lowest competitive price. It is to be noted, though, that 
goods may be able to be produced more “efficiently” because in the country of 
production social, safety, and environmental standards are low, e.g., the use of child 
labour, paying women less than men, unsafe machinery, few or no pollution controls, 
etc. This is a big issue that needs a lot of discussion and is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, which is only concerned with the misuse of preferential rules of origin.  
  The formation of preferential trade agreements has its 
positive effects on international trade, which will be explained in the next chapter. 
However, the imposition of too stringent preferential rules of origin in preferential 
trade agreements and the propagation of preferential rules of origin worldwide 
because of the formation of many preferential trade agreements have contributed to 
hindering international trade. 
                                                 
36 Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge, Massachusetts.: MIT Press 1988). See also Simon P. 
Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt, ‘Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization (2000) University of 
Virginia, Department of Economics, Working Paper 340, 1 
<http://www.virginia.edu/economics/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap340.pdf> accessed 13 August 
2014. 
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Accordingly, any further discussions in this thesis related to efficiency will focus on 
the economic value of goods, not the environment of their production.  
Added to the mentioned points, sometimes rules of origin are imposed in 
preferential trade agreements for political purposes. Each of the points is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter II. Examples of all these points are provided in the next chapter 
as well.  
 
1.4.1    Protectionism. 
  
In general terms protectionism is used to make certain that domestic producers 
are protected from adverse competition from foreign producers and from the possible 
avidity of domestic consumers for imported goods. This can happen by the imposition 
of tariffs on imported products, restrictive rules of origin and other trade regulations 
created by governments. Protectionism is the economic policy of shackling trade 
among countries.  With the spread of protectionist motivations, preferential rules of 
origin have been used as protectionist apparatuses.   
A too stringent preferential rule of origin may be costly if it requires a 
producer in a member country of a FTA, when producing the finished product for 
export to another member of the FTA, to source components from within the FTA 
that are more expensive than components from outside the FTA. This makes the 
exported product more expensive than it might otherwise have been, thereby 
providing some protection to producers making the same goods in the importing 
country. Also, a too stringent preferential rule of origin could be complex when it 
requires the producer to comply with complicated production operations within the 
trade area when producing the final product.  In preferential trade systems (in FTAs 
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and unilateral concessions, but not in CUs), rules of origin play a considerable role in 
avoiding trade deflection.  However, too stringent rules of origin are applied in many 
preferential trade agreements not mainly to avoid trade deflection, but for 
protectionist purposes, where the stringency of the rules of origin becomes more than 
that required to avoid trade deflection.  As a result, complying with the indicated rules 
of origin will require costly and/or complex operations to be taken, and hence the 
entry of the sensitive competitive goods under the preferential trade agreements 
preferences to the markets protected by the imposition of the preferential trade 
agreements’ restrictive rules of origin will be shackled.37
Although developing countries usually lack the employment of advanced 
operations when it comes to producing goods, they are characterized by inexpensive 
labour outlays needed during production processes. So, for example, they benefit from 
the production of textiles since excessive expenditure and/or advanced operations are 
unnecessary to set up an enterprise in that industry.
 
38
                                                 
37 Paul Brenton, ‘Enhancing Trade Preferences for LDCs: Reducing the Restrictiveness of Rules of 
Origin’ in Richard Newfarmer (ed), Trade, Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues 
(Washington DC: World Bank 2006) 281-287. 
38 Ibid 283. 
 These factors induce developed 
countries to form a preferential trade agreement with or grant preferences to 
developing countries to encourage investment and the establishment of manufacturing 
firms there.  On the other hand, as aforementioned, the preferential tariff could induce 
the preference-granted country to form a preferential trade agreement with the 
preference-granting country without paying appropriate attention to the rules of origin 
when concluding the trade agreement. As a result, the preference-granting country 
could attempt to protect its domestic products by imposing too stringent rules of 
origin on the competing products of developing countries trying to enter the market of 
the former under accorded preferences. Consequently, complying with the mentioned 
24 
 
rules of origin would require costly and complex operations to be taken by the 
developing country which would prevent it from profiting from the accorded 
preferences and make it exceedingly difficult for its textiles to compete in the market 
of the preference-granting country.  Thus, the developing country might not take 
advantage of the preferences and instead choose to trade with the preference-granting 
country on a MFN basis since this would not charge it the costly and the complex 
operations needed to be taken.  Examples and detailed explanation for the problem of 
using rules of origin as protectionist tools are clarified in Chapter II. 
 
1.4.2    Trade Diversion. 
 
Preferential rules of origin have been used as trade-diverting tools, i.e. 
diverting trade from efficient sources of supply39 to inefficient sources of supply40
                                                 
39 I.e., Producers of cheap goods. 
40 I.e., Producers of costly goods. 
.  
The imposition of stringent rules of origin in preferential trade regimes results in trade 
diversion when a final good producer switches its importation of inputs from an 
efficient external source of supply (located outside the preferential trade area) to a less 
efficient internal one (located inside the preferential trade area) in order then for the 
producer to comply with the preferential trade agreement’s stringent rules of origin 
when producing the final goods and thus trade in such goods under the preferential 
trade agreement’s preferences.  Hence, the imposition of trade-diverting rules of 
origin affects global efficiency negatively since it increases production by inefficient 
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producers in preferential trade areas and shrinks production by efficient third 
countries’ producers.41
Preferential rules of origin vary from one preferential trade agreement to 
another.  Their variations, along with their complexity, are considered to be a 
nightmare for producers and traders all over the world and have led to the so-termed 
“Spaghetti Bowl” phenomenon.
 
 
1.4.3    The Proliferation of Preferential Rules of Origin. 
 
42  For instance, things are complex for a trader whose 
country is a member of a variety of preferential trade agreements that impose different 
preferential rules of origin to be complied with.  Enterprises also face difficulties 
when complying with a diversity of administrative costs provoked by different 
agreements.43
In most cases, the primary purpose for concluding preferential trade 
agreements requires economic cooperation to increase trade between the countries 
parties to such agreements.  However, preferential trade agreements could also be the 
expression of a political purpose. For example, the EU was formed after the Second 
World War for the purpose of achieving peace and prosperity within the EU. 
Therefore, the political ties between countries could affect their trading relations. As a 
 
 
1.4.4    Political Purposes. 
 
                                                 
41 Robert Z. Lawrence, ‘Regionalism and the WTO: Should the Rules be Changed?’ In Schott, Jeffrey J. 
(ed.), The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead (Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC 1996) 52. 
42 Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, ‘The Theory of Preferential Trade Agreements: Historical 
Evolution and Current Trends’ (1996) American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 82-87. 
43 Sanjay Pandey, ‘Spaghetti Bowl Phenomenon and Crucification of Multilateralism: Task Ahead for 
WTO’ (2006) Amity Law School, Working Paper Series 78, 6. 
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result, preferential rules of origin could be used as devices that are designed to pursue 
political aims. 
An example of using rules of origin to achieve political goals is the US 
designation of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) between Egypt and Israel and Jordan 
and Israel for the purpose of supporting peace process in the Middle East. 
Accordingly, Egypt and Jordan have been allowed to export products to the US duty 
free, if the value of Israeli components used to produce the final Egyptian and 
Jordanian products are 11.7 % and 8 %, respectively, of the final product value.44
The negative consequences of using rules of origin as imperative political-aims-
pursuing tools are reflected in the number of the Egyptian manufacturing firms that 
export to the US under the QIZ
  
This raises the question of whether rules of origin were designed for political 
purposes.  Of course not, because international cooperation and peace processes do 
not have anything to do with rules of origin. 
45
Using preferential rules of origin for protectionist and trade-diverting purposes, 
the complexities caused by the proliferation of preferential rules of origin worldwide, 
and the use of preferential rules of origin to pursue political aims are all obstacles to 
international trade. The misuse of preferential rules of origin is what they all have in 
common.  Hence, trade has been hindered and is practised pursuant to different 
 protocol (as will be clarified in Chapter II). 
 
1.4.5    Summary. 
 
                                                 
44 State of Israel Ministry of Trade & Labor, ‘Q.I.Z – Qualifying Industrial Zones’ 
<http://www.moit.gov.il/NR/exeres/2124E799-4876-40EF-831C-6410830D8F02.htm> accessed 13 
February 2014. 
45 Sometimes referred to as the “QUIZ”. 
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national, and even political, interests because of the way in which preferential rules of 
origin are being used. 
 
1.5    The Thesis Question. 
 
As a contribution towards addressing the issues hindering international trade 
because of the misuse of preferential rules of origin, this thesis will investigate the 
possibility of harmonizing preferential rules of origin in order to prevent such misuse 
and consequently facilitate international trade.  Hence, the thesis hypothesizes that 
harmonizing preferential rules of origin would eliminate the negative effects outlined 
previously, thereby helping to liberalize international trade.  
To build up the research hypothesis, first I will discuss (in Chapter II) the 
negative effects of preferential rules of origin and give realistic examples showing 
how the misuse of rules of origin in different preferential trade regimes hinders 
international trade. Second (in Chapter III), I will address the possibilities of 
achieving a proper harmonization of preferential rules of origin and give very deep 
and technical details on how to do that. Third (in Chapter IV), I will show how the 
main proposal about harmonization will be set out and how it will be tested. 
From the above mentioned hypothesis, the thesis question can be stated as: 
Would the harmonization of preferential rules of origin aid trade liberalization? 
 
1.6    Testing the Thesis Hypothesis. 
 
The thesis aims at proving that harmonizing preferential rules of origin would 
eliminate the negative effects of the misuse of preferential rules of origin. Since 
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preferential rules of origin have not been harmonized, it will not be possible to test the 
thesis hypothesis empirically. That is why I will have to use a theoretical model for 
doing so in relation to each of the problem areas identified in section 1.4 above and 
Chapter II below. Thereupon, I intend to apply theoretically the model harmonization 
of preferential rules of origin to each problem and show, consequently, possible 
positive results proving and supporting the thesis hypothesis. For instance, after 
having given a detailed model of harmonized preferential rules of origin, I will show 
in theory the effect of such harmonized rules on eliminating protectionism.  With a set 
of harmonized preferential rules of origin, the parties to preferential trade agreements 
will be prevented from misusing rules of origin and imposing protectionist rules of 
origin pursuant to their national interests. As a result, international trade will be 
facilitated.  Also, the substantive content of the harmonized rules of origin that will be 
discussed in Chapter III could, presumably, lead to other positive results when tested.  
For example: (1) there would be fair competition and global production efficiency; (2) 
too costly and/or complex operations would not be needed to comply with preferential 
rules of origin, which would facilitate exportation and importation processes and 
increase the utilization rates of preferences in preferential trade areas; and (3) 
consumers all over the world would be provided with greater choices.  This will be 
discussed in more detail later in this thesis.  
By doing the same with each problem, i.e. applying the harmonized model of 
rules of origin to each problem, I will demonstrate the possible positive outcomes 
showing how harmonizing preferential rules of origin would eliminate the negative 
effects of misusing preferential rules of origin, thereby helping to liberalize 
international trade. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE MISUSE OF PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN 
 
Even though preferential rules of origin are designed to determine whether the 
imported good qualifies for preferential treatment, their imposition in some 
preferential trade agreements is sometimes done to pursue other objectives. Such 
objectives hinder international trade and turn it to a nightmare for producers and 
traders. 
The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin establishes certain disciplines for 
non-preferential rules of origin. The WTO member countries shall comply with these 
disciplines until the completion of the Harmonization Work Programme to ensure the 
partial, transparent and clear application of non-preferential rules of origin. However, 
Annex II of the agreement does not set down the same disciplines on preferential rules 
of origin.  As a result, WTO member countries could use preferential rules of origin to 
protect their national interests and products from competition with foreign producers. 
Moreover, in a preferential trade area, when a final product is produced, rules of 
origin could become a tool used to alter the importation of inputs from cheap 
producers outside the area to a costly producer inside it. This negatively affects global 
efficiency and leaves consumers with limited and costly choices. Also, the imposition 
of preferential rules of origin could depend on the foreign policies of countries. This 
leads sometimes to the usage of rules of origin to pursue political goals. This does not 
make trade smooth, transparent and predictable for traders. Lastly, the formation of 
preferential trade agreements, under article XXIV of the GATT, and the enormous 
increase in their number led to what is known as the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. 
Accordingly, a country could be a member of a preferential trade agreement that 
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imposes different rules of origin and also a member of another agreement that 
imposes other rules of origin. This leaves traders and producers confused by the 
complexity resulting from the proliferation of rules of origin worldwide.  
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and give examples of all the 
mentioned negative effects resulting from the misuse of preferential rules of origin. 
 
2.1    Do Preferential Rules of Origin Lend Themselves to Being Used 
For Protectionist Purposes? 
 
This Section answers the question of the whether preferential rules of origin 
lend themselves to being used for protectionist purposes.  First, it defines 
protectionism and talks about the position of the WTO towards protectionism.  
Second, it gives examples that could clarify the use of rules of origin for protectionist 
purposes.  Lastly, the chapter suggests certain solutions to overcome the problem of 
using rules of origin as protectionist instruments in some trade regimes. 
Protectionism is used to protect domestic producers from competition from 
foreign producers and from the possible avidity of domestic consumers for imports by 
the imposition of tariffs on imported products, stringent quantitative restrictions, 
restrictive rules of origin and other trade regulations created by governments. It is the 
economic policy of shackling trade between countries. Thus, protectionism can take 
many forms. However, this section is going to focus on and discuss the possible 
protectionist implementation of preferential rules of origin in some preferential trade 
regimes.  
31 
 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the WTO fights protectionism and aims to 
liberalize trade among its member countries. For that reason, the WTO is the most 
powerful fortress against protectionism.46
Article 1 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin illustrates the main uses of non-
preferential rules of origin, including: determining whether the imported goods shall 
qualify for MFN or preferential treatment, gathering trade statistics, government 
procurement, carrying out origin marking and labeling requirements and the 
application of trade policy instruments.  Accordingly, one of the roles of rules of 
origin is to implement and support trade policy instruments instead of replacing or 
supplementing them.  Hence, rules of origin shall not be used for protectionist 
 
 
2.1.1    The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
 
It will be argued in this thesis that rules of origin have been used as 
protectionist tools in a variety of trade regimes by, specifically, developed countries.  
That is why the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin was concluded in 1994 under the 
Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the WTO. The Agreement 
on Rules of Origin was formed in order for WTO member countries to comply with a 
regular set of harmonized rules when specifying the origin of a product for the 
purpose of applying MFN treatment and to prevent such rules from becoming 
obstacles to trade. However, pursuant to Article 1 of the Agreement, non-preferential 
rules of origin, when harmonized, would not apply in preferential trade regimes. 
                                                 
46 Carla A. Hills, ‘How the WTO Fights Protectionism’ (2007) IIP Digital 2007, 
<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2008/06/20080608132704xjyrrep0.1592981.ht
ml#axzz3AiJi7SDu > accessed 17 August 2014. 
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purposes or to favour the imported goods of one country over the imported goods of 
another.47
a) Shall be “defined” in a transparent, clear and precise manner when 
imposed on the good; 
 
Article 2 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin contains a list of disciplines that 
shall be followed until the completion of the Harmonization Work Programme 
(during the transition period). These disciplines clarify that non-preferential rules of 
origin: 
b)  Shall not be used to “pursue trade objectives”; 
c)  Shall not restrict, distort or disrupt international trade; 
d) “Shall not be more stringent than the rules of origin applied to determine 
whether the good is domestic” (National Treatment principle); 
e)  “Shall not discriminate between other members irrespective of the 
affiliation of the manufacturers of the good concerned” (MFN principle); 
and 
f)  “Shall be administered in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.” 
Therefore, using non-preferential rules of origin for protectionist purposes violates 
Article 2 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin as well.  That was illustrated by the 
United States – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products.48
Unfortunately, the Agreement on Rules of Origin does not provide disciplines 
for the application of preferential rules of origin as same as those provided for the 
application of non-preferential ones, thus permitting the possible misuse of 
preferential rules of origin. Annex II of the Agreement on Rules of Origin (Common 
 
                                                 
47 Agreement on Rules of Origin (April 15 1994) 1868 UNTS 397, art 1(1) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/22-roo.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014. 
48 United States – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products – Report of the Panel (20 June 
2003) WT/DS243/R. 
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Declaration with Regard to Preferential Rules of Origin) does no more than stipulate 
that preferential rules of origin shall clearly define the methods of origin 
determination; be based on the positive standard; be published pursuant to Article X:1 
of the GATT; and not be retroactively applied. The following sub-sections give 
examples of how preferential rules of origin are used as protectionist instruments. 
 
2.1.2    The NAFTA 
 
Many believe that the NAFTA rules of origin are one of the most complex sets 
of rules of origin applied in preferential trade regimes.49
By using all three means of determining origin (the change in tariff 
classification, the regional value content requirement and the specific manufacturing 
operation),
 
50 the NAFTA rules of origin51 are imposed on products classified “mostly 
at the 6-Digit tariff line level” of the HS.52
The stringency of the NAFTA rules of origin is mainly evident when the 
combination of more than one means of determining origin becomes a single rule that 
it is necessary for a product to comply with, for instance, the rule that requires a 
product to comply with a change in tariff classification along with a value content 
requirement is more restrictive than a rule requiring solely a change in tariff 
classification. Furthermore, the restrictiveness of the change in tariff classification test 
 
                                                 
49 Antoni Estevadeordal, Jeremy Harris and Kati Suominen, ‘Multilateralising Preferential Rules of 
Origin around the World’(2009) Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper Series #IDB-WP-
137, 28. 
50 All three methods of determining origin are explained in chapter 1.2. 
51 North American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) Annex III (12 December 
1992) US Gov’t Printing Office (1992), entered into force 1 January 1994 <https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&ctl=SectionView&mid=1588&sid=e9276e1c-a41e-4d33-a02c-
61fdaec23bf4&language=en-US> accessed 17 August 2014. 
52 Antoni Estevedeordal, ‘Negotiating Preferential Market Access: The Case of NAFTA’ (2000) 34 
Journal of World Trade 12. 
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varies according to the level at which the required change should occur (i.e. a change 
of tariff chapter is more restrictive than a change of tariff heading; which in turn is 
more restrictive than a change in tariff-subheading; which in turn is more restrictive 
than the change in tariff item).53  Moreover, the value of the non-originating inputs 
permitted to be utilized under the tolerance rule (or the de minimis rule), which treats 
a fixed proportion of non-originating components used in producing a final product as 
if they are originating,54 is set at only 7%.55 Moreover, in the case of textiles, the 
tolerance rule is based on the weight of textile products instead of the value of non-
originating inputs.56  Besides, the tolerance rule “does not extend to the production of 
dairy produce, edible products of animal origin, citrus fruit and juice, instant coffee, 
cocoa products, and some machinery and mechanical appliances.” 57   Under the 
NAFTA, nearly 75% of all of classified products are required to undergo a change in 
tariff chapter or a change in tariff heading in order to be conferred with the 
“originating status.”  In addition, 9% and 13% of them must comply with value 
content requirements and specific manufacturing operation. 58   The effect of such 
stringent rules of origin is reflected in Mexican exports for made little use of NAFTA 
preferences.59
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Ibid. 
54 mairiM Manchin and Annette O. Pelkmans-Balaoing, ‘Rules of Origin and the Web of East Asian 
Free Trade Agreements’ (2007) World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 4273, 6. 
55 This value is considered to be low, especially if compared with the tolerance rules of other 
preferential regimes. For example, under the EU GSP regime and the Cotonou agreement the de 
minimis amount is set at 10% and 15%. See Paul Brenton, ‘Notes on Rules of Origin with Implications 
for Regional Integration on Southeast Asia’ (2003) Paper Presented at Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council Trade Forum, 28 <http://www.pecc.org/publications/papers/trade-papers/4_ROO/2-
brenton.pdf> accessed 16 August 2014. 
56 North American Free Trade Agreement (n 51), ch 4, art 405. 
57 Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, ‘Multilateralising Preferential Rules of Origin’ (n 49) 18. 
58 Kerry A. Chase, ‘Industry Lobbying and Rules of Origin in Free Trade Agreements’ (2007) 
International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, 21. 
59 Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, ‘Multilateralising Preferential Rules of Origin’ (n 49) 7. 
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2.1.2.1    Automobiles. 
 
One of the stringent NAFTA rules of origin concerns automobiles for which a 
high regional value content requirement of 62.5% is imposed on “automotive goods” 
to be calculated by using the net cost method.60  In this case, the change in tariff 
classification test is not enough to be solely applied without the value content 
requirement rule.61  The aim of imposing such a stringent NAFTA rule of origin is to 
make it difficult for Japanese and German automakers (Volkswagen, Toyota, Nissan 
and Honda), based in Canada and Mexico, to acquire the NAFTA preferences, when 
exporting to the US, and compete with the US automakers (the big three: General 
Motors, Chrysler and Ford) in the US market. Sourcing inputs from North America 
instead of Japan and Germany62 puts the Japanese and German automakers at a price 
disadvantage and is thus deemed to be a difficult task for them to do,63 unlike the 
American automotive industry that is easily able to comply and acquire accordingly 
the preferences.64
 The pressure for the imposition of the stringent rules of origin concerning 
automotive products has been largely carried by the US “automakers” Chrysler and 
Ford and US “[a]uto parts makers.”
 
65
                                                 
60 Regional Value Content = Net cost - Value of non Originating Materials/ Net cost x 100. North 
American Free Trade Agreement (n 51), ch 4, art 402 (3). 
61 Ibid ch 4, art 403. 
62 In case the Japanese automakers seek complying with the regional value content requirement to 
acquire consequently the preferences. 
63 In other words, beside the large amount of capital needed to establish in the region and invest there, 
the emulators will have to source from the region inputs that could be less efficient if compared to 
those they might have used to source from. 
64 Chase, ‘Industry Lobbying and Rules of Origin in Free Trade Agreements’ (n 58) 34. See also 
Malcolm Fairbrother, ‘Why Do Capitalists Hang Together on Trade? Business Unity in the Case of 
NAFTA’ (2008) paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San 
Francisco, 24-31. 
65Vivian C. Jones and Michael F. Martin, ‘International Trade and Rules of Origin: Implications of 
Globalized Manufacturing’ (2008) Congressional Research ServiceRL34524, 9 (quoting Frederick W. 
Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political Analysis 157-158 (1998)). 
 Even though the imposition of the 62.5% 
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regional value content rule is very high. Chrysler and Ford actually sought the 
imposition of a higher regional value content of about 70% in order to guard 
themselves more from their foreign rivals. 66
2.1.2.2    Ketchup. 
  Thus, the more or less successful 
lobbying by the US car firms supports the view that rules of origin can be used for 
protectionist purposes.  
 
 
Another protectionist NAFTA rule of origin concerns ketchup. This stipulates 
for ketchup to have originating status, there may be “a change to tariff item 
2103.20.aa from any other chapter, except from subheading 2002.90.”67  This rule 
grants originating status for ketchup (2103.20) that is produced from imported 
tomatoes (any other chapter).  However, the rule does not allow for ketchup to be 
manufactured from a tomato paste that is not sourced regionally (2002.90). 68
Canada was allowed to use imported Chilean tomato paste when producing 
ketchup to be exported to the US under the former Canada – US Free Trade 
Agreement.
  
Otherwise, ketchup will not be granted originating status and will thus not be eligible 
to be exported regionally under preferences. So fulfillment of the change in tariff 
classification test will not be achieved under the NAFTA rules of origin, if ketchup is 
produced using imported tomato paste from outside NAFTA. 
69
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 North American Free Trade Agreement (n 51) Annex 401. 
68 Such exception is known as the “negative test”, which means that satisfying the change in tariff 
classification will not grant the originating status to the product, if the exception is not respected. See 
Brenton ‘Notes on Rules of Origin with Implications for Regional Integration on Southeast Asia’ (n 55) 
20. 
69 Ibid. 
 That is not the case now in NAFTA. It appears that the stringent 
NAFTA rule of origin for ketchup has been imposed to induce ketchup producers in 
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Canada and the US to source the needed paste from Mexican tomato paste producers 
rather than from those of Chile who sell it at a cheaper price due to their efficiency.70
2.1.2.3    The Triple Transformation Rule under NAFTA. 
  
Therefore, the whole rule has been used as a protectionist apparatus: to protect 
Mexican producers against competition from the Chilean tomato paste producers.  
 
 
One of the facts that proves the stringency of NAFTA rules of origin is the 
imposition of the triple transformation rule on textile products “that are made of 
cotton or man-made fibers.”  Such a rule is typically used for protectionist purposes,71 
i.e. to protect the US textile producers from competition against Mexican textile 
producers and US textile producers who are based in Mexico: by impelling the latter 
producers to source the materials needed for producing the textiles from the US 
instead of Asia72 (where the efficient producers are).73
Pursuant to the NAFTA triple transformation rule, with an exception of 7 % de 
minimis provided under the agreement, all of the textile production processes must 
take place regionally, i.e. in North America, if a product is to have originating status 
under NAFTA. It is as if a 100 % regional value content requirement is imposed on 
textile products.
 
74
                                                 
70 See Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2006: Routes for Asia’s Trade (Manila, 
Philippines 2006) 2 <http://www.adb.org/publications/asian-development-outlook-2006-routes-asias-
trades> accessed 17 August 2014. 
71 Mariana C. Silveira, ‘Rules of Origin in International Treaties: Comparative Study of NAFTA and 
MERCOSUR, and a General Overview of the European Union’ (2001) LL.M. Thesis, the National 
Law Centre for Inter-American Free Trade, 56. 
72 Stefano Inama, Rules of Origin in International Trade (CUP 2009) 278. 
73 Rupa Duttagupta and Arvind Panagariya, ‘Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and 
Politics’ (2003) International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper 03/229, 26. 
74 Ibid. 
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According to the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin, “Rules of origin should 
be objective, understandable and predictable.”75  Admitted by this applies only to 
non-preferential rules of origin. Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that the triple 
transformation rule is stringent, it is exceedingly complicated.76
It was the US clothing industry that pressed for the application of the triple 
transformation rule in the NAFTA.
  Consequently, it 
makes it hard for many traders and producers to understand, and to comply with it, 
especially those who are trying to run a production firm and who are involved in trade 
for the first time. 
77  One of the primary reasons for this 78 was to 
require the US clothing production firms that had relocated to Mexico (to take 
advantage of the inexpensive labour)79 to use materials sourced from the US without 
giving them the option to use instead imported Asian materials when producing 
textiles exported under the NAFTA to the US. 80
In preferential trade systems, rules of origin play a considerable role in 
avoiding trade deflection (transshipment of goods).  However, sometimes too 
stringent rules of origin are applied in preferential trade agreements, not to primarily 
avoid trade deflection, but to protect susceptible national products of some of the 
parties to preferential trade agreements, as evidenced by the fact that rules of origin 
 So in other words, the triple 
transformation rule of origin is to protect the US clothing firms based in the US 
against US firms based in Mexico.  
                                                 
75Agreement on Rules of Origin (n 47) Art 9(c). 
76 Jones and Martin (n 65) 7. 
77 K.N. Harilal and P.L. Beena, ‘The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin: Implications for South Asia’ 
(2003) Centre for Development Studies Working Paper 353, 20. 
78 The word “one” is mentioned because avoiding trade deflection could be another reason for the 
application of the triple transformation rule. However, such reason is usually used as an excuse for the 
application of stringent rules of origin. 
79 Michael G. Wilson, ‘The North American Free Trade Agreement: Gauging Its Impact on the U.S. 
Economy’ (1993) Heritage Lecture 468 <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/hl468nbsp-the-
north-american-free-trade-agreement> accessed 17 August 2014. 
80 M. Angeles Villarreal, ‘Industry Trade Effects related to NAFTA’ (2002) Congressional Research 
Service RL31386, 8. 
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are more stringent than is required to avoid trade deflection.  As a result, complying 
with the indicated rules of origin will require costly and/or complex operations to be 
taken, and hence entry to the markets protected by the imposition of restrictive rules 
of origin in preferential trade agreements will be shackled with respect to the targeted 
competing products trying to enter them under the preferential trade agreement 
preferences.81  Although the stringency of the triple transformation rule could help in 
deterring trade deflection, its level is a good deal more than that needed to avoid the 
deflection.  There are other, less stringent alternatives that could be used to fulfill the 
same aim. For example, teasing the cotton, spinning it, weaving the yarns, fabricating 
the fabrics, adorning the goods and all clothing production processes can be simply 
checked by officially surveying the textiles production firms and scrutinizing their 
stocktaking books, package deals and demands. 82
The US officials during the formation of the NAFTA recognized that that 
triple transformation rule of origin would cause the textile producers in the North 
American region to source materials from the US instead of Asia.
  Consequently, these checking 
operations could be carried out and the triple transformation rule of origin could be 
simplified. Thus, using the triple transformation rule as a disguised protectionist 
device is the only reason that explains why the US and its other NAFTA parties, 
presumably prefer applying it, although other suitable options could be used to avoid 
the trade deflection. 
83
                                                 
81 Paul Brenton, ‘Enhancing Trade Preferences for LDCs: Reducing the Restrictiveness of Rules of 
Origin’ (n 37) 281-287. 
 Apparently, this 
change might have worked out during the first couple of years subsequent to the 
82 Aaditya Mattoo, Devesh Roy and Arvind Subramanian, ‘The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
and its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined’ (2002) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
2908, 7. 
83 M. Angeles Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson, ‘NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects’ (2014) 
Congressional Report Service 7-5700, 4 <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf> accessed 17 
December 2014. 
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formation of the NAFTA. However, complying with the triple transformation rule of 
origin is costly, which does not guarantee the growth of trade between the NAFTA 
parties in the textile and apparel sector in the long run. According to the American 
Apparel & Footwear Association, the stringency of the imposed NAFTA triple 
transformation rule led to a decline that in the value of the apparel products exported 
to the US under the NAFTA and a decline in the market share of the NAFTA apparel 
imports beginning from 2000 until 2012, as shown in the diagrams below. The result 
is not trade-encouraging in the textile sector. The Association illustrated that even 
though trade between the US and its NAFTA partners increased until 2000 in the 
apparel sector, the triple transformation rule of origin is outdated, made the apparel 
imports and exports under the NAFTA suffer and no one can “negotiate 21st century 
trade deals using 20th century tools”.84
                                                 
84 Steve Lamar, ‘NAFTA at 20’ (2013) the Government Relations Team, American Apparel & 
Footwear Association <https://www.wewear.org/politicaltrends/nafta-at-20/> accessed 5 January 2015. 
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Source: American Apparel & Footwear Association (2013).85
                                                 
85 Ibid.  
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Source: American Apparel & Footwear Association (2013)86
2.1.3    The EU GSP Rules of Origin. 
 
According to the mentioned, unless flexible NAFTA rules of origin are going 
to be imposed on textiles, it is likely that the market share of NAFTA apparel imports 
will continue to decline.  Hence, the imposition of flexible NAFTA rules of origin on 
textile products is needed in order to increase the intra-NAFTA trade in textiles. 
 
 
The EU successfully harmonized and simplified its GSP rules of origin in 
2010 (explained later in Chapter III), but this happened because its GSP rules of 
                                                 
86 Ibid.  
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origin were criticized by many for being used for protectionist purposes. 87
Although developing countries usually lack the employment of advanced 
operations when it comes to producing goods, they are characterized by inexpensive 
labour outlays needed during production processes.  That is why they benefit, for 
example, from the textile production since excessive expenditure and/or advanced 
operations are unnecessary to set up an enterprise in that industry.
 This 
section shows the status quo ante of the protectionist implementation of preferential 
rules of origin in the EU GSP regime.  
88
The EU has endeavored to harmonize its various applicable preferential rules 
of origin.  In 1999, the EU tried to achieve this by applying a single set of product-
  This benefit 
could be nullified if a preference-granting country attempts to protect its domestic 
textiles by imposing too stringent rules of origin on the competing textile products of 
developing countries trying to enter the market of the former under accorded 
preferences.  Consequently, complying with such rules of origin might require costly 
and complex operations to be taken by the developing country which would prevent it 
from profiting from the accorded preferences and make it exceedingly difficult for its 
textiles to compete in the market of the preference-granting country.  Thus, the 
developing country might not take advantage of the preferences and instead choose to 
trade with the preference-granting country on a MFN basis since this would not 
require it to make the costly and the complex operations necessary for the preferential 
rules of origin. This would lead to a low utilization rate of preferences. 
                                                 
87 New Customs Rules Allow Developing Countries More Benefits from Trade with the EU [2010] 
European Commission Press Release IP/10/1526, 1<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-
1526_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 24 November 2014. See also Questions and Answers - Reform of 
GSP Rules of Origin [2010] European Commission Press Release MEMO/10/588, 1 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-588_en.htm?locale=en>> accessed 24 November 
2014. See also Paul Brenton, Frank Flatters and Paul Kalenga, ‘Rules of Origin and SADC: the Case 
for Change in the Mid Term Review of the Trade Protocol’ (2005) Africa Region Working Paper 
Series 83, 5. 
88 Brenton ‘Enhancing Trade Preferences for LDCs: Reducing the Restrictiveness of Rules of Origin’ 
(n 37) 283. 
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specific rules of origin, referred to as the single list of product-specific rules of 
origin.89  In July 2000, the EU applied this list to its GSP regime.90  Consequently, the 
single list was also applied in the Everything But Arms Agreement since the latter is 
part of the EU GSP regime.91
The EU single list of product-specific rules of origin imposed the double 
transformation
 
92 requirement on clothing products categorized under chapters sixty-
one and sixty-two (clothing products) of the HS.93  According to this requirement, 
yarns could be obtained domestically or imported from anywhere in the world.  
However, the yarns are required to be woven into fabrics in the preference-benefiting 
country in which the fabrics are then to be fabricated into apparels qualified to be 
exported to the EU under the preferences given.94  As a result, the imposed double 
transformation concept prohibited many beneficiary developing countries from 
importing fabrics needed for the production of the textiles intended for export to the 
EU under the preferences granted.  Specifically, the utilization of only domestic 
fabrics, EU fabrics (because of the bilateral cumulation done with the EU) or fabrics 
imported from the allowed regional cumulation zones was allowed. 95
                                                 
89 Commission Regulation (EC) No 46/1999 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down 
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the 
Community Customs Code’ [1999] OJ L010/1. 
90 Alberto Portugal-Perez, ‘The Costs of Rules of Origin in Apparel:  African Preferential Exports to 
the United States and the European Union’ (2008) Policy Issues in International Trade and 
Commodities, Study Series 39. 
91 The EBA initiative is part of the GSP regime where the same rules apply to both of them. The EBA 
grants the fifty least developed countries special preferential treatments more than that accorded to the 
developing countries of the normal EU GSP regime. See European Trade Commission, ‘Everything but 
Arms (EBA) – Who Benefits?’ <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150983.pdf> 
accessed 17 August 2014; European Commission, ‘Taxation and Customs Union’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_781_en
.htm> accessed 10 January 2015. 
92 It is known also by other terms: two-stage transformation, two-step conversion, multiple processing, 
two-stage conversion, fabric forward, or multiple transformations. 
93 Perez (n 90) 4. 
94 Ibid 3-4. 
95 The concept of cumulation is explained in Chapter III. Please see European Commission, ‘Taxation 
and Customs Union’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_779_en
.htm> accessed 17 August, 2014. 
For the 
45 
 
beneficiary countries to rely on the importation of fabrics for their textile production 
from the EU is costly.96
Exceptions to the double transformation requirement were provided in chapter 
sixty-two for some non-crocheted garments, where a less restrictive value content rule 
could to be applied as a substitute for the double transformation process.
 
97
The EU single list of product-specific rules of origin was characterized by its 
complexity, in which the change in tariff classification method, mostly at the heading 
level of the HS, mixed with the value content and specific manufacturing operation 
approaches was applicable to a diversity of products.
 
98  The intricacy of the EU single 
list of product-specific rules of origin along with its double transformation 
requirement prevented many developing countries from benefiting from the EU GSP 
regime since they did not usually have the appropriate production capacity needed to 
comply with stringent rules of origin and since they relied, in most cases, on the 
utilization of imported materials when it came to production.99
Sri Lanka is one of the developing countries that could not profit much from 
the EU GSP regime with regard to its textiles and apparels exports. More than that, 
Sri Lanka’s average use of the preferences accorded to it under the EU GSP regime is 
poor with respect to “foodstuffs, beverages, and machinery & electrical equipment” 
because of its inability to comply with the imposed EU GSP rules of origin.
 
100
                                                 
96 Janaka Wijayasiri, ‘Utilization of Preferential Trade Arrangements: Sri Lanka’s Experience with the 
EU and US GSP Scheme’ (2007) Asia-Pac Research & Training Network on Trade, Working Paper 
Series 29, 34. 
97 Further information about the single list of product specific rules of origin is available at UNCTAD, 
‘Generalized System of Preferences: Handbook on the Rules of Origin of the European Union’ (2013) 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.25/Rev.3/Add.1. 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/itcdtsbmisc25rev3add1_en.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014 
98 Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, ‘Multilateralising Preferential Rules of Origin’ (n 49) 9. 
99 Munir Ahmad, ‘Impact of Origin Rules for Textiles and Clothing on Developing Countries’ (2007) 
ICTSD Programme on Competitiveness and Sustainable Development, International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper 3, Geneva, 32. 
100 Wijayasiri (n 96) 35. 
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In response to the Tsunami crisis, the EU in 2005 granted Sri Lanka benefits, 
under the GSP+ system, more than those given through the ordinary EU GSP regime 
at which duty-free access to the EU was guaranteed for 7,200 Sri Lankan products.101  
Unfortunately, Sri Lanka could not benefit from the GSP+ regime concerning its 
textiles and apparels exports due to the stringency of the EU imposed double 
transformation rule of origin, because Sri Lanka relies mainly on imported yarns and 
fabrics when it comes to producing textiles.102  The fabrics that Sri Lanka sourced 
from the EU (i.e. from the preferential trade area) to produce textiles constituted only 
11% of Sri Lanka’s fabric imports. The remaining 89% came from outside the 
preferential trade area as follows: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) fabrics constituted 12% of Sri Lanka’s total fabric imports, ASEAN fabrics 
constituted 6% and fabrics imported from further zones constituted 71%, in 2007.103
China is considered to be one of reasons why the EU imposed stringent rules 
of origin in its GSP regime.
 
104  It is regarded as a rival materials provider.105  Many 
developing countries enrolled in the EU GSP regime source fabrics from 
China.106
                                                 
101 Asian Development Bank (n 70) 18. 
102 Ibid. See also, Ratnakar Adhikari and Chatrini Weeratunge, ‘Textiles & Clothing Sector in South 
Asia: Coping with Post-quota Challenges’ (2006) 2 South Asian Yearbook of Trade and Development - 
New Delhi: Academic Foundation 109-145, 109. 
103 The figures are for 2007. Wijayasiri (n 96) 34-35. 
104 It should be made clear, however, that the EU rules of origin were not motivated by a desire to 
combat trade deflection. 
105South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment, ‘Salvaging the Doha Round’ (2004) 
<http://www.sawtee.org/pdf/publication/tdm8.pdf> accessed 15 June 2013. 
106  UNCTAD, ‘Trade Preferences for LDCs: An Early Assessment of Benefits and Possible 
Improvements’ (2003) UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/8, 67. 
Because of the geographical location of many developing Asian countries 
near China, these developing countries could easily source low-priced and fine fabrics 
from China and use them in producing textiles.  However, for the sake of countering 
competition from China, the EU imposed the stringent double transformation rule of 
origin in its GSP regime to prevent the Chinese fabrics from entering its markets 
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under preferences when used in the textiles of the beneficiary Asian developing 
countries and to induce the textile producers of the latter to source materials from the 
EU (or elsewhere among GSP countries), rather than from more efficient Chinese 
sources of supply.107
The inability of many developing countries to comply with the EU‘s GSP 
rules of origin was manifested in the low utilization of their preferences under the EU 
GSP regime.  Many developing Asian countries, such as Laos, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Cambodia, India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and the Philippines could not take much 
advantage of the EU GSP system.  The mean rate of utilizing the preferences of these 
countries under EU GSP regime for chapters 61 and 62 of the HS was low. According 
to the Swedish National Board of Trade, the utilization rate of developing countries to 
the preferences granted to them under the EU GSP regime was the lowest in the 
textile and clothing sector when compared to other sectors as of 2012. 
 
108
Mahbubur Rahman, the president of the International Chamber of Commerce-
Bangladesh, clarified that the rules of origin in the EU GSP regime did not help the 
least developed countries to take advantage of the preferences accorded to them under 
the latter regime.  He argued that substituting the EU stringent rules of origin with 
simpler ones would “open an important window of opportunities for least developed 
countries like Bangladesh”
 
109
It is obvious that developing countries need to make use of the preferences 
accorded to them by any preference-granting country.  This need sometimes leads a 
beneficiary country to commit fraud, for example falsifying an origin certificate in 
 
                                                 
107 Paul Brenton and Miriam Manchin, ‘Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of Rules of 
Origin’ (2002) Centre for Eur. Pol’y Studies Working Paper 183, 13. 
108 Kommerskollegium National Board of Trade, ‘The EU’s and the US’s Preferential Arrangements – 
a Comparison’ [2012] 3. 
109 The Daily Star, ‘Product Diversification Key to Utilizing EU Market Access Facility’ (2006)  
<http://archive.thedailystar.net/2006/02/24/d60224050145.htm> accessed 15 August 2014. 
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order to comply with a stringent rule of origin of a unilateral trade regime, and thus 
illegally benefit through the preferences given to it under the regime.  The Bangladesh 
T-shirts case is a good example of this.110
In March 1995, some EU customs authorities noticed a marked increase of T-
shirts imported from Bangladesh.  They decided to request the Department of Trade 
and Industry to check the validity of the T-shirts’ origin certificates.  The EU member 
countries, the EU Commission, and EU customs authorities conducted an inspection 
concerning the issue.  According to the results, 10,000 origin certificates were 
falsified.  Consequently, a fine and customs duties on all T-shirts that were exported 
to the EU covered by the falsified origin certificates were paid to the EU.  In 1997, 
total compliance with the EU rules of origin became a condition to issue origin 
certificates (form A)
   
111 for textiles and apparel products exported from Bangladesh to 
the EU.  This caused a sharp drop in Bangladesh’s utilization of preferences under the 
EU GSP scheme to below 30% from 1997 to 1998.112
What can be learned from the Bangladesh T-shirts case is that developing 
countries are in need of any preferences accorded to them.  If stringent rules of origin 
are going to be imposed to prevent them from competing, improving, and thus 
utilizing the preferences, circumventing these rules, dealing with them as if they did 
not exist, could take place.  As a result, there would be more international trade 
disputes.  Some countries would win those cases and others would lose, so why bother 
 
                                                 
110 UNCTAD ‘Trade Preferences for LDCs: An Early Assessment of Benefits and Possible 
Improvements’ (n 106) 62. 
111 Form A is a GSP origin certificate. Form A certificates are brought out for only commodities that 
are produced in accordance with the rules of origin.  Moreover, such commodities shall be produced by 
plants registered in the Department of Trade and Industry.  More information about the Form A origin 
certificate and a sample is available at Trade and Industry Department, ‘How to Apply for a Certificate 
of Origin Form A’ (2005) the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
<http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/publications/registcert/files/forma.pdf> accessed 17 August 
2014. 
112 For more details about the case, See UNCTAD ‘Trade Preferences for LDCs: An Early Assessment 
of Benefits and Possible Improvements’ (n 106) 62. 
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in the first place with imposing stringent rules of origin? Why do countries give 
preferential trading terms and then largely negate the advantage they bring by 
imposing restrictive rules of origin? Some countries impose restrictive rules of origin 
to make such rules act as alternative trade barriers (restricting the duty-free access) 
and protectionist instruments. Imposing stringent rules of origin in a GSP regime 
could undermine the ability of the beneficiary developing countries to take advantage 
of, or utilize, the accorded preferences.  Alternatively, the beneficiaries might choose 
an alternative to forbear the granted preference and trade with the preference-granting 
country on MFN grounds, rather than trying to comply with the preferential rules of 
origin.113
Before imposing any GSP rules of origin in unilateral trade regimes, the 
preference-granting country should first gather statistics and information related to the 
production capability of the preference-given country, i.e., the amount of imported 
inputs needed for production, local resources and production firms.  Pursuant to such 
gathered statistics, a single list of rules of origin which meets the collective needs of 
the least developed countries should be imposed.  Otherwise, complying with the 
rules of origin would be difficult and would need production operations that could not 
be undertaken easily by the beneficiary country since the latter would not have the 
sufficient supplies needed for production in accordance with the imposed rules of 
origin, leading to its inability to benefit from/utilize the preferences accorded to it 
under the unilateral regime.  The only explanation that explains why a preference-
granting country would not want to gather the mentioned statistics and accordingly 
apply appropriate rules of origin to a beneficiary country is because it wishes to use 
  Of course, this assumes that the non-preferential rules of origin would be 
less strict.   
                                                 
113 Wijayasiri (n 96) 5. 
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rules of origin as protectionist apparatuses, i.e., to protect its susceptible products and 
national interests. 
In 2003, the EU Commission published the green paper, COM (2003) 787 
final, that evaluates the application of its rules of origin in preferential agreements, 
especially those with developing countries.114  The green paper explained that the role 
of the EU preferential rules of origin was to help in opening up the EU market for 
imports from partner countries, but in a way that afforded “protection for the EU 
interests concerned”. Also, the green paper explained that this policy is moving 
towards a general drive to “access for EU exports to third country markets”. 115 
Moreover, the green paper illustrated that the insufficiency of manufacturing firms, 
investment opportunities or managerial systems in the beneficiary developing 
countries, along with the inability of traders there to comprehend the complex 
imposed EU rules of origin, made it arduous for the beneficiary developing countries 
to comply with EU rules of origin and, consequently, benefit much from the 
preferences accorded to them by the EU.116  Furthermore, the summary report of the 
results of the consultation process on the green paper made clear that the EU GSP 
rules of origin did not take into account the conditions of actual market, trade, 
industry and agriculture.  Also, the report criticized the EU GSP rules of origin by 
arguing that they reflected “past defensive policy aims” and were employed too often 
“as defensive trade instruments”. 117
                                                 
114 Commission, ‘The Future of Rule of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements’ (Green Paper) 
COM (2003) 787 final. 
115 Ibid, 7. The Green Paper does not identify what these 'interests concerned' are. 
116 Ibid, 7-8. 
117 Commission, ‘A Summary Report of the Results of the Consultation Process on the Green Paper the 
Future of Rule of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements’ (2004), 4 and 7 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/origin_consultation_final.pdf> accessed 13 
January 2015. 
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Having the EU admitting clearly using preferential rules of origin to make 
access for its exports to third country markets, the complexity of its GSP rules of 
origin, the use of preferential rules of origin as alternative trade barriers, instead of 
using them to implement trade policy instruments, reflected the protectionist intention 
of the EU, which is exactly what Bhagwati described as the law of constant protection, 
as mentioned in Chapter 1. 4. 
Following on from the green paper, in March 2005, the EU adopted a 
communication characterized by its view to simplify and relax its preferential rules of 
origin and to use the value content method as the main origin determination criterion 
in the Economic Partnership Agreements and, in particular, the GSP regime.  118
2.1.4    What should be done to Combat Protectionist Rules of 
Origin? 
   
 
 
“The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom 
of trade . . . through voluntary agreements . . . [T]he purpose of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade 
between the constituent territories . . . .”119
According to this Article of the GATT, trade facilitation shall arise between 
the contracting parties to any preferential trade agreement.  Otherwise, the formation 
of a preferential trade area will be pointless and useless.  Accordingly, if stringent 
rules of origin (not necessarily excessively strict or stringent) were implemented in a 
 
                                                 
118 Commission, ‘Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements: Orientations for the Future’ 
(Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee) COM (2005) 100 final, 4.  
119 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (30 October 1947) 55 UNTS 187, provisionally entered 
into force on 1 January 1948 (superseded by GATT 1994), art XXIV (4). 
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preferential trade agreement, trade could be hindered and, consequently, the trade 
facilitation purpose mentioned in Article XXIV (4) of the GATT would not be 
accomplished. 
As seen above, the employment of rules of origin as protectionist devices 
exists in a number of trade regimes.  As a result of establishing various preferential 
contractual and/or autonomous trade regimes and lowering MFN tariffs in general, 
trade barriers have been reduced or eliminated.  Consequently, countries started to use 
rules of origin as alternative barriers to trade in order to protect their own national 
interests and susceptible goods.120
- Calculating the production capability of contracting parties to preferential 
trade agreements, by gathering statistics and information about their 
 Preferential rules of origin can continue to be used 
as protectionist apparatuses so long as they are not harmonized.  
The applications of rules of origin that suit the interests and protect the 
susceptible goods of the countries that designed them reflects the usage of the rules as 
protectionist devices.  This makes things complex for traders and producers all over 
the world in that it: (1) increases the number of international trade disputes; (2) 
reduces the utilization of preferences in preferential trade areas; and (3) undermines 
global competition.  As a direct result, consumers worldwide are left with fewer 
choices and international trade (intra-preferential trade area and trade with third 
countries) is hindered.  These unintended consequences go against many principles of 
the GATT and the WTO Agreement on rules of origin. 
Based on the previous analysis and clarifications, the following solutions are 
suggested in order to prevent the application of any protectionist rule of origin: 
                                                 
120 The term “trade objectives,” mentioned in Article 2(b) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, refers 
to the prohibition of member countries using rules of origin as a protectionist tool. See Moshe Hirsch, 
‘Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign and Domestic Policies’ (2008) Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Faculty of Law, 16. 
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established capacities and by knowing to what range they use such capacities; 
and then adopting rules of origin accordingly; 
- Or the harmonization of preferential rules of origin, provided the 
harmonization model is having straight forward rules of origin, which are 
obviously non-protectionist.  
Complying with the second suggested solution is the most efficient way to 
avoid the issue of using rules of origin as protectionist instruments.  Doing so would: 
(1) cease the freedom of countries to use rules of origin in a disguised way to protect 
their own national interests and susceptible goods; (2) ensure the objectivity, 
predictability and transparency of rules of origin; (3) eliminate the variation in such 
rules across agreements and countries; (4) reduce the number of international trade 
disputes; (5) increase the utilization proportions of preferences in preferential trade 
areas; (6) foster a global environment of fair competition; and (7) provide consumers 
all over the world with greater choice.  As a result, international trade would be 
facilitated and welfare would spread worldwide.  Under this strategy, the fundamental 
aims of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin would successfully be 
realized without those agreements being breached. The prospects for achieving such 
harmonization of both preferential and non-preferential rules of origin are discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
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2.2    Rules of Origin as Triggers to Trade Diversion. 
 
“[T]he higher the threshold established in the rules of origin, the greater the chance 
that trade diversion will take place.”121
“Trade creates jobs and lifts people out of poverty”;
 
122 but this raises the 
question: how is trade created?  Trade Creation is a technical term. According to 
Viner, trade creation a situation that could take place when the elimination of external 
tariffs between the member countries of a preferential trade area shifts the demand for 
goods from domestic producers to more efficient producers in another member 
country of the preferential trade area, leading to an increase in the trade flow between 
the member countries above previous levels, contrary to the situation before the 
formation of the preferential trade area. 123  Trade creation boosts welfare within 
preferential trade areas once it takes place subsequent to their formation. That is why 
if a large number of countries become members of a FTA or a CU, there will be a 
greater chance for the existence of cheap inputs producers within the preferential trade 
area, leading to trade creation to some extent within the preferential trade area.124
This section discusses how the misuse of preferential rules of origin could lead to 
trade diversion. Trade diversion is the opposite of trade creation. Sometimes the 
imposition of too stringent rules of origin in a FTA aims at making the internal final 
 
                                                 
121 Anne O.  Krueger, ‘Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin’ in James R. 
Melvin, James C. Moore and Raymond Riezman (eds), Trade, Theory, and Econometrics: Essays in 
Honor of John C. Chipman (New York: Routledge 1999) 91-101 as cited in William H. Cooper, ‘Free 
Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy’ (2014) 
Congressional Research Service 7-5700, 12.  
122 The attributed quote belongs to Dennis Hastert 
<http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/d/dennis_hastert_2.html> accessed 25 April 2013. 
123 Jacob Viner as quoted by Cooper (n 121) 8. 
124 C. Parr Rosson, C. Ford Runge and Kirby S. Moulton, ‘Preferential Trading Arrangements: Gainers 
and Losers from Regional Trading Blocs’ <http://www.ces.ncsu.edu/depts/agecon/trade/eight.html> 
accessed 25 April 2013. 
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good producer import costly inputs from within the free trade area rather than cheaper 
inputs from outside it, to produce a final product that complies with the FTA rules of 
origin and consequently becomes eligible for preferential treatment (duty-free access). 
Such alteration of inputs importation, from a cheap external source of supply 
(efficient) to a costly internal one (inefficient) is known as “trade diversion”.  
Therefore, diverting trade to a costly internal inputs producer could lessen “the 
economic welfare”125 of a FTA contracting party and the third countries that used to 
export inputs to the former before the formation of the FTA.126  On the other hand, 
trade diversion affects “global efficiency”, since it widens the “production” of 
inefficient internal “producers” and shrinks the production of efficient third countries 
producers.127
                                                 
125 Cooper (n 121) 8. 
126 Unless the FTA contracting party decides to forgo the preferential preferences and trade within the 
preferential trade area on MFN grounds, to maintain its importation of inputs from the efficient 
external supplier. 
127 Robert Z. Lawrence (n 41) 52; See also Asian Development Bank (n 68) 52. 
 
Trade diversion occurs not only because of the imposition of trade-diverting 
rules of origin in preferential trade areas. The formation of preferential trade 
agreements in general could lead to trade diversion as well. The following sub-section 
explains how.  
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
2.2.1    The Possible Trade-Diverting Consequences of Preferential 
Trade Agreements. 
 
If rules of origin are not imposed in a FTA, the export of products to the free 
trade area from third countries will be directed mainly to the member country with the 
lowest external tariff.128
According to Viner,
 
129 although the liberalization of tariffs among the member 
countries of a preferential trade area expands trade between them by encouraging 
sourcing the goods from inside the area, it diverts trade from an external cheap source 
of supply to an internal expensive one.130  Such diversion happens because following 
the formation of a preferential trade agreement, the tariff liberalization among the 
preferential trade agreement members makes the internal trade less expensive than 
trade with third countries external and gives the internal sources of supply “a price 
advantage”.131
Using three hypothetical countries: A, B and C, the figures show how trade 
relationships between a FTA contracting party and an external source of supply may 
differ before and subsequent to the formation of the FTA. It is to be noted that the 
following discussion does not include in the figures the need for producers to make a 
profit because whoever the producer is in Country A, B or C, he will need to make a 
profit, so in principle it is neutral as between the two scenarios. 
 
The next two figures illustrate how trade diversion could take place as a result 
of forming a preferential trade agreement. 
                                                 
128 Duttagupta and Panagariya (n 73) 17. 
129 Jacob Viner, The Customs Issue (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). 
130 Duttagupta and Panagariya (n 73) 9-10. 
131 For an example illustrating such point, see Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism, Multilateralism and 
Deeper Integration (The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1996) 24-25. 
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Suppose that before a FTA is formed between countries A and B, the 
importers in country A used to import a product (say X) costing $3.00 from country C 
at a price of $3.40 after paying a $0.40 external MFN tariff. Suppose also, on the 
other hand, that the price of producing product X in country B is $3.20. The import of 
product X from country B, at a price of $3.60 (including the $0.40 tariff payable), 
would be more costly for country A’s importers than importing it from country C, 
ignoring transport costs, insurance, etc. 
Before forming a FTA between country A and B 
P.s. the arrow in this phase and the next one stands for an 
exportation of product X to Country A. 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Once a FTA between countries A and B (A-B FTA) is formed, and customs 
duties removed, the importers of country A would source X from country B under 
preferences—at a price of $3.20—more cheaply than they would source it from 
country C—at the price of $3.40. Thus, forming the A-B FTA will divert the trade in 
X from a formerly cheap source of supply in country C (producing X locally at the 
Country A   
 
$3.00 + 0.40 
tariff = $3.40 
Country B   
 
$3.20       
Country C   
$3.00       
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price of $3.00) to a costly one in country B (producing X locally at the price of $3.20). 
Hence, trade diversion can be observed by studying with which countries each 
contracting party to a preferential trade agreement is and was practicing trade in 
goods, prior and subsequent to the formation of the agreement.132
After the formation of the A-B FTA 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
  
 
 For example, the United Kingdom (UK) used to import cheap lamb from New 
Zealand.133  However, when the UK became a member country of the EU, it began to 
source lamb from a costly lamb internal supplier—France—because the EU common 
external tariff made the importation of lamb from New Zealand “more expensive” 
than the lamb from France. 134
                                                 
132 Petros C Mavroidis, ‘If I Don’t Do It, Somebody Else Will (or won't): Testing the Compliance of 
Preferential Trade Agreements with the Multilateral Rules’ (2006) 40 Journal of World Trade 187, 191. 
133 Philip Whyte, Narrowing the Atlantic: The Way Forward for EU-US Trade and Investment (Centre 
for European Reform, London 2009). 
134 Ibid 23-24. 
 The external tariff here was quite definitely and 
A-B FTA 
Country A   
$3.20       
Country B   
$3.20       
Country C 
$3.00     
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explicitly used for protectionist purposes: protecting French (and EU) lamb producers 
against competition from cheaper imported lamb from New Zealand.135
As explained, in preferential trade regimes, trade diversion sometimes takes 
place as a result of the imposition of trade barriers, such as a country’s “external 
tariffs”
 That is why 
there is a relationship between protectionism and trade diversion (discussed later in 
this chapter).  
 
2.2.2    The Trade-Diverting Consequences of Preferential Trade 
Agreements Rules of Origin. 
 
136
                                                 
135 Agustin Carstens, ‘Making Regional Economic Integration Work’ (2005) Speech at the 20th Annual 
General Meeting and Conference of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/011205.htm> accessed 23 April 2014. Carstens 
mentions that countries may impose high external MFN tariffs for protectionist purposes. 
136 Anne O. Krueger, ‘Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin’ (1993) 
National Bureau of Economy Research working Paper 4352, 4. 
.  However, trade diversion can also happen because of the imposition of 
stringent preferential rules of origin.  
One must differentiate between rules of origin applied to goods traded 
between a free trade area member countries and rules of origin applied to imports 
coming from third countries.  The former are those preferential rules that all of the 
free trade area members agree to comply with as a condition to benefit from the 
preferential treatment when exporting goods to each other.  Therefore, the FTA rules 
of origin do not apply to imports coming from countries that are not contracting 
parties to the FTA (third countries).  When an exporter from a third country decides to 
export goods to any member of a free trade area, it would have to comply with the 
non-preferential rules of origin imposed by any member of the free trade area.   
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The formation of a FTA could result in trade diversion when the agreement 
imposes stringent rules of origin that would make an internal final good producer 
alters its importation of inputs from an efficient external inputs supplier to a less 
efficient internal one in order to comply with the FTA rules of origin and, 
consequently, benefit from FTA preferences.  It is to be noted, though, that this 
applies only to FTAs and unilateral concessions. CUs are different because they 
impose common external tariffs.  That is why, unlike FTAs and unilateral concessions, 
there is no need for preferential rules of origin within CUs, as clarified in Chapter I. 
Therefore, the trade diversion that may happen because of the imposition of stringent 
preferential rules of origin does not take place when it comes to the formation of CUs.  
 
Before forming a FTA between country A and B 
P.s. the arrow in this phase and the next one stands for the 
export of product X (input) to Country A, for the production 
of a final good there. 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Country A: 
Non-preferential 
rules of origin 
imposed on 
product X 
Country B   
 
 
Country C   
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After the formation of the A-B FTA 
To comply with the stringent FTA Preferential rules of 
origin, country A had to import product X from Country B 
instead of C 
 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
2.2.3    The Relation between the Imposition of Protectionist Rules of 
Origin and Trade Diversion. 
 
The discussion in sub-section 2.1.2.2 of protectionism concerning ketchup is 
an example of an actual case of trade diversion, where the imposition of the stringent 
NAFTA rule of origin for ketchup aims at driving North American ketchup producers 
to source the needed tomato paste from protected Mexican tomato paste producers, 
A-B FTA 
Country A   
 
X 
Country B   
 
 
Country C 
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rather than from the more efficient paste producers of Chile.137
2.2.4 North America vs. Asia. 
  This shows that there 
is a close relationship between using rules of origin as protectionist devices and the 
occurrence of trade diversion. 
Since the imposition of a protectionist rule of origin in a preferential trade 
regimes endeavors to protect an internal inputs supplier from competing with a more 
efficient external supplier by causing a shift in the importation of inputs to the former 
from the latter, all protectionist preferential rules of origin are trade-diverting, and 
thus negatively affect global efficiency.  Many examples other than the mentioned 
ketchup rule of origin clarify the relationship between the imposition of stringent, 
protectionist rules of origin and the occurrence of trade diversion. The following 
subparts illustrate additional examples. 
 
 
A diversion to North American sources of materials used in the textile industry, 
following the formation of the NAFTA, from efficient Asian suppliers138 to Mexico 
took place, which led to a reduction in Chinese and Indian materials exports to the US 
and Canada.139
                                                 
137 Brenton and Manchin (n 107) 28. 
138 Daniel Lederman, William F. Maloney, and Luis Serven, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin American 
and Caribbean (LAC) Countries: A Summary of Research Findings (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2004) 12. 
139 Inama (n 72) 278. 
  This happened because under the NAFTA rules of origin “unless 
natural fibres were imported”, the triple transformation rule imposed in the textile 
sector prevented the usage of cheap components from East Asia for the production of 
“NAFTA originating textiles”.   
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Preventing the use of East Asian components may have encouraged the 
establishment of a “capital-intensive” industry in Mexico, leading to a reduction in the 
NAFTA trade creation. 140  Consequently, Mexico acquired a considerable market 
share in both Canada and the US concerning its textile exports to their markets.141
A lot of Asian countries have declared in the late 1990s that the NAFTA 
stringent rules of origin imposed on the textiles and automobiles sectors were causing 
trade diversion.
  
This illustrates the role of the triple transformation rule in protecting North American 
materials producers and diverting trade to them from the competitive Asians.  
142  Subsequent to the formation of the NAFTA, the aggregate 
components for textile exports of Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan to North America 
became less than that of Mexico to the rest of its NAFTA contracting parties.143 
According to the World Bank, the NAFTA rules of origin were accountable for the 
regional shift of clothing importation from the Asian countries to Mexico.144
The following chart compares the allocations of Mexico, Hong Kong, Korea 
and Taiwan total textiles exports in North America, prior and subsequent to the 
formation of the NAFTA until 2001. This shows that trade diversion did take place in 
 
                                                 
140 “Potential US textiles companies wishing to relocate to Mexico have to invest greater amounts of 
capital in order to comply with NAFTA origin requirements, since to take advantage of labour costs 
and NAFTA preferential rates they have the following choices: (i) import US cotton yarn with loss of 
comparative advantage, or (ii) start the manufacturing process from imported natural fibres or to 
imports of fabrics from North America (i.e. increasing the trade diversion) or require Mexican and 
Canadian textiles producers to buy yarn from US textiles mills before being allowed to sell the clothing 
to US consumers duty-free. The combination of both the yarn forwarding rules and the high tariffs 
facing textile imports imply that the North American producers have an incentive to use US made 
fabrics rather than competitive fabrics from Asia.” TradeMark Southern Africa (TMSA), ‘Training 
Module on Rules of Origin’ (2013) TMSA Module to complement the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite market integration Initiative, 27 
<http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/Rules%20of%20Origin%20Training%20Module.pdf> accessed 
13 August 2014. 
141 T.N. Srinivasan, ‘Preferential Trade Agreements with Special Reference to Asia’ (2001) Paper 
presented at the Asian Economic Outlook Workshop, 9-10 
<http://www.econ.yale.edu/~srinivas/PrefTradeAgreements.pdf> accessed 31 August 2014. 
142 George Holliday, ‘Regional Trade Agreements: Implications for U.S. Trade Policy’ (1997) 
Congressional Report Service 97-663 E, 13 <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/97-663_19971212.pdf> 
accessed 12 August 2014. 
143 Lederman, Maloney, and Serven (n 138) 326. 
144 Ibid 12. 
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the North American Free Trade Area because the total Mexican clothing exports to 
the region before the formation of the NAFTA were less than that of Hong Kong, 
Korea and Taiwan, and contrary to what the situation came to be after the formation 
of the agreement, where the overall Mexican clothing exports to the region became 
higher than that of its three aforementioned rivals. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Lederman, Maloney, and Serven (2004).145
2.2.5    The EU double transformation rule and trade diversion. 
 
 
 
 As explained in section 2.1, the double transformation rule of origin in the 
EU preferential trade agreements is aimed mainly at encouraging the internal textile 
producers in the countries parties to these agreements to source the materials they 
need from EU suppliers rather than from more efficient external providers, such as 
those of China.  Thus according to Brenton and Manchin, producers in developing 
                                                 
145 Ibid, 326. 
1991-1994 1995-2001
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partner countries, such as those under the EU GSP and those in the Balkans under the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement, have to import fabrics from the EU instead 
of cheaper ones from producers in countries as China to comply with the double 
transformation rule of origin and be granted the preferences, leading to trade diversion, 
and a reduction in the economic welfare of Balkan countries.146
2.2.6     The Negative Effects of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. 
 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter I, subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions 
under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, preferential trade agreements may be formed 
as a discriminatory exception to the MFN principle. Article XXIV of the GATT 
differentiates between two main forms of preferential trade agreements, CUs and 
FTAs.  Article XXIV: 8 provides definitions for customs unions and free trade areas.  
Article XXIV:8 (a) (i) states that a customs union is a trading bloc that consists of two 
or more members in which, with certain exceptions, duties and restrictions of 
commerce are “eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade” between the 
members of the union.  Article XXIV: 8 (a) (ii) clarifies that a customs union imposes 
a common external tariff and other regulations of commerce related to commerce with 
WTO members which are third countries to the union. Article XXIV: 8(b) provides 
the same requirements of Article XXIV: 8 (a) (i), but with respect to free trade 
areas.147
                                                 
146 Brenton and Manchin (n 107) 14-15. 
147 Mikella Hurley and Marina Murina, ‘Designing a WTO-Consistent Customs Union: Select WTO 
Obligations in the Context of GATT Art. XXIV’ (2011) Submitted to the Permanent Mission of the 
Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 12.  
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Article XXIV: 4 provides that WTO member countries may form CUs or 
FTAs for the objective of facilitating trade between the constituent countries without 
raising barriers when it comes to trading with third countries.148
Article XXIV: 5 clarifies the conditions that shall be met to form a FTA or CU. 
Article XXIV: 5(a) and (b) illustrate that for preferential trade agreements to be 
formed, “the duties or other regulations of commerce” imposed at the formation of 
such agreements related to trade with third countries shall not on “the whole be higher 
or more restrictive” than those applied before the formation of the agreements.
 
149
Article XXIV: 6 clarifies that if the formation a CU results in a member 
country increase its tariffs above the concession rate, Article XXVIII would be 
applied. This means that the WTO member countries would have to enter negotiations 
with other WTO members. The aim of such negotiations is to compensate those third 
countries
 
150 which found difficulties accessing the market of the CU member.151
 Based on the arguments in the previous sub-sections, the formation of a 
preferential trade agreement could lead to trade diversion in two phases that could 
happen separately or together.  The first phase takes place when the liberalization of 
tariffs among the preferential trade area member countries makes internal trade less 
expensive than external trade.  This liberalization of tariffs and trade gives the internal 
suppliers special advantage that the outsider suppliers do not have.  The second phase 
occurs when the preferential trade agreement imposes stringent rules of origin that 
divert the final good producer’s importation of inputs from efficient external suppliers 
 
ii. The Outcome: 
                                                 
148 Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, (3rd 
edition, CUP 2013) 696. 
149 Lorand Bartels, ‘Interim agreements under Article XXIV GATT’ (2009) 8 World Trade Review 
339–350, 340 
150 WTO member countries that are not contracting parties to the CU.  
151 Petros Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (2nd edition OUP 2012) 212. 
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to inefficient internal ones, to satisfy the stringent preferential rules of origin and, thus, 
trade under preferences. 
What is common between the first and the second phases is that both of them 
take place subsequent to the formation of a preferential trade agreement.  However, 
trade diversion in both phases happens because of two different discriminatory causes.  
On one hand, the liberalization of tariffs among the preferential trade area member 
countries is what causes the diversion in the first phase and is discriminatory because 
the liberalization is provided to only the preferential trade area members and not to 
third countries.  On the other hand, what cause the diversion in the second phase are 
the stringent rules of origin.  Such rules are of a discriminatory nature because they 
are designed to favor internal suppliers of inputs at the expense of more efficient 
external ones. 
The GATT MFN principle does allow WTO member countries to discriminate 
between different sources of supply152.  However, the formation of preferential trade 
agreements under Article XXIV of the GATT and the principles of Annex II of the 
WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin do not lay down limits on the stringency level of 
the preferential rules of origin.  The signatories of the GATT knew that the formation 
of preferential trade areas under article XXIV of the GATT went against the GATT 
MFN principle,153
                                                 
152 Asian Development Bank (n 70) 9; in this paper it is clarified “[T]hat trade liberalization under the 
WTO should not involve any trade diversion, as MFN treatment implies nondiscrimination between 
sources of imports.” See also Cooper (n 121) 10. 
153 It is to be noted that there is more than one exception to the MFN principle.  The Enabling Clause of 
1979 is another exception from which developing countries are allowed to be accorded preferences 
autonomously from the developed countries through the formation of a GSP.  
 but they kept in mind that that formation and exception should 
68 
 
bring “welfare” to the preferential trade agreements’ contracting parties154 by creating 
trade within the preferential trade areas and by avoiding trade diversion therein.155
The application of stringent trade-diverting preferential rules of origin in a 
preferential trade area makes the internal trade costly and complicated and obstructs 
trade with efficient third countries’ producers that used to export inputs to the 
preferential trade area. Therefore, imposing trade-diverting rules of origin does not 
help in achieving the objectives of article XXIV (4) of the GATT 1994
 
156 because, 
pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Article, the formation of preferential trade areas 
“should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise 
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.”157
In preferential trade agreements, rules of origin are sometimes imposed to pursue 
political objectives depending on the foreign policies of the contracting parties. 
However, rules of origin were mainly designed for origin determination purposes and, 
definitely, not political ones. Furthermore, granting originating status is related to 
 
 In summary, imposing stringent preferential rules of origin in preferential 
trade regimes, along with high external MFN tariffs, is a trade-isolating barricade that 
could divert trade, obstruct efficient external sources of supply, and undermine global 
efficiency. 
 
2.3    The Use of Rules of Origin for Political Purposes. 
 
                                                 
154 Asian Development Bank (n 70) 5- 6. 
155 Cooper, (n 121) 10. 
156 Edwin Vermulst, ‘Keynote Speech for the ADB Intensive Course on Rules of Origin’(2004)  
Intensive Course on Rules of Origin, 16 <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2004/Intensive-
Rules-Origin/text-vermulst.pdf> accessed 10 July 2013. 
157 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (n 119) Article XXIV (4) (emphasis added). 
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“territorial disputes" because rules of origin are mainly employed to determine the 
territorial origin of the product. As a result, origin could be conferred to a territory 
that is not covered by a preferential trade agreement depending on the political views 
of WTO member countries. That is why this section is going to discuss two different 
issues. The first is how granting originating status in preferential trade regimes could 
depend on the political perspectives of WTO member countries. The second is how 
preferential rules of origin could be used for political purposes. Both are origin-
related issues and they need to be addressed because they do not make international 
trade transparent, predictable and smooth, contrary to the WTO’s aim to liberalize 
international trade.158
The predictability and stability of international trade creates investment 
opportunities, jobs and a variety of choices for consumers.
 
159
                                                 
158 World Trade Organization, ‘WTO Annual Report’ (2013) 3 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm> accessed 16 August 2014. 
See also World Trade Organization, ‘The WTO... ... In brief’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm> accessed 16 August 2014. 
159 World Trade Organization, ‘Principles of the Trading System’ (2014) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm> accessed 16 August 2014. 
  Leaving preferential 
rules of origin free for the political misuse would negatively affect trade relations, 
hinder trade and make it unpredictable for traders, producers and consumers.  
 
2.3.1    The Issue of Recognition. 
 
There are a lot of territorial disputes worldwide. The question is: how would a 
WTO member country face such a situation when it comes to determining the origin 
of an imported product in a preferential trade regime?  
70 
 
Article XXVI (5) (a) of the GATT states that: “Each government accepting this 
Agreement does so in respect of its metropolitan territory and of the other territories 
for which it has international responsibility, except such separate customs territories 
as it shall notify to the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTINGPARTIES at the 
time of its own acceptance” (emphasis added).  Such article illustrates that the answer 
to the question lies in the international responsibility of countries for the concerned 
territories.160
According to international law, Western Sahara is not recognized as being under 
the sovereignty of Morocco.
 
161  Article 94 of the EU-Morocco Association 
Agreement states that the Agreement "shall apply ... to the territory of the Kingdom of 
Morocco”.162  Despite that, the EU regards imports coming from Western Sahara as 
of Moroccan origin163 because “the Moroccan government controls Western Saharan 
trade and economic activities”.164
On June 1, 2000, the EU-Israel Association Agreement came into force.
 
165
                                                 
160 Moshe Hirsch, ‘Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments? The European Union 
Policy on Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’ (2002) 26 
Fordham International Law Journal 572-593, 578. 
161 Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara [1975] I.C.J. Rep. 12 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=323&p1=3&p2=4&case=61&p3=5> accessed 16 August 2014. 
162 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part [2000] OJ L 70/20. 
163 Eyal Rubinson, ‘More than Kin and Less than Kind: The Status of Occupied Territories under the 
European Union’s Bilateral Trade Agreements’ (2011) Konrad Adenauer Foundation Working Paper 
97/2011. 
164 Western Sahara Business Law Handbook: Strategic Information and Laws (USA International 
Business Publications, Washington DC 2013) 12. 
165 European Union External Action Service, ‘Agreements’ 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/eu_israel/political_relations/agreements/index_en.htm> 
accessed 16 August 2014. 
 The 
controversial question here is whether imports coming from the Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip shall be regarded as of Israeli origin. When it comes to 
the territorial application of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, Article 83 
provides: “This Agreement shall apply, on the one hand, to the territories in which the 
Treaties establishing the European Community and the European Coal and Steel 
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Community are applied and under the conditions laid down in those Treaties and, on 
the other hand, to the territory of the State of Israel”.166 Therefore, it is not clear 
whether the Israeli settlements are considered as part of Israel according to the Article.  
However, according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 446, “the policy 
and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab 
Territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious 
obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East”.167 Accordingly, the EU Commission answered the question of the territorial 
application of the agreement by stating that: “All relevant United Nations Security 
Council resolutions [. . .] lead to the conclusion that neither Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, nor east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, can be 
considered as part of the State of Israel”.168
The EU has adopted different approaches when it comes to conferring originating 
status in these two examples. While the EU regards the imports coming from Western 
Sahara as of Moroccan origin, it does not regard the imports coming from Israeli 
settlements as of Israeli origin.  Also, sometimes national courts adopt their respective 
government’s political approach.  For example, in the UK, if the Foreign Office does 
not recognize an entity, the English courts regard it as if it does not exist.
 
169
                                                 
166 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part (2000) L 147/17. 
167 UNSC Res 446 (12 July, 1979) UN Doc S/13450 
<http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/ba123cded3ea84a5852560e50077c2dc> accessed 16 August 
2014. 
168 Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Israel and the European Union (Lexington Books, United Kingdom 
2012) 223. 
169 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (6th edn CUP, New York 2008) 193. 
 Thus, 
originating status could be granted based on the foreign policies of WTO member 
countries in preferential trade regimes.  However, granting originating status should 
be based on international law, resolutions of international organizations or 
72 
 
international courts, such as the United Nations, General Assembly and International 
Court of Justice. 
 
2.3.2    Using Preferential Rules of Origin to Pursue Political 
Objectives. 
 
In practice, the application of preferential rules of origin sometimes depends on 
the foreign policies of WTO member countries. 
Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) are free trade zones established by the US 
Congress in 1996 and amended the US-Israel FTA for the purpose of supporting “the 
peace process in the Middle East”.170  Accordingly, Egyptian and Jordanian products 
exported to the US are eligible for duty-free access, if the values of the Israeli 
components used to produce the Egyptian and Jordanian products are 11.7 % and 8 %, 
respectively, of the final product value.171Although these rules of origin are of a 
flexible and tolerant nature, they are designed to pursue the mentioned political 
aim.172
According to Israel’s Ministry of Economy, Jordanian exports to the US were 
more than 1 billion dollars in 2004.
 
173
                                                 
170 The United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, s 19, USC s 2112 as 
amended by Public Law 104-234 (1996). See also Office of Textile and Apparel (OTEXA), 
‘Qualifying Industrial Zone’ (United States of America Department of Commerce International Trade 
Administration) 
<http://web.ita.doc.gov/tacgi/fta.nsf/7a9d3143265673ee85257a0700667a6f/196ed79f4f79ac0085257a0
70066961d> accessed 13 February 2014. 
171 State of Israel Ministry of Trade & Labor, ‘Q.I.Z – Qualifying Industrial Zones’ 
<http://www.moit.gov.il/NR/exeres/2124E799-4876-40EF-831C-6410830D8F02.htm> accessed 13 
February 2014. 
172 Hirsch ‘Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign and Domestic Policies’ (n 120) 8. 
173 However, it did not clarify the amount of goods exported under the QIZs. “Jordanian exports” does 
not necessarily include the Jordanian exports under the QIZs. 
 Total Israeli exports to Egypt as a result of the 
QIZs were $29 million in 2004; $93.2 million in 2005; and tripled in 2006. Moreover, 
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the Ministry demonstrated that the amount of Egyptian exports to the U.S. was $1,283 
million in 2004; more than $2 billion in 2005 and kept growing in 2006.174 However, 
such numbers do not show Jordanian and Egyptian exports to the US under the QIZs 
as a percentage of the total exports of each. An Egyptian report in 2008 shows 
something different that reflects the negative consequences of using rules of origin as 
imperative political instruments.  The report shows the number of Egyptian 
manufacturing firms that export to the US under the QIZ protocol. By June 5, 2008, 
717 Egyptian manufacturing firms were listed as QIZ eligible.  However, 77 % of 
such firms did not export under the QIZ protocol.175  Another study shows that the 
percentage of Jordanian exports under the QIZ in 2008 was only 0.1505 of the “total 
Jordanian merchandise exports”.176
Israel has been building settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
 
177 violating 
UN resolutions and fundamental human rights. 178   This made a lot of people 
worldwide, 179  especially in the Arab world, boycott Israeli products. 180
                                                 
174 Israel’s Ministry of Economy, ‘Qualifying Industrial Zones’ (Foreign Trade Administration 2014) 
<http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/5E659E0A-49C7-419A-8571-A87FB667AB4D.htm> accessed 
13 February 2014. 
175 Saad El Morsi, ‘77 % of the QUIZ Firms Have Not Export to the U.S. Markets’ [2008] (14) Elmal 5. 
176 Ahmed F. Ghoneim, ‘Impact of Qualifying Industrial Zones on Egypt: A Critical Analysis’ (2009) 
paper presented at the Virtual Institute UNCTAD meeting, Geneva, 23. 
177 BBC, ‘Israel Approves 558 East Jerusalem Settlement Homes’ (2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26056608> accessed 13 August 2014. 
178 Human Rights Watch, ‘Gaza: Israeli Soldiers Shoot and Kill Fleeing Civilians’ (2014) 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/04/gaza-israeli-soldiers-shoot-and-kill-fleeing-civilians> accessed 
17 August 2014. 
179 David Pollock, ‘Threats to Israel: Terrorist Funding and Trade Boycotts’ (2014) The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, Testimony submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 
180 Norwegian Shipowners’ Association (NSA), ‘Shipping Related Implications of the Arab League 
Boycott of Israel’ [2012] NSA Contingency Planning Secretariat, 1. See also, Martin A. Weiss, ‘Arab 
League Boycott of Israel’ (2006) Congressional Research Service RS22424. 
  In this 
scenario, rules of origin were used for a political aim and became stuck in a political 
battle between (1) the Egyptian consumer and manufacturer and (2) the Egyptian, US, 
Jordanian and Israeli authorities that formed the QIZs without considering the attitude 
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and preferences of the people (the consumers). Consequently, the result was not trade-
encouraging. 
Were preferential rules of origin designed originally for political purposes? No. 
International cooperation and peace processes are one thing and the use of preferential 
rules of origin something else. Preferential rules of origin are used to determine 
whether the good qualifies for preferential treatment, and not to pursue political 
objectives.  
 “So I propose the establishment of a U.S.-Middle East free trade area within a decade, 
to bring the Middle East into an expanding circle of opportunity, to provide hope for 
the people who live in that region.”181
On July 1, 1999, in Washington D.C, Egypt and the US signed the Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).  The purpose of the Agreement is to 
facilitate and expand the trade in goods between the two countries.  Also, the 
Agreement is deemed to be an initial step to form an Egypt-US FTA.
  George W. Bush. 
182  The TIFA 
resulted in the improvement of the trading relationship between Egypt and the US.183
                                                 
181 The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs, ‘Bush Calls for U.S.-
Middle East Free Trade Area’ <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2003/May/20030509173956ssor0.7209436.html> accessed 23 May 2013; See also, Jonathan 
Powell, ‘Free Trade Agreements: The Quiet Economic Track of U.S. Middle East Policy’ (2006) The 
Washington Institute Policy Analysis 1079 <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/free-trade-agreements-the-quiet-economic-track-of-u.s.-middle-east-policy> accessed 10 
August 2014. 
182 Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Trade and Industry, ‘Egypt- USA Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA)’ (2008) <http://www.mfti.gov.eg/english/Agreements/TIfa.htm> 
accessed 16 August 2014. 
183 Bernard Hoekman and Denise Konan, ‘Economic Implications of an Egypt-US FTA’ in Ahmed 
Galal and Robert Z. Lawrence (eds), Anchoring Reform With a US-Egypt Free Trade Agreement 
(Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 2005) 47. 
  
This indicates that the formation of an Egypt-US FTA is desirable to strengthen the 
Egyptian-US trading ties.     
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On May 9, 2003, the then US president, George W. Bush, urged the formation 
of the Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (US-MEFTA).184  At the time Secretary 
Rice paid Egypt a visit, she said: “we want to have an FTA with Egypt because we 
believe it will make a difference to economic reform and ultimately to the economy 
here in Egypt.”185
Chapter II clarified the protectionist practice of the US when it comes to the 
application of preferential rules of origin. That is why the harmonization of 
preferential rules of origin in the WTO system is needed. Doing so, along with the 
elimination of qualifying industrial zones, would leave no room for WTO member 
countries to use rules of origin as political instruments in preferential trade regimes. 
Moreover, the WTO should take into account that it is desirable for WTO member 
  In 2011, Lionel Johnson, vice president of Middle East and North 
Africa Affairs said: “closer trade relations between the United States and Egypt can 
bring growth and jobs for both countries”. 
Qualifying industrial zones are cumulation zones (explained in the next 
chapter). Without qualifying industrial zones, Egyptian and Jordanian firms would not 
be able to export duty-free to the US because whether the goods could be exported 
duty-free would depend on whether US law or bilateral treaties between the USA and 
Egypt/Jordan provided for duty-free trade. However, the elimination of qualifying 
industrial zones could combat the use of preferential rules of origin for political 
purposes. Besides, once a US-Egypt FTA is formed, Egyptian firms would still be 
able to export their goods to the US duty-free provided they comply with the US-
Egypt FTA rules of origin, but would the US-Egypt FTA rules of origin be flexible, 
transparent and not protectionist?  
                                                 
184 Daniel T. Griswold, ‘Free Trade Agreements: Steppingstones to a More Open World’ (2003) Trade 
Briefing Paper 18 CATO Institute, 2. 
185 United States House of Representative, ‘Review of the U.S. Assistance Programs to Egypt’ (2006) 
<http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa27645.000/hfa27645_0f.htm> accessed on 27 
August 2014. 
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countries to comply with international law, resolutions of international organizations 
and international courts when it comes to the recognition of disputed territories.  
 
2.4    The Worldwide Proliferation of Preferential Rules of Origin. 
 
Both Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause engendered a massive number of 
preferential trade agreements.  As of December 2008, about 421 preferential trade 
agreements were notified to the WTO.186  511 preferential trade agreements were 
notified to the WTO as of January 15, 2012.  In 2014, the number of notified 
agreements grew to 585. The establishment of new preferential trade agreements has 
led to the introduction of more new rules of origin to international trade.  The 
worldwide proliferation of rules of origin puts traders and producers in a nightmare of 
complying with and understanding different rules of origin imposed “arbitrarily” in 
different preferential trade agreements all over the world, resulting in high 
administrative costs. Such complexity does not make international trade transparent, 
predictable and smooth.187
Bhagwati stated that industries favor the formation of FTAs so as to gain by 
the provided preferences an advantage that their outsider rivals would not earn.  
 
Preferential rules of origin are set out with great elaboration in preferential 
trade agreements. They could be itemized in 200 pages or more (such as the NAFTA).  
Moreover, the application of preferential rules of origin differs from one agreement to 
another, making things complicated for a trader whose country is a member in a 
variety of agreements that impose different rules of origin.    
                                                 
186 World Trade Organization, Regional Trade Agreements (n 29). 
187 Peter Sutherland and others, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the 
New Millennium, Report by the Consultative Board to the Director General Supachai Panichpakdi 
(Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2004) 19-21. 
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Moreover, he illustrated that the variation in rules of origin and “regulations” across 
FTAs increases production costs, is deemed to be a dilemma for “customs 
administration”, and leads to what is named the “spaghetti-bowl” phenomenon.188 To 
be granted originating status, a final good could be produced differently twice: (1) by 
using inputs imported from one country to comply with a preferential trade 
agreement’s rules of origin; (2) and by using inputs imported from another country to 
comply with another preferential trade agreement’s rules of origin.  Such complex 
pattern of trading makes enterprises face difficulties when complying with a diversity 
of costs provoked by different agreements, especially when it comes to the imposition 
of stringent rules of origin.  This is what Bhagwati envisaged as a bowl of 
spaghetti.189
The APEC consists of 21 participants.
 
190
                                                 
188 Jagdish Bhagwati as quoted by Cooper (n 121) 11-12. 
189 Ibid 12. 
190 Namely, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China, Hong Kong - 
China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. 
Please see APEC, ‘ Member Economies’ <http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-
Economies.aspx> accessed on 12 August 2014. 
 Many agreements are formed 
between its members.  The following figure shows the bulk of the Spaghetti Bowl 
Phenomenon within the APEC region as of 2009.  In fact, such a phenomenon could 
also be visualized as a plague because a deeper look at the figure, or the fact that 
preferential trade agreements are growing in general, shows that preferential trade 
agreements spread like a plague, where the victims are those traders who suffer 
because of such a complicated system.   
The circles in the next figure represent the APEC members, while the lines 
represent an existing preferential trade agreement between the circles/members they 
connect with each other. 
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Source: Author’s analysis based on 
http://www.apec.org/webapps/fta_rta_information.html#others_fta 
 
At the moment, nothing can be done to either lessen the number of the 
preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO or prohibit the formation or new 
ones. However, the most practical solution to combat the spaghetti bowl phenomenon 
is to harmonize preferential rules of origin. Regardless of the number of preferential 
trade agreements that will be formed in the future, one set of preferential rules of 
origin could be applied to all of them. This would consequently reduce the complexity 
that traders and producers face and make international trade transparent, clear and 
predictable. 
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2.5    Summary. 
Preferential rules of origin are used to determine which imported goods 
qualify for preferential tariff treatment. The contracting parties to preferential trade 
agreements are free to impose any rules of origin they see fit. Such freedom can lead 
to the misuse of preferential rules of origin.  
Misusing preferential rules of origin can hinder international trade in various 
ways. The contracting parties in preferential trade agreements could use rules of 
origin to pursue protectionist, trade-diverting or political objectives, as clarified in this 
chapter. In addition, rules of origin should be transparent and clear. The complexity of 
rules of origin and their proliferation worldwide confuses traders and producers and 
does not make international trade transparent, clear or smooth. 
74 new preferential trade agreements were notified to the WTO during the past 
two years. Consequently, one can imagine how many rules of origin traders and 
producers are expected to become acquainted with every year. Of course, this makes 
international trade complicated, and not transparent or predictable, even though the 
main objective of the WTO is to liberalize trade. The most practical solution to 
overcome the problem of misusing preferential rules of origin would be to harmonize 
them. This issue is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE HARMONIZATION OF PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN 
 
 Rules of origin vary from country to country and from one preferential trade 
agreement to another. They are so complex and involve a lot of technicalities. To 
determine the origin of a good, one or more origin determination methods could be 
applied.  Moreover, the existence of cumulation rules makes things worse for a lot of 
traders and producers,191
 Efforts to harmonize rules of origin were made in 1953 by the International 
Chamber of Commerce. The latter submitted a proposal to the GATT members 
suggesting that they agree upon a regular “definition for determining the nationality of 
manufactured goods.”
 although they are considered by some to facilitate trade.  
Even if they facilitate trade in some cases, one question arises: how many rules do the 
public and traders have to know in order to practise trade and know their rights and 
obligations?  For this reason, the proper harmonization of rules of origin worldwide 
would be desirable in order to facilitate international trade and spread welfare all over 
the world. 
192  At that time, some countries declared that the determination 
of origin should be based on the “national economic policies” of each country. Other 
countries preferred a global origin designation criterion along with regular origin-
specifying rules. As a result, the suggestions of the International Chamber of 
Commerce were not embraced by the GATT.193
                                                 
191 Cumulation, accumulation or accumulative rules treat the inputs used to produce the final product as 
if they are originating in that country, as long as they are imported from a certain country or countries 
(as will be explained later). 
192 LaNasa III (n 35). 
193 Ibid. 
 
81 
 
 On September 25, 1974, the Kyoto Convention came into force.194  Annex D 
(which is Annex K currently) of the Convention was deemed to be another trail to 
harmonize rules of origin.195   The Kyoto Convention is aimed at harmonizing both 
preferential and non-preferential rules of origin for both of which it provides a set of 
standards to be followed when determining the origin of imported goods, whether 
they are wholly obtained in one country or more than one country is engaged in their 
production.  According to the Kyoto Convention, when it comes to the latter case, the 
country of origin is defined as the country where the last substantial transformation 
was performed.196 The Kyoto Convention lays down a set of principles that specify 
what operation constitutes a substantial transformation. 197   Unfortunately, many 
GATT contracting parties did not ratify Annex D of the Kyoto Convention and the 
Annex has not been regarded as a model to be followed by others of them.198
In the course of Uruguay Round, an agreement on rules of origin was 
discussed.  In 1995, the Agreement was adopted, which partially harmonizes non-
preferential rules of origin.
  
199
This chapter discusses the WTO’s efforts to harmonize non-preferential rules 
of origin. The chapter also clarifies how to overcome some problems concerning the 
application of rules of origin worldwide. Then, the chapter demonstrates how to 
harmonize preferential rules of origin and offers a very simple set of harmonized 
 
                                                 
194 International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Kyoto, 
18 May 1973) entered into force: 25 September 
1974<http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-
tools/conventions/pf_revised_kyoto_conv/~/media/A7D0E487847940AD94DD10E3FDD39D60.ashx> 
accessed 23 August 2014. 
195 Annex D.1 (Rules of origin), Annex D.2 (Documentary evidence of Origin) and Annex D.3 (Control 
of documentary evidence of origin) of the unrevised version of Kyoto Convention.  In the Current 
revised version of Kyoto Convention, Annex D became K, Annex D.1 became Chapter 1, Annex D.2 
became Chapter 2 and Annex D.3 became Chapter 3. 
196 International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (n 194) 
Annex K, Chapter 1: Rules of Origin, para 3. 
197 Ibid Annex K, Chapter 1: Rules of Origin, paras 4-11. 
198 Inama (n 72) 3-4. 
199 Agreement on Rules of Origin (n 47). 
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preferential rules of origin to be hopefully implemented in the WTO system and 
followed by all WTO member countries. Finally, the chapter sheds light on some 
negotiations that are currently taking place and that must be taken into account. 
 
3.1    The Harmonization of Non-preferential Rules of Origin 
 
The harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin has been undertaken by 
the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin in Geneva in association with the WCO 
Technical Committee on Rules of Origin in Brussels.200 The process was supposed to 
be completed after three years from the commencement of the Harmonization Work 
Programme, which started on 20 July 1995 (i.e. by 20 July 1998).  However, it has not 
been completed yet due to the existence of a number of outstanding issues.201
Prior to the completion of the harmonization process (during the transition 
period), the WTO member countries are not allowed to make alterations to their rules 
of origin that suit their interests and protect their national susceptible goods. Besides, 
any new rules of origin must be imposed transparently, without discrimination, 
without hindering international trade, and in an orderly and non-retroactive way.
 
202
Once the harmonization process is completed, the harmonized non-preferential 
rules of origin should be integrated in the Agreement as an annex, and consequently, 
the WTO member countries would have to bring them into effect for the purpose of 
applying MFN treatment from the enforcement date specified by the WTO Ministerial 
Conference.
 
203
                                                 
200 World Trade Organization, 'Technical Information on Rules of Origin’ (2014) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/roi_e/roi_info_e.htm> accessed 23 August 2014. 
201 World Trade Organization, ‘The WTO and World Customs Organization’ (2014) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_wco_e.htm> accessed 23 August 2014. 
202 Agreement on Rules of Origin (n 47) art 2. 
203 Ibid art 9(4). 
 Furthermore, the origin of the product will be determined according to 
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the last substantial transformation norm,204 where the change in tariff classification 
test will be applied, if more than one country is involved in the production of the good 
(i.e. if the product is not wholly produced in one country). Moreover, in case the 
change in tariff classification will not be enough to confer origin on the product, the 
value content and/or the specific manufacturing operation test will be implemented.205
 
 
3.1.1    The Outstanding Issues Obstructing the Completion of the 
Harmonization Process of Non-preferential Rules of Origin. 
 
In June 1999, 486 outstanding issues concerning the harmonization of non-
preferential rules of origin were submitted to the Committee on Rules of Origin.206  In 
November, 2001, the Doha Development Agenda was launched at the Fourth WTO 
Ministerial Conference with the aim of liberalizing international trade, by lowering 
“trade barriers” and reviewing “trade rules”.207 One of the Agenda’s objectives was to 
complete the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin by the end of 2001.208 
However, this deadline was subsequently extended until the end of 2002.209
                                                 
204 Ibid art 3(b). 
205 Ibid art 9(2). 
206 WTO, G/RO/41 (3 September 1999). This is a restricted document, but on file with the author. 
207 Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns (on the Ministerial Conference Fourth Session of 
November 2001 in Doha, November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/17 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_implementation_e.htm> accessed 
23 August 2014. 
208 International Monetary Fund, ‘The WTO Doha Trade Round: Unlocking the Negotiations and 
Beyond’ (2011) paper presented by the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and Approved by 
Tamim Bayoumi, 12 <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/111611.pdf> accessed 20 
December 2014. 
209 World Trade Organization, ‘Agreement on Rules of Origin’ (2014) para 28 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/roi_01_e.htm> accessed 23 August 
2014. 
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By June 2002, the number of outstanding issues had been reduced to 138.210 In 
July 2002, the Committee on Rules of Origin referred 94 issues to the General 
Council. Out of these 94 issues, about 30 products are currently implicated in 83 
issues on product-specific rules of origin. 211   The General Council decided to 
concentrate on the following 12 of these 94 issues: “Implications of the 
implementation of the Harmonized Rules of Origin on other WTO Agreements;212 
Dyeing and printing of textile products; Coating of steel products; Assembly of 
machinery; Assembly of vehicles; Refining of sugars; Roasting of coffee; 
Slaughtering of live animals; Refining of oils; Fish taken from the sea of the exclusive 
economic zone;213 Footwear; and Dairy products”.214
There are ongoing negotiations to complete the harmonization of non-
preferential rules of origin. In 2007, the Committee on Rules of Origin produced a 
draft Consolidated Text of Non-preferential Rules of Origin, which was then revised 
and “circulated” on November 11, 2010.
  Since 2002, the deadline for 
completing the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin has been extended 
from one year to the next. 
215
                                                 
210 Report by the Chairman of Committee on Rules of Origin to the General Office (15 July 2002) 
G/RO/52 <http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/G/RO/52.doc> accessed 23 
August 2014. 
211 Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen, ‘Multilateralising Preferential Rules of Origin around the 
World’(n 49) 13 See also Harmonization Work Programme Under the Agreement on Rules of Origin – 
The Way Forward (April 2010) WT/GC/W/622, para 7, 2 
<http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/wt/gc/w622.doc> accessed 27 August 
2014. 
212 In other words, the impact the harmonized rules of origin would have on other WTO agreements. 
213 This is the only wholly obtained issue among the 94 issues. The wholly obtained issue concerned 
the question of what origin to confer on the fish caught in the Exclusive Economic Zone and more 
specifically, whether it should be based on the flag of the member attached to the fishing vessel or on 
the coastal country. 
214 Vermulst (n 156) 9 See also Walter Stocker, ‘The WCO Seminar on the Harmonization of Non-
preferential Rules of Origin’ (2008) World Customs Organization 
<http://portal.dga.gov.do/dgagov.net/uploads/file/seminario_regional_oma/01rules-of-origin-
english.pdf> accessed 22 May 2014 (discussing details concerning similar issues and their resolution). 
 The draft consolidated text includes a 
215 Draft Consolidated Text of Non-preferential Rules of Origin (November 2010) G/RO/W/111/Rev.6 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
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draft Annex III to the Agreement on Rules of Origin and a draft Ministerial decision 
to adopt the Annex. The draft Annex III provides: “general rules; an appendix 
defining goods that are to be considered as being wholly obtained in one country; and 
an appendix of product-specific rules of origin for each chapter of the Harmonized 
System of customs classification”.216In April 2014, the WTO Secretariat presented the 
last draft Consolidated Text of Non-preferential Rules of Origin to the WTO member 
countries delegates. 217 Thereafter, the Chairman 218 of the Committee on Rules of 
Origin “reported on his consultations with delegations on a possible way forward for 
the Committee’s harmonization work programme on non-preferential rules origin”.219
                                                                                                                                            
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=87171,103528,72848,72834,73699,66435,91395,13417,87542
,63928&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&FullTextSearch=> accessed 23 August 2014. 
216 World Trade Organization, ‘Agreement on Rules of Origin’ (n 209) para 31. 
217 Minutes of the Meeting of 10 April 2014 (April 2014) G/RO/M/62, 2014, para 3.2 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=125359,123668,123622,122499,122165&CurrentCatalogueIdI
ndex=0&FullTextSearch=> accessed 23 August 2014. 
218 Mr. Marhijn Visser (The Netherlands). 
219 World Trade Organization, ‘Steps agreed on implementing Bali decision on rules of origin for LDCs’ 
(2014) <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/roi_10apr14_e.htm> accessed 23 August 2014. 
 
The inability of the WTO contracting parties to settle the outstanding issues 
until now is reflected in their importance, since such issues directly affect the interests 
of the parties.  This is why cooperation is needed between the WTO member 
countries to resolve these outstanding issues. 
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3.1.2    Problems Concerning the Application of Non-preferential 
Rules of Origin Worldwide and Suggestions to Overcome Remaining 
Obstacles to Their Harmonization. 
 
As explained in Chapter I, there are three methods of determining origin. Each 
method has its advantages and disadvantages. This section explains the advantages 
and disadvantages of each method of determining origin. Moreover, the section offers 
solutions on how to avoid the disadvantages and discusses the issue of the countries 
who are not yet members of the WTO. After all, even when non-preferential rules of 
origin are harmonized, non-WTO members would not be obliged to apply them to 
imported goods.  
 
a. The Change in Tariff Classification Method. 
 
The implementation of the change in tariff classification method220 is flexible 
and uncomplicated. However, its application is relevant to the HS, seeing that a 
profound acquaintance concerning the latter would be required once the non-
preferential rules of origin are harmonized. Moreover, the HS was not formed, on the 
whole, for origin specification objectives.  That is why the itemization of two kinds of 
certain production processes is needed: processes that do not grant originating status, 
even though they engender a change in tariff classification, and processes that grant 
originating status, in spite of the fact that they do not result in a change in tariff 
classification.221
 
 
                                                 
220 The change in tariff classification was discussed in Chapter 1. 
221 Vermulst (n 156) 5. 
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b. The Value Content Requirement. 
 
There are three types of the value content requirement:222
- The import value content requirement: origin is to be conferred on the final 
product, if the value of the imported inputs used in producing it is not higher 
than the maximum value specified by the rule. 
 
- The local value content requirement: origin is to be conferred on the final 
product, if the value of the domestic inputs used in producing it is not lower 
than the minimum value required by the rule. 
- The value of originating parts requirement: origin is to be conferred on the 
final product if the value of the originating parts used in its production is not 
lower than the minimum value required by the rule.223
Although the value content test is transparent and uncomplicated when identified, 
there are defects in its application. The import and local value content requirements 
are the most commonly used in non-preferential and preferential trade regimes. Some 
countries prefer the application of the former and other countries prefer the 
application of the latter. To calculate the percentage of the value content, the 
numerator must be divided by the denominator and then multiplied by 100. When the 
import value content method is applied, the numerator is the value of non-originating 
inputs. On the other hand, when the local value content is applied, the numerator 
becomes the value of originating inputs. Generally speaking, the value of the final 
product consists of the value of the originating and non-originating inputs.  The 
denominator is the delivery term the final product is to be valued at. The applicable 
 
                                                 
222 The value content requirement was explained in Chapter 1. 
223 Vermulst (n 156) 6. 
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delivery term varies from one country to another and from one preferential trade 
agreement to another as well. Furthermore, relying on the value content requirement 
could chastise efficient production processes in countries with cheap labour and 
inputs, which could certainly affect the value of the elements counted as originating. 
Also, due to the fluctuation of the prices of inputs and exchange rates, calculating the 
percentage of the value content is not constant. Explaining these issues and offering 
solutions on how to combat them are discussed below.  
 
i. The Import Value Content Requirement vs. the Local Value Content 
Requirement. 
 
The WTO member countries should agree on whether the applicable value 
content requirement is going to be the import value content requirement or the local 
value content requirement when it comes to the harmonization of non-preferential 
rules of origin.224  As for the value of originating parts requirement, it concentrates 
only on the value of the parts and does not take into consideration the costs of 
assembly and the manufacturing overheads in the local production process. That is 
why the value of originating parts requirement is unfair and traders and producers 
have complained about its stringency. 225  Generally, the import value content 
requirement is applied by many jurisdictions.226
                                                 
224 Edwin A. Vermulst, Jacques Bourgeois and Paul Waer (eds), Rules of Origin in International Trade: 
A Comparative Study, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994) 478. 
225 Inama (n 72) 441-442. See also ibid 437. 
226 Rajan Ratna, ‘Rules of Origin: Diverse Treatment and Future Development in the Asia and Pacific 
Region’, in Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (ed.), Towards 
Coherent Policy Frameworks – Understanding Trade and Investment Linkages, (Bangkok: ESCAP, 
2008) 76, 67-91. See also Brenton, ‘Notes on Rules of Origin with Implications for Regional 
Integration on Southeast Asia’ (n 55) 21. 
  For example, it is applied in the EU 
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preferential trade regimes. Moreover, applying it is uncomplicated,227 would lessen 
the administrative obstacles 228  and would not need circumstantial instantaneous 
inspections on the “data provided.”229
ii. The Denominator and the Numerator: An Emphasis on the EU’s Practice. 
  
 
 
As previously explained, to calculate the percentage of the local content, the 
value of originating inputs230
                                                 
227 Applying it is uncomplicated because the import value content percentage can be simply calculated 
by adding only the costs of the imported inputs valued at the specified delivery term together, dividing 
such costs by the denominator and multiplying the remainder by 100, contrary to calculating the 
percentage of the local value content where the costs of a variety of local content factors must be added 
together before being divided by the denominator and then multiplied by 100. 
228 Administrative obstacles take place particularly when it comes to using the value of originating 
parts requirement. In spite of this, such obstacles will be lessened if the import value content 
requirement is going to be a supplementary origin determination criterion after the harmonization of 
non-preferential rules of origin. 
229 Vermulst, Bourgeois and Waer (n 224) 448-49, 479. 
230 The sum of the factors that are counted as parts of the local content. 
 (the numerator) should be divided by the denominator 
and then multiplied by 100. To calculate the percentage of the import content, the 
value of the non-originating inputs (the numerator) —at a specific delivery term—
should be divided by the denominator and then multiplied by 100.  The denominator 
is the value of the final good at a specific delivery term. Since the denominator and 
the numerator used to calculate the value content percentage may differ from one 
country to another and from one preferential trade agreement to another, the EU’s 
standards of calculating the value content percentage will be used as the model to be 
followed by all WTO member countries because the EU complies with the rational 
recommendations of the Kyoto Convention when it comes to calculating the value 
content percentage. 
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The EU uses the Cost Insurance & Freight (CIF) price to value imported 
inputs.231 The CIF price is the price paid to the exporter of inputs at the time of 
importation, which includes the freight and insurance costs incurred to transfer the 
goods232 to the port of importation.233 Accordingly, any payable charges “incurred 
from” transferring the goods from the manufacturing firm in the exporting country 
until they reach the border of the importing country are to be regarded as non-
originating and the payable charges incurred after crossing the border of the importing 
country are to be regarded as originating.234 Moreover, the EU uses the ex-works 
price235 as the denominator. The ex-works price is the cost of the final product from 
the manufacturing firm.  This means that the ex-works price includes all costs 
incurred in producing the final product up to the time placing it in the manufacturing 
firm - i.e. it includes the costs of all inputs236 (the cost of the originating inputs + the 
value of the non-originating inputs at the specified delivery term),237 direct labour 
costs, 238  factory costs, Selling, General & Administrative Expenses (SG&A), 239
                                                 
231 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code [1993] OJ L 253, as 
amended [2013] OJ L 341. Pursuant to Article 40, 39 (“origin is conferred if the value of the non-
originating materials used does not exceed a given percentage of the ex-works price of the products 
obtained, such percentage shall be calculated as follows:  ‘value’ means the customs value at the time 
of import of the non-originating materials used or, if this is not known and cannot be ascertained, the 
first ascertainable price paid for such materials in the country of processing.”). 
232 These are the intermediate goods (inputs) that will be used to produce the final product. 
233 For different definitions of International Commercial Terms (Incoterms), see World Customs 
Organization, ‘Definitions’ <http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-
tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-rules-of-origin/specific-topics/study-topics/def.aspx?p=1> 
accessed 23 August 2014. 
234 Hatem Mabrouk, ‘Rules of Origin as International Trade Hindrances’ (2010) 5 Entrepreneurial 
Business Law Journal 98, 158-159. See also Vermulst, Bourgeois and Waer (n 224) 438. 
235 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 (n 231) art 40, 39 (“‘ex-works price’ means the ex-
works price of the product obtained minus any internal taxes which are, or may be, repaid when such 
product is exported.”). 
236 Both kinds of inputs (the originating and the non-originating) are known as direct materials.  
237 For example, if the imported inputs are valued at the FOB price, all costs incurred in producing the 
inputs up to delivering them on board the shipping vessel, at the agreed specified export port (pursuant 
to the terms of the sale contract), will be regarded as non-originating and all charges incurred for 
transportation and insurance will be regarded as originating. Hence, only such originating charges will 
be included in the denominator and will be thus regarded as part of the local content. 
 
238 The manufacturing costs (or product costs) consist of direct and indirect manufacturing costs. While 
the direct manufacturing costs comprise the direct materials and direct labour costs, the indirect costs 
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packing expenditures and profit (if available).240
All of the mentioned elements, with the exception of the value of the non-
originating inputs, are factors counted as part of the local content.  Their sum gives 
the numerator, if the ex-works price is used as the denominator and the method of 
calculation is the local content. However, if the method of calculation is the import 
content, only the value of the non-originating inputs will be the numerator. That is 
why determining what factor is to be counted as part of the local content, and 
consequently calculating the numerator, depends on the denominator used.
 Therefore, the denominator is the 
addition of the value of the originating inputs to the value of the non-originating ones. 
241
Pursuant to the Recommended Practice 5 of Chapter 1 of Annex K of the 
Kyoto Convention, the final product should be valued at the ex-works or the FOB 
(Free on Board) price
 
Since the EU uses the ex-works price as the denominator and values the 
imported inputs at the CIF price, it complies with Recommended Practice 5 of 
Chapter 1 of Annex K of the Kyoto Convention. 
242
                                                                                                                                            
comprise the factory costs (or manufacturing overheads). The factory costs include the indirect labour, 
indirect materials and factory-related costs. 
 (the denominator).  Moreover, the imported inputs should be 
239 The SG&A expenses, Ipso facto, include the wages for administrators, royalties (only if they are 
rational under the EU’s standards), insurance, traveling expenditures for the administrators and those 
who are assigned to sell the goods, expenses for heat and lighting, costs of leasing facilities, and 
payroll outlays. However, when it comes to using the ex-works price as the denominator, any SG&A 
expenses incurred subsequent to the departure of the product from the manufacturing firm must be 
taken away. Thus, direct selling expenses will be disregarded. See next footnote. 
240 Vermulst, Bourgeois and Waer (n 224) 442, 433-485. See also, in such book, a comparative analysis 
on the use of different denominators and the numerator calculations by different jurisdictions: the US, 
the EU, Japan, Australia and Canada. It is to be noted that under the EU’s standards, if the profit is not 
rational, it will not be included in the denominator or the ex-works price. 
241 However, that is not always the case because although the US in its preferential trade regimes uses 
the FOB price as the denominator which comprises the SG&A expenses and profit, it does not count 
the latter elements as local content factors (only royalties are included in the numerator because 
sometimes they are comprised in the factory costs and not the SG&A expenses). See Hatem Mabrouk 
(n 234)160-161. 
242 The FOB price in Recommended Practice 5 of Chapter 1 of Annex K of the Kyoto Convention is 
referred to as “the price at exportation”. See International Convention on the Simplification and 
Harmonization of Customs Procedures (n 194) Annex K, Chapter 1: Rules of Origin, para 5. 
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valued on a CIF basis.243
 Although valuing the final goods at the FOB price complies with 
Recommended Practice 5 of Chapter 1 of Annex K of the Kyoto Convention and 
results in the containment of the numerator to more local content factors,
  The FOB price is the price paid to the exporter at the agreed 
port of exportation when the goods are loaded onto the carrier.  
244 the ex-
works price has been agreed to be more suitable than the FOB price when used as the 
denominator.245
The denominator and the numerator used to calculate the value content 
percentage may differ from one country to another and from one preferential trade 
agreement to another.
  Using the latter as the denominator is deemed to be unfair to the 
factories that are situated far away from the seaport because the more distance that 
exists between the factory and the seaport, the more transportation costs from the 
factory to the seaport will have to be paid.  Hereby, using the FOB as the denominator 
will provide the factories situated near the seaport with a specialty (less transportation 
costs) that the factories situated far away from the seaport will not have. Hereby, 
using the ex-works price instead of the FOB price as the denominator is deemed to be 
fairer, in spite of the fact that using any of them as the denominator complies with the 
rational recommendations of the Kyoto Convention. 
246
                                                 
243 The CIF price in Recommended Practice 5 of Chapter 1 of Annex K of the Kyoto Convention is 
referred to as “the dutiable value at importation”. Ibid. 
244 When compared with using the ex-works price as the denominator. 
245 Vermulst, Bourgeois and Waer (n 224) 442. 
246 For instance, the denominator used in the US preferential trade schemes is the transaction value. The 
transaction value is “the value of the good adjusted to a FOB. basis”. For an example, see North 
American Free Trade Agreement (n 51) art. 402. 
 That is why using the EU’s standards of calculating the value 
content percentage as the model to be followed by all WTO member countries seems 
to be the most reasonable solution because, as previously mentioned, the EU complies 
with the recommendations of Kyoto Convention when it comes to calculating the 
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value content percentage, i.e. to use the ex-works price as the denominator, to value 
the imported inputs at the CIF price247 and to use the EU’s same local content factors 
for calculating the numerator.248
iii.   Chastising Efficient Production Processes. 
 
 
 
The value content requirement chastises “low cost or efficient production 
operations” 249  in countries with cheap labour and inputs because such cheapness 
makes it difficult for the producers to include costly local content factors in the 
numerator to comply easily with the value content requirement, contrary to the 
producers in countries with expensive labour and inputs.  Consequently, least 
developed countries, by reason of the value content requirement, are discriminated 
against and do not benefit from the advantage of low-cost production operations that 
they only have over developed countries.250
 
  Despite that, after the harmonization of 
non-preferential rules of origin, the efficient producers in the lesser-developed 
countries would not deal with the aforementioned problem in most cases because the 
value content requirement would be used as a supplementary, and not primary, origin 
designation criterion. 
                                                 
247 While the EC, Japan, Australia and Canada use the CIF price to value the imported inputs, the US 
uses the FOB price. See Hatem Mabrouk (n 234) 161. 
248 It could have been sufficient to urge using the EU’s denominator and the valuation criterion of 
imported inputs (the CIF price) since this would consequently specify what factor is to be counted as 
part of the local content. However, that is not always the case because although the US, for example, in 
its preferential trade regimes uses the FOB price as the denominator which comprises the SG&A 
expenses and profit, it does not count the latter elements as local content factors (only royalties are 
counted because sometimes they are comprised in the factory costs and not the SG&A expenses). This 
is why all WTO member countries should use the EU’s local content factors to calculate the numerator 
since this, as illustrated, is the most reasonable solution. See ibid. 
249 Vermulst, Bourgeois and Waer (n 224) 447. 
250 Paul Brenton, ‘Preferential Rules of Origin’, in Jean-Pierre Chauffour and others (eds), Preferential 
Trade Agreements Policies for Development: A Handbook (World Bank, Washington DC 2011) 161-
168, 163. 
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iv. The Instability of the Prices of Inputs Worldwide and the Fluctuation of 
Exchange Rates. 
 
Due to the instability of the prices of inputs and exchange rates, calculating the 
percentage of the value content is not constant and generates uncertainty for 
producers. 251
Exchange rates tend to be going up and down. They change frequently. 
According to Brenton, “[a]n operation which confers origin today may not do so 
tomorrow if exchange rates change.”
  The value content method takes no account of the exchange rates 
fluctuation and the instability of the prices of inputs. As the value of the currency and 
the price of inputs change, the originating status of a finished good can change on 
daily basis.  
252 However, Brenton used the word “may”. This 
clarifies that the opposite of what he said may also happen, if exchange rates change 
positively, which would offset some of the uncertainty for traders.  In other words, the 
currency risk is a two-edged sword: what is positive for one party is negative for the 
other. Given that exchange rates always fluctuate, the problem is insuperable, unless a 
global economic and monetary union is going to be formed. However, there are ways 
to minimize the fluctuation of prices of inputs and exchange rates problem. The first 
is if the final good producer obtains a binding advance ruling from the country’s 
customs administration. The second is by using the weekly, monthly or annual 
average exchange rates. 253
Based on the arguments in the previous subparts, the WTO member countries 
have to bear in mind that the EU’s denominator (ex-works price), local content factors 
 
                                                 
251 LaNasa III (n 35) See also Teruo Ujie, ‘Trade Facilitation’ (2006) Manila, Asian Development Bank, 
Economic and Research Department, Working Paper Series 78, 11 
<http://www.adb.org/publications/trade-facilitation> accessed 29 August 2014. 
252 Paul Brenton, ‘Preferential Rules of Origin’ (n 250) 163. 
253 LaNasa III (n 35) Ch. IV, B.  
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and valuation method of imported inputs (at the CIF price) can lay a good 
groundwork for the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin that depend on 
the value content requirement. In addition, the import value content requirement of a 
tolerant percentage should be applied instead of the local value content one. 
 
c. The Specific Manufacturing Operation Method. 
 
Like the value content test, the specific manufacturing operation method is 
transparent and not obscure when identified. It is also concrete. However, it has its 
share of defects.   
The specific manufacturing operation method always engenders product-
specific rules of origin254 and is misused pursuant to national “interests.” 255  Another 
problem with the specific manufacturing operation test is when the rule of origin 
requires the measurement of complicated production operations. The rule then 
becomes stringent and complying with it becomes difficult.256
                                                 
254 Paul Brenton, ‘Preferential Rules of Origin’ (n 250) 163. 
255 Vermulst, Bourgeois and Waer (n 224) 450. 
256 Paul Brenton, ‘Preferential Rules of Origin’ (n 250) 164, explaining the advantages, disadvantages, 
and key issues of the three methods of determining origin. 
 That is why the rule 
should require the simplest possible operations for producing the good to be taken 
into account when it comes to using the specific manufacturing operation test as a 
supplementary origin designation method. By solving the product-specific 
outstanding issues and by completion of the harmonization process of non-preferential 
rules of origin, the specific manufacturing operation method would not engender 
product-specific origin rules any longer and would not be misused pursuant to 
national interests. 
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An example of a tolerant specific manufacturing operation rule is that 
indicated in Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-
CAFTA), where a reasonable single transformation process is required to be complied 
with for certain textile products which are: “brassieres (HS subheading 6212.10), 
certain woven boxer shorts and pajamas (found in HS headings 6207 through 6208), 
and certain woven women’s/girls’ dresses (found in HS subheadings 6204.42 through 
6204.44).”257
Currently there are 24 WTO observer countries. About 14 countries are neither 
WTO observers nor members.
 
 
d. Non-WTO Member Countries. 
 
It is worth explaining that in the case of non-preferential rules of origin, 
determining the origin of the goods becomes a problem in practice if goods are 
imported in a non-WTO member. A non-WTO member could impose non-
preferential rules of origin that do not comply with the disciplines provided by the 
Agreement on Rules of Origin. This means that even when non-preferential rules of 
origin are harmonized, non-WTO members would not be obliged to apply them to 
imported products.  
258 The good thing is that the observer countries must 
start membership negotiations (accession) within five years of being observers.259 
Currently, all of them are negotiating their WTO membership.260
                                                 
257 US International Trade Commission, Probable Economic Effect of Modifications to DR-CAFTA 
Rules of Origin and Tariffs for Certain Apparel Goods, Investigation No. DR-CAFTA-103-16, Report 
No. USITC/PUB-3946 (USITC Publication 3946, Washington DC 2007) 2-6. 
258 World Trade Organization, ‘Members and Observers’ (n 27). 
259 With the exception of the Vatican. Ibid. 
260 World Trade Organization, ‘WTO Members and Accession Candidates’ (2013) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/members_brief_e.doc> accessed 23 August 2014. 
 For example, Russia 
and Yemen were WTO observer countries. Both started their membership 
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negotiations and then became WTO member countries in 2012 261  and 2014, 262
Even though the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin has not been 
yet completed, there have been progress and ongoing negotiations to complete the 
harmonization, as clarified above.
 
respectively. Accordingly, the number of WTO member countries is increasing, 
which means that more countries would comply with the WTO disciplines and 
principles. As for the countries that are neither WTO members nor observers, they are 
urged to join the WTO. After all, the WTO aims to liberalize trade and make it 
transparent. 
e. Conclusion. 
263
                                                 
261 The eighth Ministerial Conference in Geneva approved the accession of Russia on December 16, 
2011. On August 22, 2012, Russia became the 156th WTO member country. See World Trade 
Organization, ‘Russian Federation’ (2014) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm> accessed 23 August 2014. 
262 The ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali approved the accession of Yemen on December 4, 2013. 
On June 26, 2014, Yemen became the 160th WTO member country. See World Trade Organization, 
‘Yemen’ (2014) <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_yemen_e.htm> accessed 23 August 
2014. 
263 E-mail from Pierre de Vaucher to author (9 January 2009), on file with author. 
 To not stall such progress, cooperation between 
WTO member countries is needed. Moreover, all of the suggestions, arguments and 
analysis mentioned so far in this section should be taken into consideration by the 
WTO Committee on Rules of Origin to achieve not only a harmonized set of non-
preferential rules of origin, but also a rational one. Once non-preferential rules of 
origin are harmonized, they will be integrated into the Agreement of Rules of Origin 
as an annex, and the contracting parties will consequently have to carry them out from 
the enforcement date specified by the Ministerial Conference. Thereupon, the origin 
of the product will be determined according to a clear substantial transformation norm 
where the change in tariff classification method will be applied, when more than one 
country is involved in the production of the good, and supplemented by the value 
content and/or the specific manufacturing operation tests. 
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Having a single regular set of non-preferential rules of origin would not allow 
WTO member countries to impose rules of origin that suit their interests and protect 
their national susceptible goods, and would consequently end possible disputes. In 
addition, customs administrations worldwide would not face any more dilemmas 
caused by a variety of rules of origin imposed differently by each WTO member 
country.  Further, non-preferential rules of origin would no longer be considered as a 
nightmare for producers and traders all over the world. 
 
3.2    Harmonizing Preferential Rules of Origin. 
 
During the Uruguay Round, the harmonization of preferential rules of origin 
was proposed.264 Subsequently, the Agreement on Rules of Origin in Annex II lays 
down a few principles that the WTO member countries must comply with when 
imposing rules of origin, whether in autonomous or contractual trade regimes.265 In 
2010, the EU successfully harmonized and simplified its GSP rules of origin.266 In 
December, 2013, at the ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali, WTO ministers adopted 
the “Bali Package” which consists of a several decisions aimed at lowering trade 
barriers and facilitating trade for least developed countries.267 One of the decisions is 
on preferential rules of origin for least developed countries.268
                                                 
264 Luc De Wulf and Jose B Soko (eds), Customs Modernization Handbook (The World Bank, 
Washington DC 2005) 188. 
265 These principles were discussed in Chapter I. 
266 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
2454/93, laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 
establishing the Community Customs Code [2010] OJ L307/1. 
267 Bali Ministerial Declaration (7 December 2013) WT/MIN(13)/DEC 
<http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/balipackage_e.htm> accessed 23 August 2014. 
268 Preferential Rules of Origin for Least-Developed Countries (7 December 2013) WT/MIN(13)/42 or 
WT/L/917 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_DownloadDocument.aspx?Symbol=WT/L/917&Language=En
glish&CatalogueId=125359&Context=ShowParts> accessed 23 August 2014. 
 The decision lays down 
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certain guidelines to be followed by preference-giving countries for the application of 
preferential rules of origin to imports coming from least developed countries in 
autonomous trade regimes. According to the guidelines of Bali decision, such 
preferential rules of origin “should be as transparent and simple as possible”. 269 
Moreover, when it comes to the methods for determining origin, the change in tariff 
classification, if applied, should be done at the tariff heading or sub-heading level.270 
As for the application of the value content, the decision clarifies that the percentage of 
non-originating inputs used to produce the final good should not exceed 75% of the 
final product (import value content), and the non-originating inputs are to be valued at 
the CIF price.271 Also, according to the Bali decision, the application of the specific 
manufacturing operation method should be as simple as possible and take into 
consideration the production capabilities and the development levels of the least 
developed countries.272
Unfortunately, India did not support the implementation of the Bali Package. 
The decision of the Bali Package on public stockholding for food security purposes 
 
                                                 
269 World Trade Organization, ‘Steps agreed on implementing Bali decision on rules of origin for LDCs’ 
(n 219). 
270 Ibid. 
271 The Bali decision did not directly specify that the value of the non-originating inputs should be 
valued at the CIF price. However, the decision provides: “in case of methods used for calculation of 
foreign inputs, Members may exclude costs related to freight and insurance as well as international 
transportation costs. In case of methods used for calculation of local/domestic content, Members may 
include national or regional inland transportation costs.” Thus, this implies using the CIF price to value 
the non-originating inputs. The CIF valuation means that all costs (including the insurance and freight) 
incurred to send the inputs to the importing country’s port are regarded as non-originating and all 
subsequent costs, like inland transportation, are regarded as originating. 
272 World Trade Organization, ‘Preferential Rules of Origin for Least-Developed Countries’ (n 268). 
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was difficult for India to agree to. 273  Subsequently, the WTO member countries 
agreed to find a permanent solution to that issue by 2017.274
Most preferential trade agreements have certain elements or rules in common, 
like the definitions, neutral elements and the list of wholly-obtained goods. Besides, 
consensus on most of these elements by all WTO member countries’ delegates was 
confirmed during one of their meetings, with the technical committee on rules of 
origin discussing a draft of harmonized non-preferential rules of 
 
The Bali decision on preferential rules of origin for least developed countries 
is a breakthrough for the WTO because it reflects the WTO member countries’ 
multilateral recognition of the need to simplify preferential rules of origin and impose 
them pursuant to the production capacities of the exporting countries. That is why 
many have supported the harmonization of preferential rules of origin and many see 
that it is of crucial importance. 
According to some opinions, harmonized non-preferential rules of origin 
would lead toward harmonized preferential rules of origin because they would supply 
preferential rules of origin with a good model for harmonization. However, the 
harmonization of preferential rules of origin should be done in a different way 
because each of the methods for determining origin has its benefits and drawbacks, so 
certain steps should be taken to avoid the drawbacks when harmonizing preferential 
rules of origin for the sake of trade facilitation, transparency and speeding the process 
of harmonization.  
                                                 
273 This is a highly sensitive matter for India “given the outlay on its food programme and promises 
made to the people on the Food Security Act”. For more information see World Trade Organization, 
‘Memorandum Submitted by Dr Ashwani Mahajan from the Swadeshi Jagran Foundation on behalf of 
people of India’ (2013) Position papers provided by NGOs for the Ministerial Conference 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/ngo_e.htm> accessed 10 August 2014. 
274 World Trade Organization, ‘Days 3, 4 and 5: Round-the-clock consultations produce ‘Bali Package’’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm> accessed 10 August 2014. 
101 
 
origin.275
- Administrative arrangements relating to issue and verification of certificate of 
origin.
Consequently, harmonizing such elements in the WTO system would be an 
easy task to accomplish. On the other hand, there are some differences that exist 
between the rules of origin of preferential trade agreements, therefore requiring 
cooperation between the WTO member countries in order to harmonize them. 
 
a. Commonalities. 
The elements that are common to preferential rules of origin include the following: 
- General definitions; 
- List of wholly obtained or produced goods; 
- Insufficient or minimal operations or processes that do not confer origin; 
- Neutral elements; 
- Consignment criteria; 
- Certificate of origin; 
- Denial of preferential tariff treatment; 
- Claim for preferential tariff treatment; 
276
b. Differences. 
 
 
 
The factors that the rules of origin of preferential trade agreements do not, in 
most cases, have in common are: (1) the calculation of the numerator and the 
denominator used; (2) product-specific rules of origin; (3) cumulation rules; and (4) 
                                                 
275 Minutes of the Meeting of 19 April 2002 (2002) G/RO/M/40 
<http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=7922> accessed 10 August  2014. 
276 Ratna (n 226) 87. 
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the basic origin method to be applied under the last substantial transformation norm. 
Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
 
3.2.1    The Calculation of the Numerator and Using the Denominator. 
 
Using the ex-works price as the denominator, the CIF price to value the 
imported inputs and the import value content requirement can lay an optimal 
groundwork not only for the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin that 
depend on the value content requirement, but also for the harmonization of 
preferential rules of origin. Moreover, using the import value content requirement and 
the CIF price to value the non-originating inputs complies with the Bali decision on 
preferential rules of origin for least developed countries and is currently applied by 
many jurisdictions.  
 
3.2.2    Product-Specific Rules of Origin. 
 
Because many outstanding issues surrounding product-specific rules of origin 
are obstructing the completion of the harmonization process of non-preferential rules 
of origin, product-specific rules of origin should not be included when harmonizing 
preferential rules. Otherwise, such harmonization would take many years to be 
accomplished, as has occurred with the harmonization process of non-preferential 
rules of origin.  For this reason, I completely agree with Ratna when he said: 
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“[o]n the services, one can learn from the WTO Harmonization Work 
Programme. In the context of RTAs,277 it would be desirable to keep the 
rules of origin simple and transparent, and preferably without any 
product-specific rules. Thus, it would be preferable to follow a single set 
of general rules as qualifying criteria for the not-wholly obtained or 
produced goods.”278
3.2.3    Cumulation Rules. 
 
It is better and easier to comply with a general rule that clarifies the main 
criterion to determine the origin of a product under the last substantial norm rather 
than complying with a list of product-specific rules of origin that contains multiple 
rules applied to a variety of products.  With the exclusion of product-specific rules of 
origin in preferential trade agreements, rules of origin would be unambiguous, 
uncomplicated, flexible, and clear for the public, traders, and producers. 
 
 
Cumulation is a system applied in preferential trade regimes to increase the 
sources of inputs used in producing the final product. Cumulation rules treat the 
inputs imported from a certain country or countries as originating in the country 
where the final product is made by using the inputs.279
                                                 
277 Regional trade agreements. 
278 Ratna (n 226) 88. 
279 World Customs Organization, ‘Accumulation/Cumulation’ (2014) 
<http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-
rules-of-origin/specific-topics/study-topics/cum.aspx> accessed 24 August 2014. 
 Consequently, the preferential 
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status of the final product is not undermined.280 There are three types of cumulation 
rules: bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation.281
The definition of bilateral cumulation
 
282 is reflected in its name. It is that type 
of cumulation taking place between two partners of a bilateral preferential trade 
agreement in which inputs originating in and imported from one partner of a 
preferential trade area are regarded as originating in the other partner of the same 
trade area.283 For example, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) consists of 
four countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.284 Under the free 
trade agreement between the Republic of Korea and the EFTA (Korea-EFTA FTA), a 
producer in Switzerland can produce a bicycle (final product) from wheels (inputs) 
imported from Korea and then export the bicycle to Norway under preferences,285 as 
long as the value of the used Korean and Swiss inputs is not less than 70% of the ex-
works price of the bicycle.286 Accordingly, the wheels were treated as if they were of 
Swiss origin because a bilateral cumulation took place between the Republic of Korea 
and the EFTA.287
                                                 
280 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, IBFD International Tax Glossary, (IBFD, 6th edn, 
Amsterdam 2009) 369. 
281 Kazunobu Hayakawa, ‘Impact of Diagonal Cumulation Rule of FTA Utilization: Evidence from 
Bilateral and Multilateral FTAs between Japan and Thailand’ (2014) 32 Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economies 1. 
282 Bilateral cumulation is sometimes called “partial cumulation/accumulation”.  
283 World Customs Organization, ‘Bilateral Accumulation/Cumulation’ (2014) 
<http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-
rules-of-origin/specific-topics/study-annex/cum-bil-abs.aspx> accessed 24 August 2014. 
284 European Free Trade association, ‘The EFTA States’ (2014) <http://www.efta.int/about-efta/the-
efta-states> accessed 25 August 2014. 
285 EFTA - Korea Free Trade Agreement (Iceland-Liechtenstein-Norway-Switzerland-Korea) Annex I, 
Section I: Rules of Origin, Title II: Requirements for “Originating Products”, Article 3: Cumulation of 
Origin (December 2005), entered into force (1 September 2006) 
<http://www.fta.go.kr/webmodule/_PSD_FTA/efta/1/060217_KEFTA_eng.pdf> accessed 25 August 
2014. 
286 Ibid, Annex I, Appendix 2: List of Working or Processing Required to be Carried Out on Non-
Originating Materials in Order that the Product Manufactured Can Obtain Originating Status, 41 
<http://www.fta.go.kr/webmodule/_PSD_FTA/efta/1/060217_KEFTA_eng.pdf> accessed 25 August 
2014. 
287 Arthur Mueller, ‘What is Cumulation?’ (2006) 2 EFTA Bulletin 31. 
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Diagonal cumulation288 is applied in multilateral preferential trade regimes 
between three or more countries. 289  It means that the inputs originating in and 
imported from one or more members of a multilateral trade regime are regarded as 
originating in other members.290 For example, based on the Pan-Euro-Med regime,291 
a cumulation zone is applied between the EU, the EFTA, Turkey, the countries that 
signed the Barcelona Declaration 292  and the Faroe Islands. 293   Accordingly, if a 
product was produced in Egypt by using imported inputs from Switzerland (EFTA 
member), the product would be conferred origin and exported to Germany (EU) under 
preferences. In this example, the inputs were treated as if they were of Egyptian origin 
because of the Pan-Euro-Med diagonal cumulation zone.294
Full cumulation is the same as diagonal cumulation, but all manufacturing 
operations carried out in any member of the multilateral agreement are counted as part 
of the originating content, as if they have taken place in the country where the final 
product was made, irrespective of whether the manufacturing operations are enough 
 
                                                 
288 Diagonal cumulation is sometimes referred to as “regional cumulation/accumulation”. 
289 World Customs Organization, ‘Diagonal Cumulation’ (2014) 
<http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-
rules-of-origin/specific-topics/study-annex/cum-dia.aspx> accessed 25 August 2014. 
290 Some countries require that the preferential trade agreements formed between the members of the 
multilateral agreement must impose identical rules of origin to apply diagonal cumulation. See ibid.  
291 Council of the European Union 9429/10 Regional Convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
Preferential Rules of Origin [2010] Interinstitutional File: 2010/0092 (NLE). 
292 Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean partnership (European Union-Algeria-Egypt-Israel-
Jordan-Lebanon-Morocco-Syria-Tunisia-the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) 
adopted 28 November 1995 <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf> accessed 25 
August 2014. 
293 Full cumulation is applied by the European Economic Area (the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway) and between the EU and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
294 For more details about the Pan-Euro-Med cumulation, see European Commission, ‘System of Pan-
Euro-Mediterranean Cumulation’ (2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_783_en
.htm#specific> accessed 26 August 2014. See also Customs: Council approves new European-
Mediterranean cumulation of origin zone [2005] IP/05/1256 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
05-1256_en.htm?locale=EN> accessed 26 August 2014. 
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to confer origin on the used inputs. 295  For example, currently, there is a full 
cumulation zone between the EU and Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.296 Accordingly, 
if a men’s shirt was produced in Tunisia by sewing fabrics, which were woven from 
yarn in the EU and imported from there, the shirt would be conferred origin and the 
weaving manufacturing operation that took place in the EU would be treated as if it 
was carried out in Tunisia. Consequently, the shirt could be exported to Morocco, 
Algeria, or the EU under preferences.297
It is known that the application of stringent rules of origin in a preferential 
trade agreement encourages the final good producers to source inputs from inside the 
preferential trade area.  With cumulation rules, final good producers would be induced 
to source inputs from inside the preferential trade area and the cumulation zone, 
leading to a case of trade diversion if the internal inputs (goods sourced from inside 
the preferential trade area and the cumulation zone) are less efficient than those of the 
external suppliers. Hence, cumulation rules could be used as bait that aims at 
diverting trade and protecting national industries. For example, the NAFTA applies 
full cumulation.
 
Cumulation rules increase the sources of inputs and are considered by many as 
a trade facilitation tool. However, they can lead to negative results.  
298
                                                 
295 World customs Organization, ‘Full Cumulation’ (2014) 
<http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/origin/instrument-and-tools/comparative-study-on-preferential-
rules-of-origin/specific-topics/study-annex/cum-ful.aspx> accessed 26 August 2014. 
296 Explanatory Notes Concerning the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Protocols on Rules of Origin [2007] OJ 
C83/3. 
297 Ibid. See also European Commission, ‘A User's Handbook to the Rules of Preferential Origin used 
in trade between the European Community, other European Countries and the countries participating to 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ 15 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/prefe
rential/handbook_en.pdf> accessed 26 August 2014. 
298 North American Free Trade Agreement (n 51) Chapter 4: Rules of Origin, Article 404: 
Accumulation.  
 This means that all manufacturing operations performed in North 
America by using North American inputs are treated as part of the originating content 
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of the final product. Accordingly, trade diversion takes place when Mexican 
automobile producers source costly inputs from North America (mainly the US) 
instead of cheaper inputs from external suppliers, to satisfy the high regional value 
content of 62.5% imposed on the automotive goods.299
Barceló put forward similar arguments regarding cumulation rules as trade 
hindrances.
 
300  He stated that their role becomes more active the more stringent rules 
of origin are in a preferential trade agreement because, as a result, internal producers 
try to satisfy the stringent rules of origin by sourcing inefficient inputs from within the 
cumulation zone, instead of efficient external ones.301 Furthermore, Barceló argued 
that cumulation rules are inconsistent with article XXIV (4) of the GATT since their 
trade-diverting effects act as obstacles to the trade of external suppliers with the 
preferential trade area.302
The cumulation documentation procedures are also complicated. Sometimes 
the exporter’s government is required to “provide certification”, which increases the 
costs and administrative burdens on the exporter.
 
303 Also, under full cumulation, the 
exporter needs to “track back” the manufacturing operations that took place in the 
countries participating in the full cumulation zone.304 As a result, detailed information 
from the inputs sources of supply could be required.305
                                                 
299 Jong Bum Kim, ‘Regional Harmonization of Preferential Rules of Origin in Asia: In Search of a 
Minimum Common Denominator’ (2009) Paper Submitted to the Asian International Economic Law 
Network Inaugural Conference, 7. 
300 John J. Barceló III, ‘Harmonizing preferential rules of origin in the WTO system’ (2006) Cornell 
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series 72, 19-20, 25-26 
<http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context=lsrp_papers> accessed 
26 August 2014. 
301 Ibid 19. 
302 Ibid 26. 
303 Erlinda M. Medalla and Jenny Balboa, ‘ASEAN Rules of Origin: Lessons and Recommendations 
for Best Practice’ (2009) Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia Discussion Paper 
Series, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), Philippines, 10. 
304 World Customs Organization, ‘Accumulation/Cumulation’ (n 279). 
305 Paul Brenton, ‘Preferential Rules of Origin’ (n 250) 167. 
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Based on these arguments, the application of cumulation rules should not be 
applied in preferential trade regimes. 
 
3.2.4    The Basic Required Origin Method to be applied under the 
Last Substantial Transformation Norm. 
 
The HS was not really designed for origin specification purposes. That is why 
when the change in tariff classification is applied as the main origin determination 
criterion, it may be supplemented by the value content requirement and/or specific 
manufacturing operation methods.  Therefore, after detailed study of the HS and 
different preferential rules of origin, one can think of an alternative to product-
specific rules of origin by dividing the origin-conferring operations into four 
categories;  
1. Operations that need a change in tariff classification, at which the value content 
requirement is imposed as well, but as an optional criterion;  
2. Operations that need the value content requirement to be the sole criterion applied; 
3. Operations that require a specific manufacturing operation, at which the value 
content requirement is imposed, but as an optional criterion; and 
4. Operations that require one of the three origin determination methods to be 
complied with (the value content requirement/ the change in tariff classification/ 
the specific manufacturing operation). 
It follows that the value added criterion is the only method that is applied in all 
of the three categories for classifying origin proposed above. That is simply because 
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the value added method can confer origin on any product,306
When it comes to the percentage of the value added, it is suggested to impose 
a maximum of 60% import value content for WTO member countries, but 75% for 
WTO least developed member countries.  The figure of 60% is suggested as being a 
realistic compromise between different interests. While the 60% is quite sufficient for 
some product sectors to comply with to prove origin (as in the automotive sector), it 
could still be too stringent for some other sectors (e.g. textiles).
 unlike the change in 
tariff classification. As a result, the value added method, in the proposal for 
harmonizing preferential rules of origin in this chapter, will be the main method relied 
on when determining origin.  
307 However, one 
should not forget that the value added in a lot of sectors would be an alternative to the 
other two methods of determining origin. Nevertheless, complying with a fixed 
percentage imposed on all products is general, not confusing and does not engender 
product-specific rules of origin. Sometimes protectionist intentions aim for the 
imposition of a percentage that is even lower than 60% import value content.308
When it comes to the specific manufacturing operation, the positive test should 
be applied as an alternative (not mandatory) criterion for either the value added 
content only or both the change in tariff classification and the value added.  The 
 As 
for the 75% value content requirement for least developed countries, it was adopted at 
the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, as mentioned above, and therefore 
should not be a problem for WTO member countries to agree on.  
                                                 
306 Even the wholly-obtained goods are considered to be of a 100% value added. See Thinam Jakob and 
Gernot Fiebiger, ‘Preferential rules of Origin - a conceptual outline’ (2003) 38 Intereconomics 138, 
140. 
307 Biswajit Nag (n 34), 8. 
308 The yarn forward rule of origin imposed in the NAFTA “virtually amounts to a 100% value-added”, 
which is similar to the imposition of 0% import value content. See Rupa Duttagupta and Arvind 
Panagariya, ‘Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and Politics’ (2007) 19 Wiley Blackwell 
169, 190. 
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reason for using the positive test as an alternative criterion is to reduce the 
possibilities for engendering specific exceptional rules of origin that might take a long 
time to agree on, as has happened concerning the harmonization of non-preferential 
rules of origin.309
 Article 3 (b) of Annex II of the Agreement on Rules of Origin provides: “The 
Members agree to ensure that: . . . their preferential rules of origin are based on a 
positive standard. Preferential rules of origin that state what does not confer 
preferential origin (negative standard) are permissible as part of a clarification of a 
positive standard or in individual cases where a positive determination of preferential 
origin is not necessary”. In other words, the manufacturing operation rule of origin 
shall clearly define what does confer origin (positive test) instead of what does not 
confer origin (negative test).
 Also, the positive test is more flexible than the negative test, so this 
will not leave much possibility for imposing too stringent protectionist rules of origin. 
Moreover, when the harmonization of preferential rules of origin takes place, any 
country with protectionist intentions will understand that there is an alternative 
criterion that may be complied with no matter how stringent the test could be, which 
will, to a great extent, counter protectionist intentions as well. 
310 The specific manufacturing operation method based 
on the positive standard should be enough to explain any technicality or process that a 
certain product should undergo.  Also, the positive standard is not as stringent as the 
negative one in most cases and is not as commonly used for protectionist purposes as 
the latter.311
                                                 
309 It was mentioned previously that out of the 94 outstanding issues obstructing the harmonization of 
non-preferential rules of origin, 83 are related to product-specific rules of origin. It was also clarified 
that the specific manufacturing operations test could engender product-specific rules of origin. 
310 Bossche and Zdouc (n 148) 462. 
311 Paul Brenton, ‘Preferential Rules of Origin’ (n 250) 164. 
 That is why the manufacturing operation method based on the positive 
standard would be used as an alternative method in the proposed harmonized 
preferential rules of origin. In addition, since the specific manufacturing operation 
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method sometimes requires a lot of technicality, a separate attachment should include 
all origin-conferring manufacturing operations, for the sake of transparency and 
simplification. Accordingly, final goods producers would be able to choose: whether 
to comply with the specific manufacturing operation mentioned in the attachment or 
the other origin determination method(s).  
Based on all of the previously-clarified information, the proposed harmonized 
preferential rules of origin are presented as follows: 
 
3.2.5    Proposed Harmonized Set of Preferential Rules of 
Origin. 
 
1- DEFINITIONS 
 
These are general definitions illustrating the kinds of manufacturing operations 
and explaining terms, like “material”, “originating material”, non-originating 
material” and “Customs Valuation Agreement”. 
 
2- GENERAL RULES 
These rules: 
(i) Explain the classification of goods within the harmonized system; 
(ii) Clarify that the determination of origin shall comply with the general rules; 
(iii) Explain the neutral elements that are not part of the final good and, thus, not 
regarded as originating, like fuel, plant, and safety equipment used in the 
production; 
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(iv) Disregard the origin of the packing and packaging and containers that the 
goods are presented in; 
(v) Disregard the origin of the accessories, spare parts and tools used to produce 
the goods; and 
(vi) Disregard minimal operations and processes when determining the origin of 
the good, like preserving the good in a good condition; facilitating shipping or 
transporting it; and presenting it for sale. 
 
3- WHOLLY OBTAINED GOODS 
 
This section defines the goods that are regarded as wholly obtained in one country, 
like animals born, raised, hunted, fished, or captured in one country; plants 
harvested in that country; or minerals obtained from there. 
 
4- ORIGIN DETERMINATION 
 
a- Origin shall be conferred when the products that are classified under certain 
chapters of the HS are wholly obtained in the country of export (for example, 
chapters 1, 7, 8 and 10). 
b- Origin shall be conferred when a change in tariff classification at the chapter 
level occurs; or when a maximum import value content of 60%, or 75% for 
least developed countries, is complied with for products classified under 
certain chapters of the HS (for example, chapters 5, 16-17 and 42). 
c- Origin shall be conferred when a change in tariff classification at the heading 
level occurs; or when a maximum import value content of 60%, or 75% for 
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least developed countries, is complied with for products classified under 
certain chapters of the HS (for example, chapters75 and 76). 
d- Origin shall be conferred when a change in tariff classification at the sub-
heading level occurs; or  when a maximum import value content of 60%, or 75% 
for least developed countries, is complied with for products classified under 
certain chapters of the HS (for example, chapters 4, 29, 35 and 84). 
e- Origin shall be conferred when a maximum import value content of 60%, or 
75% for least developed countries, is complied with for products classified 
under certain chapters of the HS (for example chapters 72, 85, 87).  
f- Origin shall be conferred when a specific manufacturing operation based on 
the positive standard has been carried out; or a maximum import value content 
of 60%, or 75% for least developed countries, is complied with for products 
under certain chapters of the HS (for example, chapters 73 and 90).  
g- Origin shall be conferred when a specific manufacturing operation based on 
the positive standard has been carried out; or a change in tariff classification 
takes place; or a maximum import value content of 60%, or 75% for least 
developed countries, is complied with for certain products classified under the 
HS (for example, chapters 15, 50 and 54-63).  
 
3.2.6    Commentary on the Proposal. 
 
 As may be seen, the proposed harmonized set of preferential rules of origin is 
based on general terms and presented in a simple manner that is not too flexible or too 
stringent. No product specific rules of origin are presented and no negative standards 
are imposed. Moreover, the specific manufacturing operation method is used as 
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alternative method for origin determination. Two things must be taken in to account 
though; first, the import value content requirement should comply with EU standards; 
second, a separate attachment clarifying the alternative positive manufacturing 
operations should be given To Whom It May Concern, such as a trader, producer or 
importer. 
 One might wonder about the level at which the change in tariff classification 
shall be made. According to the proposal, the level of the tariff classification is left to 
be agreed on by the WTO members. Countries could reach consensus easily when 
there is more than one optional rule to be used. For example, some countries might 
want to impose a rule of origin that requires a change in tariff classification at the 
chapter level which might be stringent for others, but the latter might agree as long as 
there was available alternative rule to comply with. 
 In summary, the proposed harmonized set of preferential rules of origin should 
ensure the following: 
1- A wise application of preferential origin rules that are not too stringent to be 
used for protectionist, trade-diverting or political purposes; 
2- The complete elimination of the spaghetti bowl effect on preferential rules 
of origin; 
3- Alternative criteria between which a producer would always be able to 
choose instead of the mandatory three rules to be complied with in some 
current agreements; 
4- Least developed countries would be supported and there should be an 
increase  in their utilization of preferences312
5- Fair competition, since no protectionist rules of origin would be imposed; 
; 
                                                 
312 It was already explained in chapter II how some countries’ producers forgo the utilization of 
preferences because of the imposition of stringent rules of origin. 
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6- The efficiency of global production would be boosted, since no trade 
diversion would take place because of the harmonized preferential rules of 
origin; 
7- More choice for consumers; and last but not least, 
8- A real liberalization of trade. 
 In the next chapter, the proposed harmonized set of preferential rules of origin 
will be tested to try to prove the truth of these assertions.  
 By following all of the previously mentioned arguments of this part, efforts to 
harmonize preferential and non-preferential rules of origin would result in success to a 
considerable extent.  However, there are other points that should be taken into account 
concerning the harmonization of both preferential and non-preferential rules of origin. 
Tolerance rules are contrary to cumulation rules because they allow sourcing a 
fixed magnitude of inputs from anywhere in the world without affecting the origin of 
the final product leading to no trade diversion.313
Moreover, the interests of developing countries should be taken into 
consideration when harmonizing both non-preferential and preferential rules of origin.  
Besides, developing countries should know that countries with big markets, like the 
US and the EU usually request their industries to present proposals concerning the 
harmonization process of non-preferential rules of origin, which might lead to some 
protectionist implementations.  Consequently, this could happen when harmonizing 
preferential rules of origin. Developing countries should be aware of this risk because 
there will be no turning back once both types of rules of origin are harmonized. 
  That is why increasing the scope of 
tolerance rules would facilitate trade and thus needs to be taken into account when 
harmonizing preferential rules of origin.  
                                                 
313 Barceló III (n 300) 34. 
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3.2.7    The Position of WTO Member Countries. 
 
This section shows that the proposed harmonized set of preferential rules of 
origin is in line with what is actually happening in preferential trade agreements and 
therefore makes the proposal more politically acceptable. Although the preferential 
trade regimes, discussed below, represent large trading blocs around the world, they 
are only a tiny proportion of preferential trade agreements, but for reasons of space it 
is not possible to discuss more agreements. Therefore the proposed harmonized set of 
preferential rules of origin could be controversial among WTO member countries. 
The ASEAN FTA (AFTA) relies mainly on the value added criterion which is 
“a regional value content of not less than 40 percent”.314 In other words, a maximum 
import content of 60 %. The agreement was formed between least developed 
countries (Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos), developing countries (Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam) and developed countries (Brunei and 
Singapore).315
                                                 
314 Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) (Brunei Darussalam-Cambodia-Indonesia-Lao People's Democratic Republic-
Malaysia-Myanmar-Philippines-Singapore-Thailand-Viet Nam) Annex 3: Product Specific Rules of 
Origin Rules of Origin (28 January 1992) entered into force 1 January 1993 
<http://www.asean.org/images/archive/20750.pdf> accessed 10 August  2014. 
315 Association of South East Asian Nations, ‘ASEAN Member States’ 
<http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-member-states> accessed 10 August 2014. 
  The AFTA rules of origin are easy to understand, unambiguous and 
precise. They are close to the harmonized preferential rules of origin proposed above. 
The AFTA contains product-specific rules of origin relying on the mentioned value 
added criterion and uses the specific manufacturing operation method as an 
alternative criterion, but latter is also imposed sometimes in its negative form. 
However, according to the proposed rules in this chapter, rules of origin are presented 
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in a simpler way and the manufacturing operation test could be used as an alternative 
criterion as well, but always in its positive form (as shown later).  
The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) is similar to the 
AFTA, also relying on a 40% local value content requirement to be complied with.316  
Moreover, since there are proposals to form the ASEAN + 6 FTA, which might be 
really soon, more developing and developed countries would be complying with the 
mentioned AFTA rules of origin (China, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea and 
New Zealand).317
It is worth mentioning as well that the APTA (known previously as the 
Bangkok Agreement) imposes simple rules of origin relying on 55% import value 
content and 65% for least developed countries, which is, again, very close to the 
proposed rules of origin in this chapter.
 
318 The APTA members are Bangladesh, 
China, India, South Korea, Laos and Sri Lanka,319 which is also an example reflecting 
a good partnership between countries.320
On November 18, 2010, the European Commission adopted a regulation that 
reformed, simplified and harmonized its rules of origin imposed under the GSP 
regime.
 
321
                                                 
316 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand) Annex II 
– Product Specific Rules of Origin (27 February 2009) entered into force 1 January 2010 
<http://www.asean.fta.govt.nz/annex-2-product-specific-rules/> accessed 10 August  2014. 
317 Petchanet Pratruangkrai, ‘Economic ministers agree to establish Asean+6 FTA by 2015’ (2013) The 
Nation <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Economic-ministers-agree-to-establish-Asean+6-
FTA--30213274.html> accessed 10 August  2014. 
318 Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (People’s Republic of Bangladesh, the People’s Republic of China, 
the Republic of India, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of Korea and the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka) Annex II: Rules of Origin for the Asia-Pacific Trade 
Agreement, Rule 3: Not Wholly Produced or Obtained and Rule 10: Special Criteria Percentage (2 
November 2005) entered into force 1 September 2006 
<http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/yatai/xieyiwenben_en.pdf> accessed 10 August  2014. 
319 ESCAP, ‘Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement Member Countries’ 
<http://artnet.unescap.org/APTIAD/viewagreement.aspx?id=APTA> accessed 10 August  2014. 
320 ESCAP, Trade-led Recovery and Beyond, Asia Pacific Trade and Investment Report, (New York 
and Bangkok: United Nations, 2009) Ch3, 115. 
321 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 (n 266). 
 The new EU rules of origin are transparent since they rely mostly on a 
maximum of 50% import content that shall be complied with under the GSP regime, 
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but a 70 % for least developed countries. The new EU rules of origin are not really 
much different from the proposed value content percentage mentioned in this chapter. 
The main difference could be eliminated by changing the 50% to 60% for all WTO 
member countries to comply with, and not only developing countries. The reason to 
do that is simple; 50 % is too stringent to be generally imposed on a lot of products, 
especially for developing countries.322
Surprisingly, the US and Russia expressed interest in and support for the 
ASEAN.
 To do so would be the same as the rule of 
origin imposed on most sectors in the AFTA: “A regional value content of not less 
than 40 percent”. In other words, a maximum import content of 60%.  The reason a 
comparison is made here between the two rules is because the AFTA rules of origin 
are easy to understand, comply with and are imposed in an agreement formed, as 
mentioned by least developed, developing and developed countries. These countries 
were able to sit together and agree. 
323 In October, 2010, they were officially accepted to be granted seats in the 
East Asia Summit.324 The US and Russia took such step because the ASEAN 
members succeeded in increasing “their political and economic importance” by 
facilitating trade with each other.325
                                                 
322 An editorial comment, ‘EU agrees new rules of origin’ (2010) Agritrade 
<http://agritrade.cta.int/en/layout/set/print/Agriculture/Topics/Other/EU-agrees-new-rules-of-origin> 
accessed 10 August 2014. 
323 Association of South East Asian Nations, ‘ASEAN Secretary-General Visits Russia’ (2014) 
<http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-secretary-general-visits-russia > 
accessed 10 August 2014. 
324 Wilhelm Hofmeister, ‘From the Driver’s Seat to the Backseat - Regional Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia’ (2011) 4 International Reports of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 145. 
325 Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed), Asean-U.S. Relations: What are the Talking Points? (Institute of 
South East Asian Studies, Singapore 2012) 19. 
  This type of cooperation can be witnessed a lot 
in the preferential trade field. That is why; extensive collaboration between many 
WTO member countries could exist during the harmonization of preferential rules of 
origin. 
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The following table shows some of the existing preferential trade agreements 
relying on the value added criterion: 
Agreements Main Criterion 
for determining 
Origin 
The percentage of the value 
content 
AFTA Value Added  40% local value content 
APTA Value Added 55% import value content 
65%  import value content for 
least developed countries 
EU GSP Value Added 50% import value content  
70% import value content for 
least developed countries 
AANZFTA Value Added 40% local value content 
ASEAN - China326 Value Added  40% local value content 
SAPTA (South Asian 
Association for Regional 
Cooperation Preferential 
Trading Agreement) 327
Value Added 
 
60% import value content 
Singapore – Australia328 Value Added  50 % local value added 
                                                 
326 China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (ASEAN-China) Annex 3, Rule 4: Not Wholly Produced or 
Obtained (4 November 2002), entered into force 1 January 2010 
<http://www.asean.org/images/2013/economic/afta/ACFTA/3-
%20ACFTA%20TIG%20Annex%203.pdf> accessed 10 August 2014. 
327 SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) (Afghanistan-Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-
Maldives-Nepal-Pakistan-Sri Lanka) Annex III, Rule 3 : Not Wholly Produced or Obtained (11 April 
1993), entered into force 7 December 1995 <http://saarc-
sec.org/uploads/document/SAPTA%20Agreement_20110812120334.pdf> accessed 17 August 2014. 
328 Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (Singapore-Australia) Annex 3, Article 3: Originating 
Goods (17 February 2003), entered into force 28 July 2003 
<http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/Singapore-Australia.pdf> accessed 10 August  2014. 
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Source: Author’s Analysis 
 It is not clear yet what kinds of rules of origin the APEC FTA is going to have 
when it is formed, but many of the ASEAN and ASEAN+6 member countries are 
APEC members.329
 The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
 The preferences of the ASEAN member countries when it comes 
to imposing rules of origin are for such rules to be simple, clear, and straight-forward. 
This gives hope that clear and flexible rules of origin will be applied in one of the 
biggest possible FTAs in the world to be formed.   
330 is a proposed 
trade agreement to be established between the US and the EU by the end of 2014.331 
The possible rules of origin to be applied in this very large FTA are not yet known, 
but it is to be hoped that the agreement will avoid the imposition of rules of origin that 
could obstruct trade in one of the largest future FTAs worldwide.332
 Non-preferential rules of origin were supposed to have been harmonized by 
1998. That deadline has been missed by many years. Moreover, there still remain a 
large number (94) of issues to resolve, including many of the most difficult issues. 
The fact that the WTO operates through consensus and that it has a large and very 
diverse membership make it very hard to agree on anything. This explains why the 
 
 
3.2.8    The Prospects for Agreement on Harmonized Preferential 
Rules of Origin. 
 
                                                 
329 APEC, ‘Member Economies’ (n 190). 
330 European Commission, ‘What is the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)?’ (2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/> accessed 10 August 2014. 
331 European Commission, ‘State of Play of TTIP negotiations after the 6th round’ (2014) 
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Doha process has become virtually deadlocked. Even the Bali agreement, which 
supports a lot of points discussed in this chapter, is now threatened by opposition 
from India. Furthermore, at the Committee on Rules of Origin meeting in September, 
2013, Canada, Australia and the US stated that they do not believe anymore that the 
harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin would be trade facilitating.333
 The Bali Package comprises about 16 decisions.
  
 Nevertheless, there are reasons for optimism. Having seen earlier that the value 
added method is used as the main criterion for determining the origin of goods in 
many preferential trade regimes, there would seem to be a good possibility for 
implementing the proposed harmonization of preferential rules of origin.  
334 India’s refusal to support the 
Bali Package is not related to the decision on preferential rules of origin for least 
developed countries, but to the decision on public stockholding for food security 
purposes.335 This means that all WTO member countries agree on the application of 
the 75% import value content requirement for least developed countries, which 
conforms to the proposed harmonized set of preferential rules of origin discussed in 
this chapter. Moreover, the WTO member countries agreed to find a permanent 
solution to India’s issue by 2017, which could lead to the implementation of Bali 
Package by then.336
  During the Committee on Rules of Origin meeting in September, 2013, a lot of 
countries did not agree with the views of Canada, Australia and US referred to above. 
India, the EU, China, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei expressed their interest in 
 
                                                 
333 World Trade Organization, ‘Members divided on way forward for rules of origin’ (2013) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/roi_26sep13_e.htm> accessed 10 August 2014. 
334 For full details of these decisions, see World Trade Organization, ‘Ministerial Declaration and 
Decisions’ (2013) <http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/bali_texts_combined_e.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2014. 
335 World Trade Organization, ‘Days 3, 4 and 5: Round-the-clock consultations produce ‘Bali Package’’ 
(n 274). 
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completing the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin. India described the 
different rules of origin applied by different countries as a “jungle” and stressed the 
importance of harmonizing non-preferential rules of origin because of the difficulties 
that its exporters currently face.337
 The Technical Committee on Rules of Origin has been arranging meetings up to 
the present with WTO member countries’ delegates to try to solve the outstanding 
issues of non-preferential rules of origin.
 
338  From 486 outstanding issues, 94 core 
policy outstanding issues remain to complete the harmonization of non-preferential 
rules of origin.339
 The fact that the spaghetti bowl phenomenon was triggered by the proliferation 
of preferential rules of origin worldwide and the increase in the administrative 
burdens that traders face made a lot of companies aware of the need to harmonize 
preferential rules of origin.
 The harmonized non-preferential rules of origin so far are flexible 
and transparent compared to the stringent rules of origin discussed in Chapter II. 
Moreover, the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin could serve as a 
model for the harmonization of preferential rules of origin and vice-versa. 
 Preferential rules of origin are used to determine the country of origin of the 
product to decide whether to accord preferences to that product. However, non-
preferential rules are used for implementing trade policy instruments, labelling 
requirements, gathering trade statistics and government procurement. That is why 
preferential rules of origin are easier to negotiate. 
340
                                                 
337 World Trade Organization, ‘Members divided on way forward for rules of origin’ (n 333). 
338 Minutes of the Meeting of 18 April 2013 (2013) G/RO/M/60, this is a restricted document, but on 
file with the author.  
339 World Trade Organization, ‘Agreement on Rules of Origin’ (n 209). 
340 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘ICC World Trade Agenda Post-Bali Business Priorities’ 
(2014) Paper Prepared by the ICC Commission on Trade and Investment Policy, 6 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2014/ICC-WORLD-TRADE-
AGENDA-Post-Bali-Business-Priorities/> accessed 10 August 2014. 
 While the number of WTO member countries is 
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currently 160,341 the number of preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO is 
585.342 Consequently, the academic field and literature are more focused on the 
preferential arena and the spaghetti bowl.343
 
 
 With an understanding of the political incentives for harmonization and of 
sensitive industrial sectors, countries could somehow reach a compromise. The 
suggested proposal for harmonizing preferential rules of origin might not be perfect 
for some countries, but it could definitely serve the process of harmonization of either 
non-preferential or preferential rules of origin. The guidelines mentioned in this 
chapter are of extreme importance and should be taken into consideration at least. 
 Finally, the WTO member countries should seriously discuss the completion 
soon of the harmonization work programme and the harmonization of preferential 
rules of origin during the Doha round in order to overcome the negative effects 
resulted from the misuse of rules of origin.  
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CHAPTER IV 
TESTING THE PROPOSED MODEL FOR HARMONIZED PREFERENTIAL 
RULES OF ORIGIN 
 
Chapter III came up with a proposed harmonized set of preferential rules of 
origin. This Chapter (IV) tests the proposal in order to evaluate its efficiency in 
overcoming the negative effects of non-harmonized preferential rules of origin that 
were discussed in Chapter II that resulted from the misuse of such rules of origin.  
Testing the harmonized set is going to be done by comparing two scenarios. 
The first is the status quo. In other words, the preferential trade agreements as they 
are, currently, without a harmonized set of preferential rules of origin.  The second is 
the possible impact of harmonizing preferential rules of origin in the WTO system by 
applying the proposed set of rules to certain preferential trade regimes.   
Since the harmonization of preferential rules of origin in the WTO system has 
not been accomplished until now, applying the harmonized set of preferential rules of 
origin is going to be theoretical. Also, to make things easy for the reader, the author in 
this chapter is going to apply the proposed set of rules to some of the trade regimes 
discussed in Chapter II, i.e. the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) and the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC).  
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 4.1    Protectionism. 
 
 Rules of origin have been used for protectionist purposes in some preferential 
trade regimes. This happens because countries are free to apply too stringent 
preferential rules of origin for the purpose of protecting their own national interests. 
The proposal for harmonization lays down limits on the level of stringency of such 
rules. As discussed in Chapter II, the imposition of protectionist rules of origin can 
take three forms: (1) requiring producers to comply with more than one origin 
determination method; (2) requiring producers to comply with a stringent value 
content requirement; and (3) requiring producers to comply with a stringent 
manufacturing operation based on the negative standard. However, the proposed 
harmonized rules would allow producers to choose which method of origin 
determination to comply with. Moreover, the value content percentage requirement in 
the proposal is not too stringent and takes into account the production capacities of 
least developed countries. Furthermore, the specific manufacturing operation method 
is based on the positive standard, rather than the negative one.  Adopting the 
harmonized set of rules would not give large firms the chance to lobby for the 
application of too stringent protectionist preferential rules of origin.  
 An example will now be discussed, drawn from the discussion in Chapter II, to 
illustrate this point. The NAFTA imposes a very stringent and protectionist 62.5% 
regional value content requirement on automotive goods. The 62.5% here equals a 
maximum import content of 37.5%. Big US automakers pushed the US government to 
impose the too stringent 37.5% import value content in order to be protected from 
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Japanese and German competitors established in North America.344
- Before (the NAFTA as it is): 
The change in 
tariff classification method cannot be relied on to confer origin for automotive goods. 
That is why the NAFTA relied on the value content requirement.  The following two 
tables illustrate the case before and after the imposition of the proposed harmonized 
preferential rules of origin:  
Source: NAFTA 
- After the implementation of the proposed preferential rules of origin: 
Source: Author’s Analysis 
                                                 
344 Vivian C. Jones and Michaela D. Platzer, ‘The Proposed U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS FTA): Automobile Rules of Origin’ (2011) Congressional Research Service R41868, 7. 
Chapter  Tariff 
heading 
Tariff Sub-
heading 
Tariff Item Product description  Rule of Origin 
87 8702 8702.10 - 8702.10 bb 
- 8702.90 bb 
“vehicles for the 
transport of 15 or 
fewer persons” 
Import value content 
of 37.5% 
 
Chapter  Tariff 
heading 
Tariff 
Sub-
heading 
Tariff Item Product 
description  
Rule of Origin 
87 8702 8702.10 - 8702.10 bb 
- 8702.90 bb 
“vehicles for 
the transport 
of 15 or fewer 
persons” 
A maximum import value 
content of 60% and 75% 
for least developing 
countries 
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One can easily appreciate the main difference between the two tables. The import 
value content specified in first table allows for the utilization of a maximum 37.5 % 
imported materials for the finished product to be conferred origin. However, the 
second table allows for a maximum of 60% imported materials to be used in 
producing the good. The 37.5% is not a big deal for the US automaker because they 
already rely on inputs sourced from the US. However, foreign automakers rely on 
imported inputs and such a percentage makes it difficult for them to source inputs 
from outside the North American region. The application of the 60% import value 
content requirement is more flexible. Therefore, adopting the proposed harmonized 
set of rules would allow the Japanese, German and Korean automakers to compete 
fairly with the US automotive industry and no protectionism would take place.  
 The next example concerns the NAFTA protectionist triple transformation rule 
of origin. The next two tables demonstrate the difference between the two cases. 
- The current position in NAFTA: 
      Source: NAFTA 
Chapter  Tariff 
heading 
Product description  Rule of Origin 
61 6105 
6106 
“cotton yarns to 
woven cotton fabrics; 
man-made filament 
yarns to pantyhose; 
wool yarns to woven 
wool fabrics to wool 
apparel.” 
“A change to heading 61.05 through 61.06 
from any other chapter, except from headings 
Nos. 51.06 through 51.13, 52.04 through 
52.12 … provided that the good is both cut 
(or knit to shape) and sewn or otherwise 
assembled in the territory of one or more of 
the NAFTA parties.” 
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-  The NAFTA after implementing the proposal: Two possible scenarios: 
 
  Source: Author’s Analysis 
OR 
   Source: Author’s Analysis 
 
Chapter  Tariff 
heading 
Product description  Rule of Origin 
61 6105 
6106 
“cotton yarns to woven 
cotton fabrics; man-
made filament yarns to 
pantyhose; wool yarns 
to woven wool fabrics 
to wool apparel.” 
A specific manufacturing process 
based on attachment 1; or a maximum 
import content of 60% (or 75% for 
least developed countries) 
Chapter  Tariff 
heading 
Product description  Rule of Origin 
61 6105 
6106 
cotton yarns to woven 
cotton fabrics; man-
made filament yarns to 
pantyhose; wool yarns to 
woven wool fabrics to 
wool apparel. 
A change to heading 61.05 
through 61.06 from any other 
chapter or a maximum import 
content of 60% (or 75% for 
least developed countries) 
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The current rule of origin in the first table relies on a negative standard change 
in tariff classification (“except from headings Nos. 51.06 through 51.13, 52.04 
through 52.12 …”). Furthermore, the specific manufacturing operation that is 
mentioned later on is imposed as a mandatory origin determination criterion. This is 
an extreme case of stringency. However, if the proposed harmonized rules were 
applied, there would be two possible scenarios. The first scenario takes into account 
the technicality and sensitivity of the textile industry. The term “Attachment 1” 
mentioned in the second table refers to the optional manufacturing process based on a 
positive standard. Consequently, a producer could choose either the manufacturing 
process or the value added criterion. The third table utilizes the criterion of change in 
tariff classification that the NAFTA currently uses, but in a positive form, and offers 
an optional value content method to use.  
 If the proposed harmonized rules were applied, one of the above two 
scenarios would occur, depending on the choices eventually made in the negotiations: 
either scenario would be suitable because the rules in each are flexible, could be 
applied to all WTO member countries and would not be manipulated pursuant to local 
interests. The NAFTA triple transformation rule of origin hardly allows for the 
importation of any imported inputs. As mentioned in Chapter II, it was imposed 
mainly to protect the US producers of materials from Asian competitors. This happens 
when textile producers within North America try to satisfy the stringent rule of origin 
by using inputs sourced from the US instead of Asia. The proposed harmonized set of 
rules limits the level of stringency and allows local textile producers to source 
materials from outside North America. This would give the Asian materials a chance 
to enter the US market and compete fairly with the US materials.  
 
130 
 
4.2    Trade Diversion. 
 
Preferential rules of origin may cause trade diversion when a final goods 
producer inside a preferential area tries to satisfy a too stringent rule of origin aiming 
at diverting his importation of inputs from a cheap external source of supply to a 
costly internal one. In other words, the final goods producer who used to import 
inputs from outside the preferential area would not be able to continue its importation 
of inputs from an efficient external source of supply if it is to satisfy the stringent 
preferential rules of origin.  
Without a harmonized set of preferential rules of origin, countries are free to 
impose trade-diverting rules of origin in preferential trade regimes. However, the 
proposed harmonized rules allow the final goods producers in preferential trade areas 
to use imported inputs from external sources of supply. For example the 60% import 
value content requirement allows the final goods producers to use a fixed magnitude 
of inputs imported from anywhere to produce the final the products. Consequently, 
final goods producers would be able to import inputs from external efficient sources 
of supply. This means that a final goods producer inside a preferential trade area 
would still be able to continue importing inputs after the formation of the preferential 
trade area from efficient external sources of supply, leading possibly to no trade 
diversion.  
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The next two tables illustrate the NAFTA ketchup trade-diverting rules of origin 
- The NAFTA now: 
Chapter  Tariff heading Tariff Sub-
heading 
Product 
description  
Rule of Origin 
21 2103 2103.20 Ketchup A change to tariff 
item 2103.20.aa 
from any other 
chapter, except from 
subheading 2002.90 
Source: NAFTA 
- The NAFTA after adopting the proposed harmonized rules 
Chapter  Tariff 
heading 
Tariff 
Sub-
heading 
Product 
description  
Rule of Origin 
21 2103 2103.20 Ketchup A change to tariff-sub-heading 
2103.20 from any other chapter; or a 
maximum import content of 60% (or  
75% for least developing countries) 
Source: Author’s analysis 
According to the first table, a ketchup producer in North America could 
produce ketchup by using any good classified under any chapter except tomato paste 
(sub-heading 2002.90). In other words, for the ketchup to be accorded preferences 
under the NAFTA, North American ketchup producers cannot produce ketchup from 
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imported tomato paste. This exception of using certain goods represents the 
application of the specific manufacturing operation in its negative form.  
As mentioned in Chapter II, the triple transformation rule of origin was 
imposed to divert the importation of tomato paste from Chile to Mexico. This means 
that ketchup producers in North America, who used to import tomato paste from Chile 
before the formation of the NAFTA, would need to import tomato paste from Mexico 
instead to satisfy the rule of origin.  
The second table presents a change in tariff classification rule of origin with 
no negative standard (no exceptions). As a result, ketchup producers could import 
tomato paste from Chile (no exceptions in the tariff classification345
 Preferential rules of origin may be used to achieve political goals. The 
application of preferential rules of origin could depend on the foreign policies of some 
countries. In some cases this could lead to negative results and hinder trade. The 
purpose of preferential rules of origin is to determine whether the good qualifies for 
) and no case of 
trade diversion would occur. It is to be noted, though, that such a rule would be 
optional since a 60% import content requirement could be used as an alternative 
instead. Of course, in that case, the ketchup producers who used to import tomato 
paste from Chile would pick the change in tariff classification rule since the value 
content requirement restricts them to using a fixed magnitude of tomato paste (60% of 
the value of the ketchup).That is why the proposed harmonized rules not only limit 
the level of stringency, but also offer flexibility for producers.  
 
4.3    Political Purposes. 
 
                                                 
345 Manufacturing operation in a negative form. 
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preferential treatment. They were not designed to pursue political aims. The important 
question is whether the proposed harmonized rules would be able to end the use of 
rules of origin for political purposes.   
 In general, adopting a single set of harmonized preferential rules of origin 
means that each country in preferential trade areas would have to apply this set of 
rules on imports coming to its market. Consequently, countries would not be able to 
change or misuse the rules pursuant to their national interests or foreign policies.  
 As discussed in Chapter II, under the qualified industrial zones, for Egyptian 
and Jordanian products to enter the US market on preferential terms, the values of 
Israeli components used to produce the final Egyptian and Jordanian product must be 
not less than 11.7 % and 8 %, respectively, which equal an 88.3% and 92% import 
value content requirement.   
 Qualifying Industrial Zones are cumulation zones. The US clarified that this 
autonomous arrangement was made to support the peace process in the Middle East. 
Even though the mentioned percentages are even more tolerant than the 60% provided 
by the proposed harmonized rules, the utilization of preferences by many Egyptian 
and Jordanian firms was really low, reflecting their rejection to the use of Israeli 
components.  
 Without the qualifying industrial zones, Egyptian and Jordanian firms would not 
be able to export duty-free to the US because whether the goods could be exported 
duty-free would depend on whether US law or bilateral treaties between the USA and 
Egypt/Jordan provided for duty-free trade. Thus, the harmonized proposed rules do 
not offer an alternative way for the Egyptian or Jordanian products to be exported to 
the US duty-free. However, Chapter III suggested the elimination of cumulation zones 
because they may lead to trade diversion. In this political scenario, the elimination of 
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the qualifying industrial cumulation zones could push countries to find other 
alternatives, like forming free trade agreements. That is why negotiations to form a 
free trade area between Egypt and the US are currently taking place as mentioned in 
Chapter II, which would allow Egyptian exporters to export products to the US duty 
free and thus increase the utilization rates of preferences without any political 
restrictions reflected in a value added criterion. 
 
4.4    The Spaghetti Bowl. 
 
 The spaghetti bowl phenomenon is the term used to describe the proliferation of 
rules of origin resulting from the formation of many preferential trade agreements. A 
country may be member of one preferential trade area and a member of another 
preferential trade area imposing different rules of origin. This makes things 
complicated for traders and producers worldwide. The increase in preferential trade 
agreements year by year in the WTO system leads consequently to an increase in the 
number of rules of origin with which traders and producers have to comply when 
seeking preferences. 
 Having one set of harmonized clear, flexible and transparent preferential rules 
of origin would lessen the administrative costs, the complexity and the burdens that 
traders and producers face, regardless of the increase in the number of preferential 
trade agreements.  
 Chapter III, Section 4 presented a figure representing the number of preferential 
trade agreements between the APEC members. If the proposed harmonized rules were 
adopted, there would be a single line in the figure representing the harmonized 
preferential rules of origin, applied not only to the agreements between the APEC 
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members, but to all preferential trade agreements. Thus, the proliferation of different 
rules of origin would cease to exist if the proposal for harmonizing preferential rules 
of origin were adopted. 
 
4.5    All Best Possible Outcomes. 
 
 Preferential rules of origin could be used for protectionist and trade-diverting 
purposes if they are too stringent. The proposed harmonized rules of origin are not too 
tolerant because the change in tariff classification could be applied to products at the 
chapter level, and the 60% import value content and specific manufacturing 
operations could still be stringent when applied to certain products. However, the 
proposal is not too stringent and offers flexibility by offering alternative criteria 
between which a producer would always be able to choose instead of the mandatory 
three rules to be complied with in some current agreements. Moreover, the value 
content requirement is the main method of determining origin. The application of 60% 
import value content to all products is clear and transparent, which will not make 
rules of origin complicated for traders and producers. The specific manufacturing 
operation method is not easy to understand and requires a lot of technicality. That is 
why it would not be a mandatory requirement and all production operations would be 
mentioned in a separate attachment so as to not confuse people who are not experts. In 
summary, adopting the proposed harmonized rules offers flexibility and sets limits to 
the level of stringency. Accordingly, preferential rules of origin would not be so 
stringent as to be used for protectionist and trade-diverting purposes, and trade would 
be facilitated.  
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 Adopting the harmonized set of rules of origin would guarantee the complete 
elimination of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. Having a single set of preferential 
rules of origin applied to all preferential trade regimes would be guaranteed if 
preferential rules of origin were harmonized. 
 It is important to take into account the interests of least developed countries. 
The 75% import value content requirement offers greater flexibility for least 
developed countries. All WTO member countries seem to have agreed on that 
pursuant to the Bali decision on preferential rules of origin for least developed 
countries. As mentioned in Chapter III, WTO member countries finally realized the 
importance of considering the production capacities of least developed countries, so 
the proposal ensures that least developed countries would be supported. 
 Finally, if adopting the proposed harmonized rules would stop countries from 
imposing protectionist preferential rules of origin, foreign competitors would be able 
to compete fairly with local producers. Thus, the proposed harmonized rules could 
ensure the existence of fair competition. Moreover, since adopting the proposal could 
end the imposition of trade-diverting preferential rules of origin as well, once a 
preferential trade area was formed, producers who used to import inputs from 
efficient external sources of supply would still be able to import from the latter. This 
could boost the efficiency of global production and leave local consumers with more 
choices.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Rules of origin are those laws and regulations that are applied to determine the 
country of origin of goods.  A good is conferred origin if it was wholly obtained in the 
exporting country or has undergone a last substantial transformation. A wholly 
obtained good is a good that is produced entirely in the exporting country. It is either 
a natural product or a good produced from natural products, such as minerals 
extracted from the soil or water, live animals, harvested vegetables or goods produced 
there from. The last substantial transformation is the concept used to determine the 
country of origin of the good when more than one country is involved in its 
production, i.e. the importation of inputs from one or more country was needed to 
produce the good. The last substantial transformation is indicated by three possible 
methods: the change in tariff classification, the value added and the specific 
manufacturing processes. 
Upon the importation of a product, each country applies its own rules of origin 
to determine the origin of the product.  That is why rules of origin differ from one 
country to another. Such rules of origin are known as “non-preferential rules of 
origin”.  Non-preferential rules of origin are mainly used for gathering trade statistics, 
government procurement, carrying out origin marking and labeling requirements, and 
the application of trade policy instruments such as anti-dumping duties, 
countervailing measures and quantitative restrictions.  However, there is another type 
of rule of origin called “preferential rules of origin”.  Preferential rules of origin apply 
in preferential trade agreements. They are used to stipulate whether a good is deemed 
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to originate in a preferential trade agreement partner country and consequently 
eligible for preferential tariff treatment.  
Although preferential rules of origin play an increasing role and are an 
important issue in international trade, such rules can be misused. Even though the 
primary purpose of preferential rules of origin is to determine whether a good 
qualifies for preferential treatment, they could be used for protectionist purposes when 
countries use them to protect their own national interests and sensitive goods by 
imposing too stringent preferential rules of origin.  The imposition of too stringent 
preferential rules of origin in preferential trade agreements and the proliferation of 
preferential rules of origin worldwide because of the formation of many preferential 
trade agreements have been hindering international trade. 
The imposition of too stringent rules of origin in preferential trade agreements 
is triggered by two reasons in two different scenarios.  The first scenario is when a 
country uses the preferential tariff as a bait to induce another to form together a 
preferential trade agreement.  Because of such inducement, sometimes the latter 
country does not pay appropriate attention to the rules of origin when concluding the 
trade agreement. As a result, internal final good producers when seeking preferences 
have to comply with the too stringent rules of origin and source inputs from country 
with protectionist intentions (as in the EU GSP example given in Chapter II).The 
second scenario takes place when all members of a preferential trade area agree to 
impose protectionist rules of origin so as to divert trade from an efficient external 
source of supply to an inefficient internal one(as in the NAFTA rules of origin for 
ketchup, for example). Also, sometimes rules of origin are imposed in preferential 
trade agreements to achieve political objectives. 
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Imposing too stringent preferential rules of origin could lead to negative 
results and does not facilitate trade. A too stringent preferential rule of origin could be 
costly when it requires a producer to source expensive inputs from within the trade 
area for producing the final product.  Also, a too stringent preferential rule of origin 
could be complex when it requires the producer to comply with complicated 
production operations within the trade area when producing the final product.  
Moreover, applying too stringent trade-diverting rules of origin affects global 
efficiency negatively and does not leave consumers with appropriate choices since 
trade diversion increases the production of inefficient producers in preferential trade 
areas and shrinks the production of efficient third countries’ producers. Preferential 
rules of origin vary from one preferential trade agreement to another.  Their variation, 
along with their complexity, is considered to be a nightmare for producers and traders 
all over the world and leads to the so called “Spaghetti Bowl” phenomenon. For 
instance, things are complex for a trader whose country is a member of a variety of 
agreements that impose different preferential rules of origin to be complied with. 
Even large enterprises face difficulties when complying with a diversity of 
administrative costs provoked by different agreements. Harmonizing preferential rules 
of origin would eliminate the negative effects outlined previously, thereby helping to 
liberalize international trade. 
This thesis has discussed the negative effects that can result from the misuse of 
preferential rules of origin and given realistic examples showing how the misuse of 
rules of origin in different preferential trade regimes hinders international trade. Also, 
the thesis offered and theoretically tested a proposed harmonized set of preferential 
rules of origin and gave extensive and technical details on that. 
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 According to some views, the prospects for achieving harmonization of 
preferential rules of origin could be adversely affected by the WTO’s failure so far to 
harmonize non-preferential rules of origin. The latter were supposed to have been 
harmonized by 1998, but that deadline has been missed by many years. Moreover, 
there still remain a large number (94) of issues to resolve. The fact that the WTO 
operates through consensus and that it has a large and very diverse membership 
makes it very hard to agree on anything. For example, in 2007 the Committee on 
Rules of Origin faced some difficulties related to some outstanding issues. 
Consequently, the General Council recommended the temporary suspension of work 
on these issues and requested the Committee on Rules of Origin to focus on the 
overall architecture of the product-specific rules of origin.346
 In principle, the harmonization process for non preferential rules of origin is still 
continuing. The initial mandate has been renewed several times and negotiations are 
still open.
Even the Bali agreement 
is now threatened by opposition from India. Furthermore, at the Committee on Rules 
of Origin meeting in September, 2013, Canada, Australia and the US stated that they 
did not believe anymore that the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin 
would be trade facilitating. However, there is still hope for the harmonization of both 
non-preferential and preferential rules of origin.  
347Now, the reference to the negotiating text is G/RO/W/111/Rev.6.348
 WTO members have been able to sit down and agree. The Bali Package 
comprises about 16 decisions.
 
349
                                                 
346 Eighteenth Annual Review of the Implementation and Operation of the Agreement on Rules of 
Origin (11 December 2012) G/RO/73/Corr.1 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=113894,113756,42239,63777,95766,99813,100889,99180,109
525,72172&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&FullTextSearch=> accessed 1 September 2014. 
347 E-mail from Mette Azzam to author (3 September 2013), on file with author. 
348 Draft Consolidated Text of Non-preferential Rules of Origin (n 215). 
349 World Trade Organization, ‘Ministerial Declaration and Decisions’ (n 334). 
 India’s refusal to support the Bali Package is related 
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to only one decision. This means that all WTO member countries agree on the 
application of the 75% import value content requirement for least developed countries, 
which complies with the proposed harmonized set of preferential rules of origin 
discussed in Chapters III and IV. Moreover, the WTO member countries agreed to 
find a permanent solution to India’s issue by 2017, which could lead to the 
implementation of the Bali Package by then. 
  During the meeting of the Committee on Rules of Origin in September, 
2013, the EU, China, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei expressed their interest in 
completing the harmonization of non-preferential rules of origin.350 Also, the EU has 
successfully harmonized and simplified its GSP rules of origin.351
 The spaghetti bowl phenomenon could be the key for the harmonization of 
preferential rules of origin. The number of WTO member countries is currently 
160.
 Moreover, a lot of 
preferential trade agreements rely on the value content requirement for determining 
origin as explained in Chapter III, so there is a good possibility of implementing the 
proposed harmonization of preferential rules of origin. 
 The harmonization of preferential rules of origin should be easier than the 
harmonization of the non-preferential rules because preferential rules of origin are 
used to determine the country of origin of the product to decide whether to accord 
preferences to that product. However, non-preferential rules are used for many 
different purposes including implementing trade policy instruments, labelling 
requirements, gathering trade statistics and government procurement. That is why the 
harmonization of preferential rules of origin would be easier to negotiate. 
352
                                                 
350 World Trade Organization, ‘Members divided on way forward for rules of origin’ (n 333).  
351 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1063/2010 (n 266). 
352 World Trade Organization, ‘Members and Observers’ (n 27). 
 Thus, the number of non-preferential rules of origin notified to the WTO is 
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fixed (160). On the other hand, the number of preferential trade agreements notified to 
the WTO is 585. This proliferation of preferential rules of origin worldwide has led to 
an increase in the administrative burdens that traders face and made a lot of 
companies aware of the need to harmonize preferential rules of origin.353 That is why, 
again, the harmonization of preferential rules of origin is different from non-
preferential rules. The academic literature is more focused on the spaghetti bowl 
phenomenon for the same reason as well. Many economists and professors worldwide 
support the harmonization of preferential rules of origin, such as Antoni 
Estevadeordal, Kati Suominen,354 John J. Barceló III,355 Rajan Sudesh Ratna,356 
Stefano Inama,357 Edwin Vermulst,358 Peter Sutherland359
 Finally, it is expected for the reasons mentioned that the WTO member 
countries would take a decision, sooner or later, to put an end to the increase in the 
complications caused by not only the misuse of preferential rules of origin, but their 
 and others.  
 The proposed harmonized rules of origin take into account the sensitivity of 
some products and at the same time offer alternatives and transparency. With an 
understanding of the political incentives and sensitive industrial sectors, countries 
could somehow reach a compromise. The suggested proposal for harmonizing 
preferential rules of origin might not be perfect for some countries, but it could 
definitely serve the process of harmonization of either non-preferential or preferential 
rules of origin.  
                                                 
353 International Chamber of Commerce (n 340). 
354 Estevadeordal and Suominen, ‘Rules of Origin: A World Map and Trade Effects’ (n 343) 66.  
355 Barceló III (n 300).  
356 Ratna (n 226) 85-88. 
357 Stefano Inama, ‘The Value of the WTO Ministerial Decision on Preferential Rules of Origin for 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs), (2014) Paper Prepared for the UNCTAD Expert Group Meeting 
for Least Developed Countries: Way forward on the WTO Ministerial Decision on preferential rules of 
origin, Geneva, 5 <http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/aldc2014_05_inama_en.pdf.pdf> 
accessed 12 January 2015. 
358 Vermulst, Bourgeois and Waer (n 224) 483-484. 
359 Peter Sutherland and others (n 187) 22.  
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proliferation as well. The WTO member countries should seriously discuss the 
harmonization of preferential rules of origin during the Doha round to overcome the 
negative effects resulting from their proliferation and misuse for the sake of 
international trade facilitation. 
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